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The Clergy Reserves: "Economical Mischiefs" or Sectarian Issue?

ALAN WILSON

PEOPLE HAVE NOT BEEN THE VILLAINS in our accounts of the Canadian past. Like St. George, Canadians have met and conquered mythical or abstracted evils: Manifest Destiny, the Colonial Office, Annexation, the Canadian Shield, the Rockies, and the Clergy Reserves. The Clergy Reserves have been cited as one of the greatest of Canadian rogues. In our treatment of them, moderation and second thoughts have given way before moral certainty, political action, and historical agreement.

"But everybody said," quoth he, "That 'twas a famous victory."

The history of public administration and land endowments seems too prosaic to excite attention or to draw forth any champions but the sober writers of formal dissertations.

The Clergy Reserves have been attacked for their ground plan, their executive direction, their administrative handling, their purpose, and for the protection that they evoked from those so ill-advised as to see some virtue in them. They became a kind of Aunt Sally at which it was considered safe—almost respectable—to throw any sort of abuse. This myth has been perpetuated in the bulk of historical writing, and it almost became written into our economic assumptions¹ despite the successful record of other and similar experiments in land endowment. Durham was most moderate in his day in labelling the Reserves a "grave economical mischief."

In more recent years, R. G. Riddell was the first to undertake the

¹Some qualification of this view, however, has appeared, for example, in W. T. Easterbrook and H. G. J. Aitken, *Canadian Economic History* (Toronto, 1956).

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task of investigating the record of these land reserves, together with those of the Crown.2 He sought to vindicate the principle underlying reserves of land for public purposes. This was a valuable service, but regrettably Riddell did not then carry his investigation the further step of testing this hypothesis in a detailed study. An examination of the surviving records of the Clergy Corporation of Upper Canada of private letters and journals, of the papers of the Canada Company, and, above all, of the extensive remains of the records of the Executive Council and Crown Land Office suggests that even in practice the Clergy Reserves have to some extent been judged too harshly.8 It would be the subject of another study to investigate the purpose of the endowment in the light of contemporary views of the proper relations of Church and state; even here second thoughts might also suggest qualifications of the traditional picture. It is the purpose of this paper to examine some of the ways in which the administration has been attacked, and to enquire to what extent these condemnations were justified.

The Constitutional Act of 1791 established the Clergy Reserves. Charles James Fox, in the Commons, had objected to the suggested proportion of one-seventh of the land as a reservation for the clergy, with a similar amount for the Crown. Pitt ignored the implication that this was an excessive endowment for a pioneer land (if, indeed, this had been in Fox's mind), remarking that he wished to help the clergy into "as respectable a situation as possible." To set aside oneseventh of the land, he asserted, had almost grown into an established custom in England as the proportionate commutation for tithes. A

²R. G. Riddell, "The Policy of Creating Land Reserves in Canada," in Essays in

Canadian History, ed. R. Flenley (Toronto, 1939), 296-317.

3 Among these sources is the Minute Book of the Clergy Corporation for Managing the Clergy Reserves of Upper Canada in the Diocesan Archives, Toronto. Important references to the Clergy Reserves and to factors affecting their development occur frequently in the records of the Canada Company, now housed in the Ontario Archives (P.A.O.). The daily petitions respecting Clergy Reserves heard by the Executive Council are among the most useful sources of information on the the endowment. They are found in the records of the Council's activities both as a land board and as an executive authority in general matters, referred to respectively as: Land Book A-U, Land Book, Province of Canada, A-G; and State Book A-M, State Book, Province of Canada, A-O, in Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), Ottawa, The daily handling of Reserves business by the administrative officers may be found in a daily handling or Reserves Dusiness by the administrative oncers may be round in a variety of sources in Ottawa and Toronto, chiefly: P.A.C., Record Group 5, A1 (the so-called "Upper Canada Sundries"); P.A.C., R.G.7, G1, G5, G7, G12, G17c, G20—despatches and minutes relating to details of management; P.A.C., R.G.19, B5 and C7—fiscal records, sheriffs' accounts, Treasury correspondence, and records of commutation; P.A.O., Crown Land Papers (C.L.P.), a vast collection of miscellaneous records—departmental correspondence, surveyors' notes, agents' reports, inspection returns, printed circulars-contained in over 80 shelves, with Clergy Reserves material widely

4Hansard (London, 1817), XXIX, 112-3.

land endowment was best, but if one-seventh proved too much, provision was made in the bill for later revisions. Some Canadian scholars have argued that the creation of the Clergy Reserves was a prime instrument in fashioning a rigid, Anglican-dominated, new British empire, with Pitt as the principal architect. However, Fox's objection to the plan for the Reserves stemmed from his prediction that Upper Canada might soon be swamped with "American sectaries," whereby the Clergy Reserves scheme would "give to dissenters one-seventh part of all the lands in the province." Pitt did not deny this point; he ignored it, thereby betraying no undue desire for an Anglican empire.

The Pitt government gave to the colonial executive the power to determine the administrative structure of the new endowments. Although Simcoe's actual performance was marred by the complexity of the tasks that confronted him, by quarrels with Dorchester, and by interference and indecision in the Colonial Office, he introduced the outlines of the Upper Canada scheme for the Clergy Reserves and instituted the controversial ground plan by which they were to be laid out. In this work, he was ably assisted by his Surveyor General,

D. W. Smith.

Whatever the weaknesses of the land administration during Smith's tenure of office, they largely resulted from the overwhelming magnitude of the task, and not from the limitations of his talents or devotion. Smith's was a prodigious task. Despite Nonconformist opposition, Simcoe would have delivered the Clergy Reserves into the hands of an Anglican ecclesiastical corporation. His illness and Smith's objections probably halted this project. Keeping the Reserves in government hands may have complicated the state's commitment to the Church of England, but it provided an opportunity for coordinating the province's land policies. In this task, Smith met with many obstacles.

Within a month of accepting office, in July, 1792, he had prepared a report on the best system of laying out the Reserves, conformable to the imperial instructions and the circumstances of the province. This scheme, calling for the reservation of two townships in every seven to be opened up, was not accepted. Simcoe's original land proclamation, based upon Granville's instructions, had stated that the Reserves should "be not severed Tracts each of One Seventh Part of the Township, but such Lots or Farms therein . . . between the other Farms . . . to the Intent that the Lands so to be reserved may be nearly of the like Value with an equal Quantity of the other parts

⁶*Ibid.*, 107–8. ⁶P.A.C., Q279–1, 169.

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to be granted." This clause still left much doubt as to just how the lots were to be laid out, whether in small or in large fractions of the sevenths set aside for Crown and clergy. If it were his own land, Smith argued, he would lay out the whole country in townships six miles square, reserving every fourth and seventh township. That way, he claimed, the settlers would be least disturbed and the reserved areas brought closer to existing settlements. But Smith was assigned the task of preparing another report, conforming more closely to imperial instructions and, presumably, to the current plans maturing in Lower Canada.

This is not the place to trace the details of this controversy further. Suffice it to say that after several attempts to satisfy local needs and imperial preferences, Smith saw his famous "chequered plan" accepted by the imperial government in the spring of 1794. Significantly, however, Smith was not himself satisfied with this arrangement, and continued until his departure from Canada to urge upon the government further changes in the plan.8 At least, one of these, which I have called elsewhere the "parcel system," if modified, might have offered greater advantage. Not the least important of Smith's objections was that put forth in a brilliant report of December 25, 1797, in which he sought to persuade Peter Russell's government to integrate the land policies of the new province. He called attention particularly to the dangers inherent in the promiscuous and extravagant granting of Loyalist land rights. The opportunities for the shrewd speculator, the potential conflicts with other land interests (Crown and Clergy Reserves, Crown lands, Indian lands, private holdings), the need for good communication and for more intensified settlement—all were included in this able survey. The Russell government, however, chose to ignore them all, with serious results for the province for the next fifty years. This report and subsequent events ought to have served to place the problems of the Clergy Reserves in realistic proportion to the whole of the land troubles of the province. Perhaps the conflict was irrepressible, but its worst effects might have been mitigated. Moreover, when trouble came, nearly twenty years had passed and other problems had arisen to intensify the conflict.

The first open attacks on the Clergy Reserves were of a special and peculiar nature. The agitations begun by Robert Nichol and

⁹C.L.P., Reports, Crown Land Department, 1795-9, 177-211.

⁷C.L.P., shelf 77, item 2, Crown and Clergy Reserves Reports, 1794 [1793]–1856, n.p., "[Draft] Report of the Surveyor General respecting such mode of locating the lands intended to be reserved..."

lands intended to be reserved. . . ."

*Details of the proposed modifications are treated fully in G. A. Wilson, "The Political and Administrative History of the Upper Canada Clergy Reserves, 1790–1855," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1959, chapter n.

Robert Gourlay seem to have been less than spontaneous and popular outbursts. Odious popular comparisons with American land systems emerged later, but these earliest attacks bore the imprint of the

professionally injured.

With little industrial or mercantile development before the War of 1812. Upper Canada was still to a large extent dependent on the disposal of lands for the basis of its economy. In that enterprise, the volume of new settlers became the touchstone of prosperity, the polestar of the speculator. The collapse of the "American" market in immigrants amid postwar hatreds, and the limited British colonization programmes of 1815-6, brought the threat of a major economic depression in 1817.10 The land speculator found himself saddled with large holdings and little immediate hope of relief. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that the Assembly directed its attention to a full discussion of the land problem.

Naturally, when land played such a vital role in the economy, many prominent men were land dealers. Some members of the Assembly, including Colonel Robert Nichol, were deeply involved in land speculations and in the trade in Loyalist grants. Two legislative councillors, who had vast private holdings in the southwestern part of the province, were William Dickson and Thomas Clark. Dickson alone, among the speculators, persisted in resisting the official regulations limiting immigration from the United States—a significant departure from the stereotype of a Family Compact grip on the province. Moreover, it was a relative of both Dickson and Clark, Robert Nichol, who

soon precipitated a crisis over the Clergy Reserves.

Nichol, long a close friend of the Governor and an adornment to York and Niagara society, had suffered badly from the war; by 1817, he was in desperate financial straits. Gore and Strachan both charged that Nichol was forced to take the steps he did from his interests in various land deals.11 Probably he was sufficiently desperate to play the devil's advocate for Dickson and Clark, even if he did not believe that he was acting in the best interests of the Niagara District. It is not true, however, as the myth will have it, that he attacked the Clergy Reserves as the root of all evil. Of eleven resolutions on the evils of the province's land and immigration policies, only two dealt specifically with the Clergy Reserves. The majority were aimed at

¹⁰Helen Cowan, "British Emigration to British North America, 1783-1837," in

University of Toronto Studies, IV (2), 1928, 70-5.

11A. G. Doughty and N. Storey, eds. Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1819-1828 (Ottawa, 1935), 2; for a valuable suggestion pertinent to the whole question of the relation between criticism of the Clergy Reserves and private speculative interests, see J. J. Talman, "The Church of England in Upper Canada, 1791–1840," in C.H.R., XV(4), Dec., 1934, 369–70.

the situation most deeply affecting the interests of western land-holders: the political decision to limit American immigration. It was clear that Nichol and his supporters were not opposed to the Clergy Reserves in principle, for they made no move to do more than to limit this "lavish appropriation." These were criticisms natural to land-jobbers in a part of the province where settlement was reaching the secondary stage of development earlier than in the rest of the country, and where, for unique administrative reasons, there existed larger blocks of Clergy Reserves. When Gore abruptly prorogued the Assembly, he was moved to do so from the fear of the passing of "the most obnoxious . . . part of these Resolutions" — the demand for free

American immigration. It was a fourth disenchanted relative of this growing "family compact" of malcontents who next sought to direct public attention to the evils of the system of public lands. Robert Gourlay, visiting with his relative, Thomas Clark, must have heard the grumblings of Clark, Dickson, and Nichol. Gourlay, however, characteristically fell out with them all, proceeding on his own to assail the government for its land and immigration policies. His two-volume Statistical Account of Upper Canada is generally taken to be one of the earliest and most bitter attacks on the Clergy Reserves scheme. Yet, in that respect, it too is a much milder document than its reputation suggests. 18 Based on a questionnaire in thirty-one parts, addressed to the landholders of the province, the Statistical Account began with a set of "Sketches" of the province (not written by Gourlay, but included by him in the finished work) that displayed a tone of mild approval of the Clergy Reserves system, "that will eventually furnish a very ample support . . . at moderate rents."14 Later, in the work, however, Gourlay himself asserted that "no thinking person" could support either Crown or Clergy Reserves. 15 Further, he claimed, his volumes gave the people their first chance to voice their feelings against the Clergy Reserves. In the light of this, it is interesting to review the evidence he presented.

By geographical distribution, Gourlay heard largely from the western parts of the province, and not at all from the Home District. Sixty townships replied, covering seventy townships in fact. Only two questions bore any direct relation to reserved lands: one on the state of the roads, the other calling for suggested improvements. The small proportion of responses naming the Clergy Reserves as a specific

¹²O322, Gore to Bathurst, April 7, 1817.

¹³Robert Gourlay, Statistical Account of Upper Canada (2 vols., London, 1822).

 ¹⁴Ibid., I, Sketch XXV, 231.
 15Ibid., "Explanation of the Maps, Plates, etc.," xi.

abuse is significant. Only 17 townships named them as one cause of hardship, none as the sole source of distress. These seventeen linked the Clergy Reserves with all other forms of reserved lands; nearly half the seventy, however, reported that the land speculator and the absentee landowner were the primary offenders. Other abuses cited were lack of capital or labourers, the condition of the roads, and the effects of the war. Asked specifically about the roads, only one township out of seventy reporting mentioned the Clergy Reserves as a factor contributing to bad roads.

On the basis of his evidence, then, Gourlay had no reason to single out the Clergy Reserves for special condemnation. His informants did not attack the Clergy Reserves as a weapon of special ecclesiastical privilege; they regarded them primarily as one obstacle to economic advancement, and as part of a much larger problem of the use of wasteland in a community steadily moving into the secondary stage

of its development.

None the less, sectarian attacks coincided with these assaults at the end of this decade; before long, the Clergy Reserves were the subject of a widespread attack in which it is difficult to discover either the specific grounds of criticism, or to which of them priority should be given. Nichol, Gourlay, and their associates had done much to stir up a public that had not found cause to attack the Reserves before.

In the years that followed, sectarian interests were not the only ones opposed to the Reserves. It is not unlikely that private speculators were as active behind the scenes as they had been prominent in the Assembly of 1817. Certainly, J. B. Robinson maintained this contention for many years, 16 while other less interested observers gave testimony that "the number of petitions against the Reserves, and number of signers are not in all cases safe data to act upon."17 It could serve certain interests to preserve the myth that the Reserves were a constant obstacle to the province's advancement. The Canada Company's administrators harboured little love for the Clergy Reserves -a prize they had sought to gain in the original contract establishing the Company. At that time, the Company's friends and officials, with a shrewd sense of the market, had proposed an arrangement from which the Reserves would not have benefited unduly. A spirit of conscious rectitude marked the Company's later negotiations over the Clergy Reserves. 18 It poised ready at any signal to absorb large or small packages of Clergy Reserves at advantageous prices, selling

¹⁶P.A.O., Robinson Papers, Robinson to Wilmot Horton, Dec. 24, 1828.

^{170379-1,} George Biggs to Lord Stanley, July 6, 1833, 188.

18Canada Company Papers, "Commissioners' Letters and Reports, 1826-1829," I, Directors to Galt, May 11, 1827; ibid., II, "Directors to Commissioners," Dec. 6, 28, 1831; ibid., April 5, May 17, 1832.

them immediately to strengthen a reputation for not hoarding lands. while the Company's own lands would be withdrawn from sale to fatten and thrive amid a lean market.19 For this public-spirited concern for the Church's interests and those of the province, the Company was still willing as late as the mid-fifties to accept a commission of 5 to 15 per cent. Sir John Colborne spoke many times of the fashionable mode of centring on the Clergy Reserves as "the grievance of the season." Yet, for this recurrence, the Legislative Council was probably as much to blame as the political opportunism of the agitators or the private interest of the speculators. The Clergy Reserves were attacked from all sides, but not least on the grounds that in their operation no steps were taken to adjust the system to the needs of a North American frontier community. This contention, tenable perhaps on the broad grounds of prevailing attitudes to Church-state relations, has been allowed to obscure the substantial administrative adjustments and improvements that were undertaken almost from the start.

The first major overhaul of the machinery of the Reserves was not suggested in the face of public demand, but arose from an imaginative public servant's desire for efficiency and closer control. Prideau Selby, Receiver General, put forth in 1810-11 a ten-point programme with three aims: to establish a Clergy Reserves office; to tighten the controls on rent collections by a system of bondsmen and of regular judicious ejectments for non-payment;20 and to raise rents in accordance with increased values and the costs of the improved machinery of administration. Selby's plan met with some success: the accounts were improved, rents were raised, and the fees system was reorganized to ensure better administration. The War of 1812, coming so soon after the introduction of Selby's plan, probably halted this first cautious reform. Certainly, the financial trials of the Clergy Reserves administration were increased in the interval and neglect of war. Leases and fiscal control suffered, while the problem of the collection of fees deepened. Some sheriffs reported that no rents could be collected in the troubled state of the province for three years.21 An urgent need to realize a firm, consistent policy emerged from the strains of war.

While auditing practices were somewhat improved in the latter part of the second decade, new complications soon developed. In April, 1819, another reasonable increase in rentals was fixed, but in

 ¹⁹Ibid., "Letters to Directors from [Commissioner] Widder, 1839–1845," Dec. 21, 1844.
 ²⁰State Book E, 278 ff.

²¹See, for example, P.A.C., R.G.1, L7, vol. 30, Returns Crown and Clergy Reserves, 1812–1840, Sheriff John Spencer, Newcastle, to William Halton, Dec. 30, 1815.

the Council's desire to appear fair, it once again exempted existing lessees. The result was to institute a third scale of rents-each subdivided into three seven-year periods-for which the sheriffs were responsible in their accounting. The burden of trouble and expense for the civil servant was matched by the confusion in the public mind. Auditing, from the appearance of the surviving records, was now virtually impossible. Other inconsistencies developed from the same motive of seeking to allay criticism by extending dubious privileges to ungrateful lessees. Sheriffs complained that in their attempt to take direct action against those in arrears, they were stayed by the hand of mercy extended by the Lieutenant Governor himself. Fortunately, in 1815, an end was brought to the system of absolving applicants from the payment of fees by absorbing these in the rents of the first three years. Henceforth, this drain on the capital fund of the administration was checked. However, the sheriff's five per cent of collections, surveyor's fees, and all office expenses at York continued to be exacted from the gross income before the capital had been invested in British Consols. Accordingly, substantial sums of investment capital must have been lost through the simple folly of not extracting the fees and expenses from the income earned on the invested gross proceeds.

In 1819, through the vigorous leadership of Dr. Strachan, the Clergy Corporation of Upper Canada was established "for the Superintending, Managing, and Conducting of the Clergy Reserves." While it seemed to be the realization of Simcoe's old plan for ecclesiastical management, the new Corporation was a hybrid. Besides the Anglican clergy of the province, it included on its executive board the Inspector General and Surveyor General, with Stephen Heward, Auditor General of Land Patents, acting as its first secretary. Thus, in the face of growing charges from the Nonconformist public, the government was to some degree committed more openly than ever to support of and co-operation with the Church.

Despite Heward's best efforts in the early years, the Corporation's stewardship was wasteful. The clergy, acting as agents for collections, applications, and mediation, offered the advantages of local administration but failed to realize them. Heward became disillusioned and fell into arrears; his successor, George Markland, was simply inefficient. The executive membership was divisive, compromised the government, proved a sounding-board for John Strachan, and attracted bitter

²⁸P.A.O., U.C. Clergy Corporation Minutes, March 25, 1820.

²²State Book G, April 26, 1819, 57. For full text of the charter see: C.L.P., 57, 2, Orders in Council of Regulations regarding matters connected with the Department of Crown Lands, vol. II, n. 11.

criticism.²⁴ The confusion in jurisdiction was extraordinary: sheriffs, deputy surveyors, Surveyor General, later Commissioners of Crown Lands, local clergy, Corporation officers, and ecclesiastical, provincial, and imperial officials all shirked or shared the duties of management. By 1830, the government was pursuing a retreat from this bitter failure. Hopes were held that the Clergy Reserves management, firmly undertaken by the new Commissioner of Crown Lands, would

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at last offer positive benefit and allay criticism.

Meanwhile, these conflicting administrative and political pressures had been affected by two developments in 1826-7. Authorities in Canada and Great Britain were agreed that the leasing system, as it existed, functioned too slowly and awkwardly to alleviate the pressures of public complaint against the Crown and Clergy Reserveswhatever the justice of these claims. As part of the problem of wastelands, the Reserves might be sold in whole or in part. Three possibilities lay before the administrators of the Clergy Reserves: the Clergy Corporation might be empowered to add sales to their power over leasing; a private corporation might be permitted to buy those not already under lease; or the government might itself sell them. The full pressure of the Clergy Corporation, of John Strachan, of the powerful Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and of friends of the Church on both sides of the Atlantic set about to frustrate the last two possibilities. Armies of friends and opponents of the Church vied in prayer and clashed in debate over the issue. Religious, administrative, economic, and political motives and criticisms were hopelessly entangled. When the proposed Canada Land Company, a private venture in speculation and colonization, sought to absorb all or a part of the Crown and Clergy Reserves, prayers flew up from all sides that the Company's ambitions would be crowned with success or that the Company should be scattered before the winds of the Church's wrath. The Crown Reserves were sold readily to the Company, but the Clergy Reserves enjoyed the special protection of the British Parliament, where the Church's influence was strong and political perils grave. When the Clergy Reserves emerged intact from the battle with the Canada Company, appearing more than ever to be in the embrace of the Church's friends, cries of shame arose. Purchase of the Crown Reserves released a substantial portion of the government's locked-up lands, but it threw public complaint wholly upon the Clergy Reserves—an undeserved fate in the circumstances.

²⁴See, for example, the evidence of a dispute between Strachan and Bishop Mountain over the proper relations of church and state, in which Strachan enlisted the support of the Upper Canada Clergy Corporation, U. C. Clergy Corporation Minutes, Nov. 6, 1823; P.A.C., R.G.5, A1, 63, U.C. Sundries, Mountain to Maitland, Dec. 30,

1823; ibid., 64, Rev. Robert Addison to Maitland, Feb. 13, 1824.

Further, from this battle John Strachan emerged with extravagant claims of his church's right to administer and to enjoy exclusively the fruits of the Reserves.25

This agitation—amid other circumstances—prompted public enquiries in Britain and Canada, which drew further attention to the Reserves as instruments of religious privilege, and pointed to their practical mischief. As to the latter charge, the evidence given to the British House of Commons Canada Committee was misleading.26 Of the nineteen witnesses, excepting Wilmot Horton and James Stephen, only two could be said to have had a long and direct association with the affairs of Upper Canada. Questions were often phrased to include both provinces, while responses came from those familiar only with Lower Canada. Large blocks of Clergy Reserves were represented as being the worst impediments to the building of roads, but these were much more common in Lower Canada. In Upper Canada, not even Gourlay's enquiry had brought out this distinction, perhaps for the good reason that the government had often taken steps to open up such areas.27 No comparable programme had been instituted in Lower Canada, while the Clergy Corporation of Upper Canada had brought pressure to bear upon the government to that end. Significantly, two of the chief witnesses were directors of the newly-formed Canada Company, still smarting from the failure to obtain the Clergy Reserves for their enterprise; their view of the Clergy Reserves would be, to say the least, peculiar. The result was a rather general, almost woolly, approach to the problems of the Clergy Reserves and of religious privilege in Canada. Curiously, it was a Canada Company director, Simon McGillivray, who alone drew the distinction between the Clergy Reserves as "an actual personal grievance . . . operating upon an individual" and the general irritation generated by rival denominational claimants, or by groups seeking large-scale improve-ments. "The Clergy Reserves," he observed, "take away no man's property, they form an impediment to improvement, but that will be removed by disposing of them." The Canada Committee went on record as condemning the Reserves as leading obstructions to the province's advancement. To correct this situation they favoured sales, while

²⁵The two most celebrated expressions of this campaign, of course, were Strachan's funeral sermon on the death of Bishop Mountain, and the extraordinarily inept "Ecclesiastical Chart" of the province released by him in England.

28This, of course, is the famous "Report from the Select Committee on the Civil Government of Canada." The Canadian Assembly's committee was that led by Marshall

Spring Bidwell in 1829.

²⁷The Upper Canada Executive Council failed, when asked by the Clergy Corporation in 1820, to adopt this principle generally and to set aside funds for such a programme. None the less, in practice, the Council was not far off from fulfilling the Corporation's

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strong recommendations were voiced calling for the use of part of the funds to improve the condition of the unsold balance of Reserves. But lack of direction and persistent inconsistency in imperial land and emigration policies had contributed much in the past to the unsatisfactory state of things in Canada. By neglecting to make this clear, the Committee did an injustice to the administrators in Canada, who groped blindly for principles of their own, and regularly had to take

into account new suggestions from Great Britain.

One such suggestion resulted in the second of the important developments of 1826-7. This was the naming by the imperial government of a Commissioner of Crown Lands, whose duties should include sales of Clergy Reserves under a new Sales and Improvement Act of 1827.2 Peter Robinson, the successful applicant, was not without talents, but the imperial commission and instructions multiplied his duties and confused his responsibilities to such an extent that his personal weaknesses fed on the uncertainty.29 Neither imperial nor colonial authorities pressed him to effect the limited improvements on vacant Reserves provided for in the 1827 Act. Costly inspections of individual Reserves, frequent delays, and misleading sales statistics marked his administration. These developments, and inept management by the Clergy Corporation, provided a discouraging picture before 1832. In subsequent years, however, the administrative arrangements entered on a steady, if gradual, plane of improvement which did not terminate until the experiment was abandoned in 1854.

During the first four years of the new programme, until the waning of the first great tide of immigration in 1832, sales advanced swiftly: 130,000 acres at an average of 13/-5d. an acre. 30 The outcry against "economic obstacles" died down in the rush to buy. Farmers on contiguous lots bought cheerfully to confirm improvements on previously leased lots, or to ensure a good future for their sons. The Canada Company, however, tried to stir up dissension on the grounds that the Clergy sales had pushed its lands off the market, 31 while the imperial government grew alarmed at the threat to sales of ordinary Crown lands. 32 The Clergy Reserves seemed fated to displease somebody at every stage of their history. None the less, sales persisted steadily throughout the thirties, offering eloquent testimony to the demand

287 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 62.

30Q377-1, Colborne to Goderich, Jan. 16, 1833, 187.

42/393, 439.

²⁰ See, for example, Robinson's commission, cited in J. E. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service; An Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1841-1867 (Toronto, 1955).

³¹Canada Company Papers, I.1, a, "Correspondence with His Majesty's Government. . .," Price to Hay, Oct. 29, 1829, 88-9.

32Q358-3, P. Robinson to Hay, Jan. 22, 1831, 524, and Hay's endorsation in C.O.

for the Reserves and ample proof of their ready accessibility. Unfortunately, those who had formerly leased, and who now sought to protect an investment by purchase, proved to be those who had kept up regular payments in the past. Thus, the bulk of the remaining lessees were those with the poorest credit records. Such people came most often into conflict with the vestigial Clergy Corporation Office, run by the government after 1835 but still associated in the public mind with the aggressive church of Archdeacon Strachan. The result

was to embitter further the Clergy Reserves controversy.

Despite these serious limitations, individuals and the public at large were coming to have appreciably fewer reasons for complaint. With steadily increasing sales and frequent appeals from land agents for arbitration in private and public disputes arising out of the Reserves, the Council was forced to attend to the Clergy Reserves almost continually on an administrative, no less than on a political and executive, level. The problem was a part of the Council's general crisis over land business, one of the most persistent and crucial in the pre-Rebellion era. The wonder is that the Council attended so thoroughly to Clergy Reserves affairs.

The Council had from the first dealt conscientiously and justly with private problems arising from the Reserves. Although in November, 1835, it determined to put to auction unoccupied Clergy Reserves, 38 it continued to entertain appeals from squatters with large improvements who believed themselves to have a just claim to purchase, and from lessees wishing to convert to freehold. In choosing which lots should be auctioned, the Commissioner of Crown Lands was required by the 1827 Act to name those lots that would best relieve the pressure of criticism. Many were chosen on the recommendation of the Deputy Surveyors, who were aware of local needs, but occasionally the Council was appealed to directly by a settler anxious to have the lot of his choice put up for auction at a time when he could best afford to buy.34

Private arrangements for the purchase of the balance of terms of leasehold, or for the alienation of parts of a leased lot, were often left unreported to the authorities. Consequently, the public records might be at variance with the petitioner's memory. Improper descriptions of land and incorrect claims of the original occupants would plague the Council—pertinent details in official records, but often overlooked by uninformed farmers anxious to conclude a bargain. In arranging conversions from leasehold, the Council had to exercise special caution. The slightest irregularity in documentation or claim was passed on

88Land Book R, Nov. 19, 1835, 202-3.

³⁴See, for example, petition of Tice, Caistor, Land Book S, Oct. 27, 1836, 236.

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from the administrative officers to the Executive Council in special land session. As a general rule, and partly in order to reserve a right of scrutinizing such uncertain claims, the Council refused to acknowledge that conversion was a *legal* right. Conversion was kept in the shadowy world of privilege, or, in the Council's words, "a usage of Government in favour of lessees," subject to the Council's careful review of all the circumstances of the case. This caution was hailed as a great abuse, breeding uncertainty in the mind of the lessee. Judged by a review of hundreds of similar cases in the Land Books, however, the practice was tedious, thorough, and necessary.

The task of evaluating the lots for private sale and of fixing township averages fell to the Deputy Surveyor. After 1835, the introduction of a 10/- per acre floor price did not ease the burden of conciliar review. The Council regarded the figure as literally a "floor," permitting lots to be sold at cellar rates as low as 3/- 9d.; these it subjected to a special scrutiny, only occasionally rejecting the Surveyor's evaluation as too low. Marginal adjustments in acreage for individual lots were not normally entertained, although occasionally errors in early surveys were later equitably adjusted. Throughout the history of the experiment, one of the continuing cares of Council was to arrange exchanges of Clergy Reserves for those who had located in error or found the lot to their dissatisfaction. Compensation was usually found elsewhere, if the exchange of the suggested lots was deemed impossible.³⁶ Further examples of individual petitions might be cited, but it must be clear that the opportunities of discrediting the Reserves system by displeasing individual petitioners stretched almost to infinity. No one thought to acknowledge the Council's patience and general success in handling nearly 2,000 land petitions annually—the Clergy Reserves accounting for fully two-thirds of these at times—including one-acre adjustments for unauthorized squatters.

Public interests and those of private business were also given consideration. To prevent the dangers of speculation, large blocks of Reserves were not alienated. Similarly, from the beginning, the administrators were careful to protect the proposed routes of public projects: military roads, trunk roads, roads through blocks of Reserves.³⁷ It is significant that in a survey of every petition affecting

³⁵See case of L. and M. Hyde, Land Book U, Feb. 27, 1840, 208–9. The application of this principle is best illustrated in this case, where, after losing his lot on the execution of his creditors, the original lessee was ruled to have lost the "favour" of conversion. Thus, the conversion was awarded to the Hydes as occupants at the expiry date.

³⁶Examples of these arrangements abound in the records of the Council, but extensive reference here would be impossible.

³⁷See examples in the cases of the School Reserves, 1809. Land Book F, 224–5, 228; the Mohawk Tract and Long Woods, Land Book K, 472; the Talbot Road, Land Book K, 28; the Penetanguishene Road and Yonge Street, *ibid.*, 340; the road leading to the Huron Tract, Land Book L, 386.

the Clergy Reserves that reached the Executive Council between 1791 and 1855, of the surviving records of the Crown Lands Office, and of a sampling of the records of Quarter Sessions for several districts over a wide range of years, fewer than half a dozen requests for the transfer of Reserves as obstructions to roads could be found. All were readily acquiesced in by Council. Canals and other waterways were also given special treatment. Unleased Reserves along the Rideau Canal route, for example, were rigidly excluded from sale during the period of construction lest unforeseen losses should be sustained from flooding, or changes in route be effected.88 Ironically, by thus protecting new avenues of commerce, the Council may have contributed to the clamour against the "unavailable" Clergy Reserves. From the beginning, first mill sites in any district were not disturbed by Clergy Reserves, for the Reserves were located elsewhere. Second mills might be erected on reserved land, but the owners were protected by relaxed leasing and sales terms. The Council also kept open for the millers any Reserves threatened by flooding from the mill-pond or that might prove useful as wood lots. Similar consideration was given in the case of quarries, some of these being released in the late thirties from the restrictions of the chequered plan.89

Little was done about timber-cutting and other depredations on Clergy Reserves, or indeed on any class of public land in the period before the Rebellion. The question was a difficult one, being related to other important aspects of administration, such as the collection of arrears of rent. Outright squatters and timber pirates were not the only offenders; those who paid only the first instalment of rent or purchase price in hopes of extracting the subsequent payments by ruthless timber mining were the largest group responsible for this great waste. In this matter, the folly of lax administration was not confined to the Reserves, but under the system of leasing, the Clergy Reserves were

perhaps hardest hit.

The problem of squatting was never adequately settled. Baines, the Clergy Corporation's secretary, reported in 1835 that "the greater proportion of the valuable Clergy Reserves in the Johnstown District and Eastern District [had] been occupied for many years without authority."40 Such firmness in this matter as came in the thirties was badly conceived and unwisely administered. It arose in the handling of squatters' claims from reservations of rectory lands. The equity

40Land Book R, 109.

⁸⁸See, for example, petition of Brown et al., Raleigh, Land Book R, June 2, 1826,

³⁸Q 287-1, Elmsley to Hunter, July 25, 1800, 167. Typical cases may be found in Land Book Q, 332; Land Book S, 368; Land Book U, 252; Land Book T, 192. Concerning quarries, see for example C.L.P., "Letters, Outgoing, C.C.L. to Civil Secretary, etc.," Robinson to Rowan, March 12, 1835.

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demonstrated by the Council in clergy sevenths business broke down in despatching rectories affairs. Indeed, as Durham observed a endowing the rectories in 1836 changed the nature of the Clergy Reserves conflict: it could no longer continue as a difficult but not impossible situation. Political manipulations had identified the question with the constitutional struggle over executive responsibility. The Rectories Crisis—by seeming to foster Anglican exclusivist claims to the Reserves-intensified this battle, and raised a second constitutional issue, Establishment. The significance of the dispossessions of squatters for the sake of the rectories did not lie in their number, for there were not many; their real importance lay in the impolitic way in which the dispossessions were passed by the Council.42 The determination of certain Anglican clergy, certain inaccuracies in the land records of the vestigial Clergy Corporation, and the well-calculated Council reports on individual cases as drawn up by John Strachan did little to relieve public distrust.48 The reputation of the Clergy Reserves was badly soiled by this development.

In the Durham Report, the administration of Upper Canada's Clergy Reserves was not singled out for any special reproof: it shared the general criticisms directed against the land and fiscal business of a public service that was riddled with inconsistencies and faulty

arrangements.44

During the early Sydenham era, R. B. Sullivan, acting as president of the Committees of Council, played a useful role in furthering reforms in the administration of the Clergy Reserves. Sullivan's qualifications stemmed in part from an able report made earlier while he was still Commissioner of Crown Lands. This report of March, 1837, had admitted the limitations of the endowment scheme and had deplored the general error by which the opponents of the Reserves had succeeded in equating one-seventh of the wild lands with one-seventh of the total economy. If this fallacy could not be communicated to the public, then for political reasons he recognized the necessity of selling the remaining sevenths as quickly as possible and of improving the administration in the interests of greater returns.

But Sullivan argued that in fact the Reserves were now proving a positive benefit to the province. He complained that the assumption

⁴¹C. P. Lucas, ed. Lord Durham's Report on the Affairs of British North America (3 vols., Oxford, 1912), II, 176-7.

⁴²See for example Land Book Q, 332; Land Book S, 368 and 388; Land Book T, 192 and 626.

⁴⁸See, for example, account of Arnot case, in Q387-1, Colborne to Glenelg, Sept. 3, 1835; Land Book R, 142.

⁴⁴Lucas, ed. Durham's Report, 103-4.

⁴⁵Q396-4, Sullivan to Joseph, Secretary, March 28, 1837, 577-96.

of the Crown Reserves by the Canada Company had deprived the government of nearly "all its land in the more settled areas of the province." Only the Clergy Reserves remained in those districts that were not simply wilderness. These lands, he noted, were much sought after: they sold well, increased population, and were the means of intensifying settlement. This last point is especially interesting because it is precisely the reverse of the claim made by the Canada Committee a decade earlier. Through the thirties, it seems, the Clergy Reserves had undergone a significant change in their relationship to other lands in the province, and were now emerging as assets in some significant ways. Lessees, Sullivan added, had now become more than ever anxious to buy,

. . . as the opportunity of selling their improvements to newcomers becomes more frequent and there cannot be anything more desirable than that Emigrants should have an opportunity of purchasing at a moderate rate farms already partially improved or that the tenants who have not had the means of purchasing land unless by the sale of these improvements, should be enabled to raise funds by which they can become independent land-holders in the back settlements.⁴⁶

Thus, the Clergy Reserves had become a means whereby the old order gave way to new, and improved itself in the bargain. Older settlers converted the fruits of their labour to liquid capital before moving on; newcomers with modest means avoided unfamiliar perils and demands in the first frontier. By the thirties, the Clergy Reserves had become a vital factor in the continuum of land settlement in Upper Canada. They offered a source of capital, almost a vital currency, linking the security and ambition of the fresh immigrant with

the experience and enterprise of the old pioneer.

Under Sydenham new reforms in the administration of the Reserves were introduced, but they were mixed blessings. Costly errors resulted, and executive discord and political opposition arose. None the less, a useful beginning was made and further reforms followed throughout the forties. For example, in 1837, R. B. Sullivan and W. H. Draper had advocated certain fiscal changes in the Reserves administration.⁴⁷ Under the direction of William Morris and Francis Hincks in the forties these reforms were achieved. They resulted in improved handling of the proceeds from Reserves returns invested in England, and later led to the proposal that these investments should be transferred from British Consols to higher-paying Canadian debentures. Glenelg, Grey, Arthur, and Sydenham approved, seeing also the advantage to public works projects in Canada. Lack of faith in

⁴⁷Q396-4, Sullivan to Joseph, March 28, 1837, 577-96; Q401-1, Draper to Glenelg, June 22, 1837, 220-9.

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Canadian administrative efficiency and solvency united Lord Stanley, James Stephen, the Treasury officials, Strachan, J. B. Robinson, and the S.P.G. The battle raged in official correspondence for nearly a decade, but by 1847, with the firm backing of Bagot and Elgin, the Canadian officials won.⁴⁸ Transferring the Reserves fund to Canadian debentures released a large amount of new capital just at the beginning of the speculative fifties. The struggle to achieve this transfer of resources and responsibilities bore a direct relation to the struggle for Responsible Government. Indeed, in these fiscal relations, the Reserves prompted a victory for Canadian responsible administration at a critical time in colonial development.

Meanwhile, during the forties under prodding from John Strachan and others, the costs of administering the Reserves were greatly reduced. Salary schedules were effectively trimmed with no reduction in efficiency. The more professionally administered Crown Lands Office relieved the Council of many of the worst burdens of supervision of the Reserves. None the less, the Council remained a conscientious board of appeal, reducing prices set by the land officers to match other competition. Grave "economical mischiefs" and irresponsible administration did not characterize the Clergy Reserves experiment in its last years. Sales were steady, prices reasonable and high, and criticism, other than that on political and sectarian grounds, far reduced.

The announcement in 1848 that limited Clergy funds were available to all denominations was important for two reasons. ⁵⁰ It suggested that the improved administrative procedures and fiscal arrangements were succeeding—a partial vindication of the endowment in its later years. On the other hand, it rallied the forces of voluntarism to battle for their principles, and the radical reformers to compete for their votes. Bound by law to obtain legislative approval in England for adjustments in the 1840 Clergy Reserves Act, Canadian nationalists, voluntarists, secularizationists, and discontented Reserves beneficiaries found that the winning of Responsible Government emphasized the hiatus existing between Canada's legislative ambition and her competence to settle the Reserves issue.

The decline of the moderates in the ranks of the Reformers, and the ascendancy of the moderates among the Conservatives, paved the way for judicious compromises. The principle of state endowments

⁴⁸It would be impossible to list the dozens of pertinent letters. Many can be found in P.A.C., Department of Finance Papers, R.G.19, C7, 1; others are scattered through the despatches of the Governors General, R.G.7, G12, vols. 62–5; memos in C.O. 42 are particularly valuable here.

⁴⁹Land Book, Province of Canada, C, 549. ⁶⁰Canada Gazette, Jan. 29, 1848.

for religion was nominally repudiated and indirectly maintained through an elaborate system of actuarial compensations to existing incumbents, in the Clergy Reserves Act of 1854. The principle of land endowments was never considered. Ironically, social, political, and constitutional tensions were relieved at a time when the Clergy Reserves system was beginning to fulfil its ancient promise.

Undoubtedly, the Crown and Clergy Reserves assumed too large a proportion of the lands of a frontier province. Conflicts with other land schemes—private and public—were inevitable in view of the widespread speculation in lands. The ground plan of the Reserves might have been improved, but extensive changes in the current practices of private and governmental speculation would have remained necessary. Moreover, imperial interference would have to have been curtailed.

Despite serious and usually successful efforts to accommodate the Clergy Reserves to public needs for better communication and more intensified settlement, the government could not avoid censure or blunders. Private injury was perhaps slight. The worst abuse was certainly the sometimes heavy concentration of Reserves in back concessions, to which front reservations had been reassigned to

facilitate prior development of the front.

Administrative weaknesses existed, but after 1830 they were being persistently attacked. By that decade, the advent of sales and the further progress of some areas in the secondary stage of their development relieved some of the worst pressures resulting partially from the Reserves and like lands. Indeed, R. B. Sullivan's report of March, 1837, suggests that the Reserves had become an effective instrument

in furthering new settlement and in improving old.

The chief weakness of the Reserves system as an experiment in land endowment for a public object lay in the purpose to which they were devoted and in the failure to re-examine that purpose responsibly. The Clergy Reserves became, for reasons not connected with their economic value, the symbolic centre of a bitter politico-religious controversy. In several ways, the administration of the Reserves had kept abreast of the movement for Responsible Government, particularly as it affected the public service and administrative improvement. During two-thirds of the period of public controversy, the administration of the Reserves showed signs of steady improvement, even of public usefulness. The last period of their history, following the Sydenham régime, saw the virtual end of all but sectarian and secular arguments against them. These, however, were enough to bring an experiment of some merit to an end.

Draper Conservatism and Responsible Government in the Canadas, 1836–1847

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GEORGE METCALF

IN THE STUDY OF CANADIAN HISTORY, there is possibly no period which has received as much attention as the decade of the eighteen-forties. Yet it is surprising how much of this era remains unknown. The only comprehensive work on the political history of the time is still J. C. Dent's The Last Forty Years, published in 1881, a book which, valuable though it is, is thoroughly biased and is indeed a classic example of the whig interpretation in Canadian history. Reasons for this anomaly are not difficult to find. The question of overriding importance in the period is the achievement of Responsible Government, and it is on this point alone that most historians have focussed their interest. They have also followed Dent's bias and portrayed the story almost exclusively as that of the struggle and victory of the Baldwin-LaFontaine Reformers.

Such historical writing, however, carries within it grave deficiencies. It leads naturally to a distortion whereby those who seem to have been in any way opposed to the principle of Responsible Government are looked upon as misguided obstructionists or are virtually ignored. The ministry of Moderates which governed the United Province from February of 1841 until September of 1842 has rarely been described except in terms of how the Reformers eventually broke into it; while the Conservative ministry of 1844 to 1847 is treated as though it were a sort of backwater where nothing at all happened until the arrival of Lord Elgin. But there are few important events that have been completely the result of the victory of one party and have been in no way modified by those who opposed them. This is no less true of the story of the Canadas in the eighteen-forties.

One of the chief casualties of the whig interpretation has been

William Henry Draper. Indeed he has been so long ignored that it comes as something of a surprise to discover that he held the position of Attorney General—the highest to which he could aspire—for seven of the ten crucial years following 1839. Yet he was scarcely a colourless figure and certainly not a cypher. Commanding in physical appearance and persuasively eloquent, Draper made his personality felt strongly in the colony. Nor, despite his Family Compact background, was he by any means the reactionary he has often been depicted. His political career was marked by two very definite aims -the maintenance of the British connection, without which he feared Canada must be absorbed into the United States, and the formation of a moderate and respectable Conservative party which would command the support of the electorate. When the Attorney General finally quitted politics in 1847, it was difficult to see how much he had contributed to either of these ends, Nevertheless, in clearer perspective, his career was not the failure he possibly thought it, and is worthy of further scrutiny.

The son of an English clergyman, William Henry Draper ran away to sea at the age of sixteen.1 Some three years later, in 1820, he arrived in Upper Canada and settled in Port Hope as a schoolteacher. Persuaded by a local barrister to enter the field of law, he served his apprenticeship in the office of George Strange Boulton, Here Draper first gained entry to the gracious society of the Family Compact and was soon befriended by the Attorney General of the province, John Beverly Robinson. Upon graduation, he entered a legal partnership with Christopher Hagerman, Robinson's political heir apparent. His courtroom eloquence gained Draper a wide reputation in the province -as well as the nickname of "sweet William"-and he early broke lances with men of the stature of John Rolph and William Lyon

Mackenzie.2

In the spring of 1836, however, Draper was reluctantly persuaded to seek a seat in the House of Assembly on the insistence of his benefactor, John Beverly Robinson. Disliking politics, Draper entered the field only because it seemed the surest route to the judicial preferment which was the real end of his ambitions. Duly elected for Toronto, the young lawyer took his place in a thoroughly congenial and Tory House. The path now seemed clear for him to follow the

¹For information on Draper's early life see D. B. Read, Lives of the Judges of Upper Canada and Ontario (Toronto, 1888), 222-4, and obituaries appearing in the Toronto

newspapers, Nov. 3, 1877.

Toronto Public Library (T.P.L.), "An account of a prosecution . . . embracing the speeches of John Rolph, esquire, and W. H. Draper, esquire, and the judge's charge to the jury with notes"; Ontario, Department of Public Records and Archives (P.A.O.), O'Brien Journal, Journal #49, Jan. 19, 1831.

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footsteps of the Boultons, Robinsons, Allans, and Hagermans in correct Family Compact fashion. The young politician was soon appointed to the Executive Council by Lieutenant Governor Head, and in January of 1837 was made Solicitor General. In the same year he travelled to Britain as Head's personal representative during the acute financial crisis that was then threatening the colony.3 In December, however, Mackenzie's rebellion radically altered all existing circumstancesincluding the seemingly assured future of the new Solicitor General The collapse of the rebellion was followed by the coming of Lord Durham, the subsequent publication of the famous Report, and finally by the arrival of Charles Poulett Thomson as Governor General with instructions to effect a union of Upper and Lower Canada. It was during the administration of Poulett Thomson, later Lord Sydenham. that the subsequent course of Draper's political career was determined. At the same time this was probably the most acutely painful period in a political life notable for its series of awkward incidents. Following as he did in Thomson's wake, he became bitterly separated from his old friends and adherents, but at the same time did not gain the approbation of the Governor General.

The question of the Union itself caused serious difficulties for Draper. He had championed the idea against Hagerman and the Tories even before Thomson's arrival, but had pledged himself to the Cartwright Resolutions which assured the predominance of Upper Canada. Thomson was determined both to force through the Union at all costs and to see that it was accompanied by no such conditions. A remarkably confused session followed, but in the end, the Governor as usual gained a complete victory. The Cartwright Resolutions were reduced to ineffective "recommendations," and the Union was passed largely by Reform support. But the Tories, particularly those of the political shade of Archdeacon John Strachan, never forgave Draper for his capitulation on the issue, and the enmity was not allowed to die. Although Draper was profoundly disturbed by the break with his

These negotiations were actually unsuccessful and extremely awkward for Draper. For some reason the Colonial Office preferred to deal with John Henry Dunn, the Upper Canadian Receiver General, who had gone to Britain against Head's wishes. For the correspondence on this issue, see Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), Q series, vols. 396–402.

There were fourteen Resolutions in all, and the major points included: that the seat of government should be in Upper Canada; that in the united Legislative Assembly Upper Canada should keep its present representation while that of Lower Canada should be limited to fifty; that only the English language should be spoken in the United Legislature; that the debt of both provinces should be charged to the United Province; and that that portion of Lower Canada comprising the areas of Gaspé, Bonaventure, and Rimouski should be annexed to New Brunswick.

⁵C. R. Sanderson, ed., The Arthur Papers. II. Jan. 1839-Mar. 1840 (Toronto, 1957), 342, item 1034. friends, supporters, and benefactors, he was granted little time to ponder the situation. The Governor General was a young man in a hurry, and those who supported or opposed him were alike caught up or cast aside in the onward rush of his policies. Although Lord Sydenham's bill to settle the Clergy Reserves was one which Draper could honestly support, his advocation of it drove a further wedge between himself and the Tories. Even his advancement came at the expense of his friends—poor Christopher Hagerman was literally harried out of the political field by the Governor, and Draper suc-

ceeded as Attorney General.

Sydenham's next moves were complex and confused, but as successful as ever. An unashamedly chequered Executive Council was formed consisting of both reactionary and reasonable Tories, ultra and moderate Reformers, and "non-political" members. Robert Baldwin was lured in only to be ejected, but the Governor kept two of the moderate Reformers—John Henry Dunn and Samuel Bealy Harrison. The ensuing elections were another stunning success for the administration. Although LaFontaine's French block was still committed to Baldwin, in Upper Canada both Reformers and Tories were nearly annihilated. A new and temporarily dominant party had emerged—the Sydenhamites. Dissatisfied with all the old political groups Sydenham had formed a new Moderate party. Draper was given the role of leading the conservative wing of this block, while the Provincial Secretary, Samuel Harrison, was to control the liberal section. In point of fact, however, Draper's position was becoming more and more isolated. Disliked by both Tories and Reformers, he was the Governor General's man. But Sydenham gave him no real support. Possibly annoyed at what he considered Draper's confusion over the Cartwright Resolutions, Sydenham merely tolerated his Attorney General. His real confidence was placed in the enigmatic Provincial Secretary. Affable on the surface, sheer ice beneath, Samuel Harrison was a calculating, practical, liberal of the Governor General's own stamp. He and Draper were ostensibly joint leaders, yet by the autumn of 1841, the Secretary was the acknowledged spokesman for the Government in the House of Assembly.

Soon the Attorney General was pushed still further into the wings. In September Baldwin moved the resolutions for Responsible Government—the question most likely to destroy Harrison's uncertain sway over the liberal Moderates. The Secretary and Sydenham neatly countered this by passing an alternative set of resolutions which were full of fine sounding liberal sentiment, but were deliberately vague

⁶For Sydenham's opinion of Draper and Harrison respectively, see P. Knaplund, Letters from Lord Sydenham to Lord John Russell (London, 1931), 47-8; 146.

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and open to several interpretations.7 Nevertheless, the Reformers hailed them as the Magna Carta of Responsible Government, and this coupled with the Governor's decision to bring Francis Hincks into the Council, left Draper deeply shaken. Supposedly Sydenham's chief adviser, he had scarcely been consulted about these moves. Eventually he swallowed hard and voted for the Harrison Resolutions, but decided he could not continue in office if Hincks were to come in. Sydenham. however, refused to accept Draper's resignation,8 and the Governor's death on the following day temporarily shelved the problem.

The arrival of Sir Charles Bagot in January, 1841, provided Draper with the opportunity of beginning anew. He soon gained the firm confidence of the new Governor, who, unlike Sydenham, was a man of his own temperament and convictions. As a result the Attorney General became in fact as well as in theory the leader of the Executive Council, while the icy Harrison faded more into the background. At the same time, although separated from both Tories and Reformers. Draper was not entirely isolated in the province. Although an Anglican, the stand he had taken earlier on the thorny problems of the Clergy Reserves and the endowment of King's College had earned him the heartfelt gratitude of the Wesleyan Methodists.9 Throughout Draper's career, the influential pen of Egerton Ryerson was to be his strongest and most consistent supporter. Moreover the Attorney General had also gained the approbation of many political moderates, although his inability ever to organize properly this segment of the population was perhaps his greatest failure.

Although the important events of Sir Charles Bagot's administration are extremely well known, a full appreciation has never been given to the part played by Draper and the Executive Council as a whole. The first problem that the Attorney General and the Governor faced was that of the general weakness of the Government, Robert Baldwin had definitely gained influence in the vital centre portion of the Moderates, and now possessed a very good prospect, with the French alliance, of overthrowing the administration. Equally disturbing was the alternative of a Tory-French rapprochement. If the latter two groups had little else in common, they shared an ardent hatred of the Union which had so unceremoniously thrown them together. And such an unholy alliance could have but one object—the repeal of that Union.

Bagot attempted to deal with the crisis by the policy of extension choosing men from as many groups as possible. Francis Hincks was

⁷Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada, Sept. 3, 1841. ⁸P.A.C., Bagot Papers, vol. II, pt. 2, Draper to Bagot, June 9, 1842 (private). ⁹A. E. Ryerson, The Story of My Life (Toronto, 1883), 179.

still willing to accept the Inspector-generalship. If his accession, which would seriously weaken the Reformers, could be balanced by someone who would bring Tory support, the administration could still hold a majority when the House of Assembly met in September. The coming of Hincks to the Council, however, again raised the old agonies of doubt for Draper. He felt that it would in fact preclude the chance of gaining any Tory, and that, left isolated, he himself would lose what Conservative support he had retained. In that case, as he wrote to Bagot, he would "bring no party-command no respect-influence nobody," and the Governor General might do better to form a more harmoniously Liberal Council. 10 Nevertheless he would still be willing to try the experiment if a strong Tory could indeed be persuaded to enter the Government. The offer was finally accepted by Henry Sherwood, the ambitious mayor of Toronto. But this in fact raised new problems. Sherwood was an arch Tory and his appointment might disastrously offend the two strongest liberals in the Ministry, John Henry Dunn and Samuel Harrison. Dunn, whom Draper sounded personally, proved in the event to have no objections; Harrison was absent in Kingston, and while they awaited a reply from the Secretary, Bagot and Draper pondered together the whole dubious situation. The crux of the matter was clearly the French block. Actual political intercourse had by this time overcome the earlier prejudices against the French which Draper had imbibed from the Tory newspapers.11 They were not really particularly concerned about Responsible Government, he felt sure, but merely wanted their fair share of power and patronage. But since the Tories had offered them nothing but scorn, they were now committed by LaFontaine to an alliance with Baldwin. Bagot feared that, once in the administration, the French would make excessive demands to which he could not accede. He summed up his own feelings in a letter to Stanley with the words: "In short it is perplexing, infinitely perplexing."12

The wavering hand of the Governor General, however, was soon to be forced by the inexorable course of events in the Canadas. Draper, after a long and inconclusive discussion of the question with Bagot, retired to his lodgings to clear his own mind on the subject and to place his recommendations concisely on paper. On July 16, he stated his position to the Governor in a long letter.18 Membership in the Council for the French was a matter of justice as well as of absolute necessity. Otherwise the Government would probably be

 ¹⁰Bagot Papers, vol. II, pt. 2, Draper to Bagot, June 9, 1842 (private).
 ¹¹P.A.O., Scrapbook of Parliament, Sept. 13, 1842.
 ¹²Bagot Papers, vol. IV, Bagot to Stanley, July 10, 1842.
 ¹³Ibid., vol. II, pt. 2, Draper to Bagot, July 16, 1842 (private and confidential).

defeated, and the members would feel called upon to resign because of the Harrison Resolutions. The alternative of a dissolution would be extremely unwise due to the distracted state of the province. Moreover if the French must inevitably come in, it would be eminently better to invite them now, as "Your Excellency will find demands more difficult to meet advanced by a party flushed with success—than they would urge while victory is yet doubtful." But would the French accept without Baldwin? And if not, would Baldwin enter while Draper sat on the Council? The Attorney General thought not: "I," he wrote, "should be the greatest difficulty, and it is for that reason that I repeat . . . that I am not only ready to immediately tender my resignation—but my unhesitating opinion that the opportunity of securing the French party ought not to be lost upon any question affecting merely an individual member of the Government."

Draper's advice reached Bagot as part of a chorus. R. B. Sullivan had also been insisting upon the necessity of the French, and the Governor received a devastating letter from S. B. Harrison.¹⁴ The Secretary's masterly analysis left not the slightest doubt that the administration could not survive a vote of confidence; the accession of Sherwood, rather than helping matters, would drive still more of the Moderates to Baldwin. Under the weight of such advice, Bagot decided on his course of action, and informed Stanley that with the Colonial Office's acquiescence, he desired to admit the French.¹⁵ But before Stanley's discouraging reply was received, events had come to a head.

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When it became obvious on September 10 that an attempt would be made to overthrow the administration, Bagot called on LaFontaine and asked him his terms. LaFontaine replied that he could not take office without Baldwin. On the eleventh, a place for Baldwin was offered, but negotiations once again foundered—this time over the number of seats the French would receive. Then on the night of the twelfth an important meeting of the Executive Council was held in the office of Dominick Daly. Bagot was not present, and the lead in the discussion was no doubt taken by Draper, Harrison, and Sullivan in convincing the non-political members-Daly and Killaly-that the hand of the Governor must be forced. Draper, moreover, could afford to play the principal part at this time since he was in the most sympathetic position. He was the only one of those present who would actually lose his place, for Ogden was away in England and Sherwood had not yet arrived. The result of the meeting was the decision that an ultimatum must be given to Bagot. Another definite

¹⁴Ibid., Harrison to Bagot, July 11, 1842 (private and confidential).
 ¹⁵Ibid., vol. V, Bagot to Stanley, July 28, 1842 (private and confidential).

offer had to be made to LaFontaine. Draper would resign. Ogden and perhaps Sherwood must be forced out. Since the Solicitor-generalship in Canada East was still vacant this would open up to four places for the French and Baldwin. They should also be offered two other civil positions outside the Council, If Bagot felt he could not comply with this, the members intimated that "after great

deliberation," they must resign.16

To such a declaration, Bagot had now little chance of resistance, even had he wished it. On the following day the offer was made to LaFontaine in the precise terms dictated by the Council. The sequence of events following this move are well known. LaFontaine was pathetically grateful, but again was forced to refuse. Baldwin, still hoping to bring down the Ministry in the fashion of the British House of Commons, had stipulated that no pension could be given to Ogden and Davidson. Bagot then played his last master stroke by empowering Draper to read the offer to LaFontaine in the House of Assembly, and to intimate that the Governor could go no further. The French block, which had not known of the negotiations, was electrified, and a compromise was forced on its leaders. The Council was then reconstructed with the additions of Baldwin, LaFontaine, Morin, Aylwin, and Small, with the Moderate, Harrison, nominally becoming Government leader in the Assembly. In Draper's speech, which he considered the swan song of his political career, the Attorney General stressed his confidence in the reasonableness of the French Canadians, and his desire to see the day when a Union of the Canadas in a larger and broader sense than then existed could be formed. 17

The mixed reception accorded to Bagot's act also reflected on Draper. From Egerton Ryerson and J. W. Murdock, the former Attorney General received heartfelt congratulations. Lord Stanley, on the other hand, in his letters of reproach to Bagot, gave Draper credit for his sincerity, but added that he felt his advice and that of the rest of the Council was injudicious and that in giving it at all they went beyond the proper limit of their functions. Nevertheless, the political manœuvrings of the autumn of 1842 were a victory for moderates of all colours—for Draper and Harrison as well as for Bagot himself. The French had been gained, and, despite the disapproval of Stanley and the much more violent reactions of Peel and Wellington, the British administration did not have the political courage to turn back the clock. At the same time the Reformers did not succeed in forcing

¹⁷Scrapbook of Parliament, Sept. 13, 1842.

19Bagot Papers, vol. IX, Stanley to Bagot (?), Nov., 1842.

¹⁶P.A.C., C.O. 537, vol. 140, Memorandum, Sept. 12, 1842.

¹⁸P.A.O., Hodgins Papers, Ryerson to Draper, Oct. 8, 1842; Bagot Papers, vol. II, pt. 2, Murdock to Bagot, Oct. 18, 1842.

their way into the Council in a manner that would have proved utterly unacceptable to the imperial authorities and to Bagot. In the accomplishment of this compromise, the advice tendered by Draper and Harrison was particularly important. Between Bagot's being "infinitely perplexed" on July 10, and his decision to admit the French if possible on July 28, lie the letters he received from his Attorney General and Provincial Secretary on the fifteenth and sixteenth of the month. Finally, and perhaps more important, the ultimatum delivered by the Council on the night of September 12 provided Bagot with an invaluable excuse with which to stave off the Colonial Office. Despite all the reproaches, Stanley had finally written to Bagot: "On the other hand I admit that the unanimous recommendation of your late Council themselves that you should open negotiations with the French party, and failing in these negotiations, this avowal that they could not conduct your government placed you in a position in which you had little choice of your course of action."20

Draper returned to his practice in Toronto with the happy security of a place in the judiciary as soon as a vacancy on the bench occurred. Bagot had stipulated this to LaFontaine at the time of his offer. The former Attorney General was also given a seat on the Legislative Council, but he vowed never to return to active politics. Nevertheless, when the Metcalfe crisis erupted in late 1843 and the whole of the Executive Council, save Dominick Daly, resigned, Draper received an urgent summons that his presence was required at Government

House

The political philosophy of the man who was to be virtual prime minister for the next three and a half years was somewhat imprecise, for it was the product of a mind constantly altering and adjusting to the rapidly changing circumstances around him. Nevertheless, some principles are reasonably clear. He had emerged as a new type of political being in the Canadas—a moderate Conservative, differing with both Reformers and Tories. His belief in the British connection was the keystone of his philosophy, and he felt that the Reform tactics would seriously endanger that end. Although Baldwin pleaded the opposite, Draper was not convinced, nor would it seem did he entirely believe in the sincerity of Baldwin. There was also perhaps a deeper and more instinctive difference with the Reformers—one of social milieu. This, of course, did not hold true for them all—Draper had condemned Sir Francis Head's cavalier treatment of a man like Marshall Spring Bidwell, and he had done his very best to co-operate with Baldwin when they had worked together for a year on Sydenham's Executive Council. But with the rougher, more "backwoods" 20 Ibid., Stanley to Bagot, Oct. 16, 1842 (private and confidential).

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elements of the party—with the fiery, evangelical-tinged Hincks, with the Peter Perrys and the Malcolm Camerons—there was a social

gap that was virtually unbridgeable.

Draper was also alienated from the old Tories. Their intransigence in the face of the whole colony was as deadly a threat to the British connection as an outright assault. As a true conservative he knew the necessity of yielding many things in order that all one stood for would not be swept away. Moreover, no matter how pro-British the Tories might proclaim themselves, it was really only to their own ideas of what Britain stood for that they were loval. When their own policies were subordinated, they could attack a British Governor as vindictively as ever Sam Adams did. Their bitter outcry against the generous-minded Sir Charles Bagot was not something Draper could easily forget. To him the difference between Tories and Conservatives was, as he expressed it to Ryerson, essentially one of "selfishness" against "patriotism." Thus Draper saw himself—or at least his friends and enemies saw him-as a sort of colonial version of Sir Robert Peel, and Draper had flatly told Sherwood in 1842 that the time had come when the Conservatives must assist the Governor General in moving forward, and not be perpetually looking backwards.²²

These would seem to be the general outlines of his political philosophy. As for his more specific principles, Draper was mainly pragmatic—desiring only to produce good and cheap government. Such he felt was bound to be popular government, and men of all political colours should put their shoulders to the wheel to aid the depressed colony, not worrying about their theoretical differences. As he wrote

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I do hope that . . . the time is not far distant when public consideration will prevail over party feeling, and sound constitutional principles—such as the foundation of free and representative governments—will be carried out in full practical operation, without stopping the machine of government every now and then to test the proper form of any of its different parts, as a matter of speculative demonstration.²⁸

Draper did, however, feel himself committed to the Harrison Resolutions of 1841, and hence to Responsible Government in some form. This did not necessarily mean to party government; but if parties must exist, then what was needed was a broad and national one capable of submerging a great deal of the small, conflicting factions in the colony. It was towards the formation of this that Draper worked throughout his administration. The relative failure of

²¹Hodgins Papers.

²²Bagot Papers, vol. II, pt. 2, Draper to Bagot, June 18, 1842 (private).

²⁸Hodgins Papers, Draper to Ryerson, Jan. 26, 1844 (private and confidential).

the Attorney General in achieving these ends has left the history of this period looking merely like a tangled and confused fight for survival. Nevertheless it is not difficult to see his wider perspectives.

Draper arrived at Government House in early December of 1843 to find a very fluid state of affairs. Following the resignation of the Ministry, Baldwin and LaFontaine had defended their positions in the Assembly and were upheld by a vote of 46 to 23. Metcalfe had then prorogued Parliament and was now attempting to form a ministry of all parties. Besides Draper and Daly, the Governor called on J. S. Cartwright for the Tories. S. B. Harrison, who had resigned from the Council some months before the crisis, was asked to represent the Upper Canadian Reformers, For the French came Denis Viger, the old patriote, who, eclipsed first by Papineau and then by LaFontaine, was now grasping for his own place in the sun. But this initial effort was to fail. Cartwright declined outright, and Harrison did so temporarily, pleading trouble with his personal finances.24 Draper, Viger, and Daly alone were left to the harassed Governor to carry on the administration. Because of the Harrison Resolutions, Draper and Viger insisted that they should be given no particular office or emoluments and that the whole arrangement should be very definitely provisional. To this Metcalfe gave his reluctant consent. Thus came into power one of the strangest administrations that Canada was ever to see. Designed to be very temporary it was to last almost a year. Their opponents gleefully dubbed the ministers, "the triumvirate," and did not expect such an oddly assorted threesome to prove compatible for long. Nevertheless the exertions of these men, coupled with those of the Governor and of Gibbon Wakefield, who briefly came to their aid, proved sufficient to dispose of all routine business.

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It was not in the sphere of business, however, but in that of politics that the government seemed likely to founder. As a result, the province was treated to some of the most desperate politicking it had ever seen. For eight months, Kingston was a hive of rumours. In late December, it was said that Marshall Spring Bidwell²⁵ was returning from his exile in New York to become Metcalfe's Attorney General. By January 20, it was supposed to have been Morin and Cherrier that were deserting the Reformers.26 When Wakefield left for England at the end of that month, some were sure that it was to get the Queen's permission so that no less than Louis Joseph Papineau could take office.²⁷ Included in one form or another in all the supposed arrangements were Samuel Harrison and William Hamilton Merritt,

²⁴C.O. 537, vol. 143, Metcalfe to Stanley, Aug. 10, 1844.

T.P.L., Baldwin Papers, vol. A73, Sullivan to Baldwin, Dec. 21, 1843.
 P.A.C., LaFontaine Papers, Baldwin to LaFontaine, Jan. 20, 1844.

²⁷Baldwin Papers, vol. A42, Dunn to Baldwin, Dec. 25, 1843.

Working quietly behind the maze of rumours, Draper was trying to build an administration. This was his opportunity to construct the broad and national Conservative party of which he had dreamed. He proposed to break the French, who were naturally a conservative force, from their unnatural alliance with Baldwin, and to unite them with moderates of any colour from Upper Canada. The actual acquisition of the French was originally left to Viger. Draper concentrated on the western section of the Council, fixing his sights on three principal targets-William Hamilton Merritt, S. B. Harrison, and Egerton Ryerson. Merritt, the founder of the Welland Canal, was, to quote Ryerson "the man as far as it relates to popular influence in the western section of the province."28 He was also an influential Reformer who felt that Baldwin and LaFontaine had carried matters too far in their resignation under Metcalfe. Moreover, Merritt was a thoroughly practical businessman greatly interested in the internal improvements for the colony which Draper was planning. He seems to have tentatively accepted the post of Receiver General, but on later considering the matter retracted, feeling he could not deal Baldwin so great a blow.29 Relations with Harrison were even more unsatisfactory. The former Secretary was probably the most logical man to capture the Moderates, but Harrison was coolly playing his own game. Confounding both Draper and the Reformers who were also soliciting him, he suddenly attempted in January of 1844 to form his own administration.30 Following the failure of this project, Harrison again declined to have anything to do with the Government and eventually accepted a seat on the bench. Equally unsuccessful were Draper's attempts to gain Ryerson. Although the latter was willing enough to accept the office of Provincial Secretary, the appointment was blocked by Metcalfe who feared he might be inundated with requests for office from ministers of all the sects.81

In Lower Canada, the political situation was one of unrelieved blackness. Viger, who had originally asked for three weeks, had failed to gain a single supporter in four months. Yet the old Frenchman remained maddeningly full of confidence, and Draper was beginning to be exasperated with him. Spring broke with a fresh spate of rumours. Harrison and Merritt were said to be intriguing again. 32

⁸¹C. B. Sissons, Life of Egerton Ryerson (Toronto, 1937), II, 56.

Hodgins Papers, Ryerson to Draper, Sept. 19, 1844.
 P. Merritt, Biography of William Hamilton Merritt (St. Catharines, 1875), 265. ³⁰For Harrison's ambivalent attitude, and his attempt to form a ministry see: C.O. 537, Metcalfe to Stanley, Aug. 10, 1844; Baldwin Papers, vol. A51, Hincks to Baldwin, Jan. 28 (?), (1844); *ibid.*, vol. A55, LaFontaine to Baldwin, Dec. 23, 1843 (private); ibid., LaFontaine to Baldwin, Jan. 28, 1844.

³²P.A.C., Merritt Papers, vol. 16, Merritt to Draper, July 20, 1844; J. P. Merritt, W. H. Merritt, 274; Hodgins Papers, Draper to Ryerson, Sept. 17, 1844 (private and confidential).

Sherwood was reported to have threatened the Governor General with dire vengeance from the Tories if he did not soon form a Council.³⁸ MacNab seemed to be disgusted with everything, and LaFontaine thought he was almost ready to join the Reformers!³⁴ In June there was talk that the Montreal businessman and politician, F. A. Quesnel, had been given *carte blanche* to form a government.²⁵ H. H. Killaly, writing to Merritt, could only say "all is wrong; all topsy-turvy. God knows where it will all end."³⁶ Draper himself wrote to Merritt:

I am as you say in a critical position. I have no doubt that I am thought an ambitious man desirous of political place and power. Let me undeceive you. I hate politics. I commenced my political career in 1836 because it was thrust upon me. . . . I am especially desirous to retire now if I can do so creditably. 37

By now it was obvious to Draper that he had no more time to spend in his attempt to construct a broad party; for the present it was necessary to fall back on what was immediately expedient. A trip to Montreal convinced him that nothing further would be gained by delay in that sector. The necessity was to patch up a Council in the quickest manner possible. In Canada West one important acquisition was made when William Morris, a man of ability who wielded a great influence among the Presbyterians, accepted the office of Receiver General. The Solicitor-generalship was taken by Henry Sherwood, although this position no longer entailed a seat on the Council. In Lower Canada, Denis Benjamin Papineau, brother of the great Louis Joseph, came over under strong pressure from Viger, but brought with him no influence. The Attorney-generalship East was refused by four men before it was taken by James Smith, a Montreal lawyer. It was found temporarily impossible to fill either the office of Inspector General or that of Solicitor General East. Following the partial formation of the Council, the question was debated whether to meet the old parliament or to dissolve. The decision was taken in favour of the latter, "not," to quote Metcalfe, "with any great confidence—but as the least of all evils."38

Nevertheless, dissolution did in fact provide the administration with its famous election victory of 1844. In bringing about the change in public opinion that made this possible, Draper did not play a great role. This was left to Metcalfe with his bombastic addresses, to Ryerson with his skilful pen, to the Reformers themselves who

³³J. P. Merritt, W. H. Merritt, 274.

Baldwin Papers, vol. A55, LaFontaine to Baldwin, May 25, 1844.
 LaFontaine Papers, Dr. Boutillier to LaFontaine, June 25, 1844.

³⁶J. P. Merritt, W. H. Merritt, 274.

⁸⁷Merritt Papers, Draper to Merritt, June 20, 1844.

³⁸C.O. 537, vol. 143, Metcalfe to Stanley, Sept. 17, 1844.

thoroughly overplayed their hand, and to the general feeling that Baldwin had sacrificed Upper Canadian interests to the French. Nevertheless, if he could claim little responsibility for winning the election, Draper had to accept a great deal of responsibility for the conduct of the administration which the election brought to power.

The last two parliamentary sessions which Draper faced as Attorney General are remembered chiefly for the weakness of the Government with its tiny majority, the numerous minor defeats the administration suffered, and particularly for the grand débâcle over the University Bill. But although Draper himself had envisaged a period of retrenchment with few controversial issues there were several important measures passed. A permanent Civil List was voted, establishing the principle that it was the Canadian Parliament that had the right to tax Canadians. The Common School Act of 1846, drawn up for Draper by Egerton Ryerson, was the first really workable and durable settlement of that whole vexing question. There was also an important Schools Act for Lower Canada, and a great deal of legal reform

received the royal assent.

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Draper next made a determined effort to lay at last the spectre of 1837. On December 17, 1844, the House unanimously adopted an address to Her Majesty to pardon all rebels and free those of her "misguided subjects" who might still be languishing in prison. Two months later, a despatch from Stanley announced that complete amnesty had been granted. The following day a bill was introduced by Denis Papineau providing payment for citizens of Upper Canada who had had property destroyed during the rebellion. A similar motion was initiated on behalf of Lower Canada, but bogged down over the unravelling of claims. This measure was to eventually outlast Draper and bring near disaster to Baldwin and Lord Elgin in the famous session of 1849. More successful in appeasing the Lower Canadians was an address for the repeal of restrictions on the French language moved by Papineau on behalf of the Government on February 21, 1845. This move, which was directly contrary to Metcalfe's instructions, had been made after Draper persuaded the Governor of the need to forestall a Reform address to the same end. 39 It was perhaps the most serious setback that Baldwin and Company suffered in the two sessions.

The main problem Draper faced, however, was not that of legislation, but of the anomalous position of his administration. A Ministry of moderates, it did not hold the real confidence of any party in the Assembly. It stood on Tory support, but there was not a Tory in the

⁸⁹J. W. Kaye, Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe (London, 1854), II, 56.

Council. Moreover Draper's idea of a broad and national party would inevitably mean that the Tories would be cast aside as soon as that party was formed. The Tories, for their part, were not unaware of this possibility, but were in a similarly agonizing position. They had been elected, not because of any predisposition of the Upper Canadians for their political philosophy, but because the province had responded to Metcalfe's loyalty cry. They were there simply as supporters of the Governor General, and if they failed to give that support, they would lose their own raison d'être in the eyes of the electorate. The fall of Draper would not bring the Tories in—it would mean the accession of the Reformers or complete chaos. The real question, therefore, was how long the mésalliance could last.

The crux of Draper's problem, under these circumstances, was how to placate the Tories until he could dispense with them. To manage this, he felt the necessity of having at least one of them on the Executive Council. Henry Sherwood as Solicitor General did not solve the problem. Since that post no longer entailed a seat on the Council, Sherwood did not share "cabinet responsibility," and instead of acting as a prop for the administration, he was merely the focal point for Tory discontent. Draper first attempted to remedy the malady by giving the Inspector-generalship to the high Tory, William Benjamin Robinson. This proved an ephemeral expedient, During the great fight over the University Bill, an irate John Strachan called on all his reserves, and managed to detach both Robinson and Sherwood. Draper had possibly hoped to have the measure passed with Reform support, but this was not forthcoming. The Attorney General exerted himself to the full. Resigning his seat in the Legislative Council, he was elected to the Assembly in order to defend the bill in person. As the Tory ranks wavered, he announced he would "stand or fall" by the measure. When Robinson still resisted, Draper, on the floor of the Assembly, dramatically forced the resignation of the man he had just brought into the Council.40 But in the last analysis the Attorney General was checkmated. A group of Tories led by Sherwood informed Draper that they would vote for the bill on the second reading only if there would be no third. Metcalfe felt that if the Government fell it would be impossible for him to form another administration; Draper acceded and the measure was shelved. 41

Following this disaster, the Attorney General began to build once more. The Council was again patched up as William Cayley accepted the Inspector-generalship. Cayley was a fortunate accession, for although acceptable to the Tories, he did a great deal to strengthen

 ⁴⁰Mirror of Parliament (Montreal, 1846).
 41C.O. 537, vol. 143, Metcalfe to Stanley, April 4, 1845 (confidential).

Draper behind the scenes.⁴² But the urgent necessity was to gain the French. The remainder of Draper's career was largely devoted to this vital end.

Any hope had long since died that Viger or Papineau would bring influence, nor did Draper wish to gain more such isolated individuals. Either their block as a whole, or at least a significant wing of it was needed. Draper shrewdly struck at their weakest link. The French block had long been dominated by the Montreal wing of the party led by LaFontaine and Morin. This was a matter of some dissatisfaction to the Quebec group who felt that their interests were being sacrificed to the Upper Canadian Reformers. They had never had a member of their own origin in the Council. Even in the first Baldwin-LaFontaine administration it had been the English-speaking lawyer, T. C. Aylwin, who had represented them. Draper's first approach was accordingly made to René Edouard Caron, Speaker of the Legislative Council, and Mayor of Quebec. The offer was relatively small—three places in the Council with Viger and Papineau retiring—but Draper intimated that once there, the French could soon improve their position. 48 Caron was obviously interested, and promised to speak to his "friends." He did, in fact, first write to LaFontaine who was understandably both surprised and annoyed and who refused to have any dealings in the matter himself.44 But Caron's own views, as expressed in a letter to Elzear Bedard are worth quoting as a reflection of Quebec opinion:

Notre parti perd de la force et de l'importance chaque; l'opposition faite par nos amis a été moins formidable que l'administration ne le pensait; cette opposition loin de devenir plus forte diminuera encore nous avons été et nous sommes honteusement sacrifié au Haut-Canada, et nous le serons tant qu'il n'y aura pas dans l'administration des personnes disposées et capables de soutenir nos interêts. . . . Tu connais mon estime et mon respect pour Baldwin, mais enfin s'il est lui même délaissé et abandonné par les siens, il doit être et je suis sûr qu'il est assez généreux pour ne pas insister a soutenir une lutte inutile. 45

A few days later, the Government received a more substantial indication of the change of feeling in the Quebec area. André Taschereau, a Government supporter, won the riding of Dorchester which had become vacant upon the death of his brother, a LaFontaine man. Taschereau was immediately appointed Solicitor General East. Denis Viger was also able to regain a seat in the Assembly following

44Ibid., 4-8.

⁴²See: P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, vol. 336, Cayley to Macdonald, May 22, 1847.
⁴³Correspondence between the Hon. W. H. Draper and the Hon. R. E. Caron (Montreal, 1846), 1-2.

⁴⁵LaFontaine Papers, Caron to Bedard, Sept. 7, 1845.

the death of the Conservative incumbent in Trois-Rivières, Nevertheless negotiations with the French as a whole were temporarily halted. Caron wrote to Draper that at the moment none of his compatriots would accept office unless Daly and Smith resigned as well as Viger and Papineau;⁴⁶ but Metcalfe would not sacrifice Daly, the

one minister who had stood by him in 1843.

Following the Governor General's departure, the whole negotiation suddenly exploded into the open. LaFontaine had discovered excellent political capital in one of Draper's letters that Caron had confidentially loaned him—an unfortunate reference of the Attorney General to the fact that he had long felt the retirement of the apathetic Viger a necessity. The French leader accordingly decided to publish the correspondence. When Caron protested strongly, and intimated that in that case he might have to publish other letters himself, LaFontaine disingenuously treated this as permission to do as he wished. The letters were read in a bitter meeting of the Assembly in April of 1846, But the Reform attempt to split the Council failed when Viger,

although indescribably humiliated, supported Draper. 60

Undismayed by this fiasco, Draper now sounded Augustin Morin at the end of the session. It was again an astute choice. Morin, the second in command of the French party, was definitely wavering. Unlike the other Reformers he still trusted and sympathized with Caron who was once more acting as intermediary. He quarrelled with LaFontaine on the subject, and distrustful of his own judgment appealed to the other members of the party. The Montreal group were adamant for the rejection of the proposals. In Quebec the sentiment was different, but Etienne Taché, who held the greatest influence in that sector, felt he could not recommend that the party desert LaFontaine although he personally favoured the proposals. Morin accordingly broke off negotiations, but in doing so he mentioned publicly that he had acted without, although not against, LaFontaine. There now seemed a definite possibility that the monolithic French wall was beginning to crumble.

Negotiations were again resumed upon Lord Elgin's arrival. Despite a certain aloofness between Elgin and Draper, the Governor General did agree that a French alliance with the Attorney General would be

⁴⁸Draper-Caron Correspondence, 8-11.

⁴⁷Ibid., 14-16.

⁴⁸Ibid., 21-2; 24.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 26.

⁵⁰ Mirror of Parliament (Montreal, 1846), 47-54.

⁵¹Baldwin Papers, vol. A51, Hincks to Baldwin, Aug. 16, 1846.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., vol. A55, LaFontaine to Baldwin, Sept. 20, 1846 (private).

a more natural one than their present coalition with Baldwin.55 Once more an attempt was made to drive a wedge into the Quebec sector, which was beginning to feel that their Montreal leaders were keeping them from power indefinitely. By the middle of March even T. C. Aylwin, Baldwin's strongest supporter in the eastern section, had joined the others and wrote to Morin that he had "ruined us."56 Caron came down to Montreal to confer with the Ministry represented by Cayley.⁵⁷ Morin became uncertain as he received abuse from the Quebec members,58 while LaFontaine flatly refused to have anything to do with a matter that might concern Caron. Hincks was definitely fearing a split, and he wrote to Baldwin that the French were "panting for office."59 Caron returned to Quebec and presented Cayley's offer before his colleagues in a meeting presided over by Joseph Cauchon, the editor of Le Canadien. After much argument it was decided that if Caron could form an administration on the double majority principle he should do so, but that nothing less should be accepted. 60 That four out of the seven seats on the Council should go to the French, however, seemed prohibitive to both Draper and Elgin. 61 Having at last brought a substantial section of the French block to bypass LaFontaine, the Attorney General was content to await further developments.

The negotiations were never to be renewed. Within a few months his failure to contain the rising Tory pressure had half-driven, halfpersuaded the Attorney General to quit the political arena. The internal party struggle had continued since Draper first formed his administration. Lord Metcalfe's departure in November of 1845 had left him pathetically weak. Draper was now openly castigated in the Tory press, while Sherwood as Solicitor General intrigued with Strachan and continually harassed his erstwhile leader. Even so it was Sherwood who actually prolonged Draper's lease on power, since his challenge to MacNab for the leadership of the High Tories totally disrupted his own faction. Until the Tories could knit their ranks, therefore, the Attorney General was able to continue seeking an alliance with the French and building a moderate Conservative

Council.

At the end of the session, Draper took a decisive stand and forced both Sherwood and the apathetic Viger from the Government. John Hillyard Cameron—again a man acceptable to both the Tories and

 ⁵⁵A. G. Doughty, ed., The Elgin-Grey Papers, 1848–1852 (Ottawa, 1937), I, 14.
 ⁵⁶Baldwin Papers, vol. A51, Hincks to Baldwin, March 25, 1847 (private).
 ⁵⁷Doughty, ed., Elgin-Grey Papers, I, 39–44.
 ⁶⁸Baldwin Papers, vol. A51, Hincks to Baldwin, March 29, 1847.

⁵⁹ Ibid., Hincks to Baldwin, April 18, 1847.

⁶¹ Doughty, ed., Elgin-Grey Papers, I, 27-33.

the Attorney General-assumed the Solicitor-generalship, while the Presidency of the Council was taken by William Morris who had been long executing its duties. But an attempt to conciliate MacNab by making him Adjutant General of the Militia ended in disaster. The fiery knight accepted the post, then resigned it over the appointment of an assistant and intimated that he would support a Baldwin-LaFontaine ministry if he were promised the Adjutant-generalshin and a seat on the Legislative Council. This the Reformers were only too willing to do. Hincks was elated, thought MacNab's break with Draper was irreconcilable, and looked forward to bringing the Ministry down. 62 Baldwin and LaFontaine also agreed to support MacNab, but were more dubious as to the results. LaFontaine was actually correct in guessing that as much as they hated Draper, the Tories feared the Reformers more and would not support MacNab on such terms. 68 In the event, MacNab's friends soothed his ruffled honour, while Draper promised to press Sir Allan's claims upon the new Governor.64

The arrival of Lord Elgin saw, as we have noted, the beginning of Draper's final negotiations with the French. The collapse of this effort was then followed by the Attorney General's last struggle for power with the Tories. The accession of MacNab to the Council was now deemed a necessity, and Draper recommended that he be admitted without portfolio. An attempt to stem the Tory tide, however, was made by balancing MacNab's appointment with that of John A. Macdonald, one of the Attorney General's closest followers, as Receiver General. Morris, who made the actual offer to Macdonald wrote: "Keep this to yourself, always remembering that if you will not put your shoulder to the wheel, you assist those, who, it may be, desire to regain the power which you and I hope to deprive them of; I mean the "Family."65 Also promoted to a seat on the Council was young John Hillyard Cameron, the Solicitor General. In the Canada East section, a more able William Badgely succeeded Smith as Attorney General. Then complications began to develop. One of the moderate Conservatives whom Draper wished to bring into the Council was Ogle Gowan. MacNab now refused to take office with Gowan whose newspaper had attacked him over the Adjutant-generalship issue. Gowan on the other hand felt strongly the injustice of being excluded from the administration simply because he had supported it." MacNab was still as inflamed as ever, and told LaFontaine "how

66 Ibid., Macdonald to Morris, May 9, 1847.

⁶²Baldwin Papers, vol. A51, Hincks to Baldwin, Nov. 16, 1846. 63 Ibid., vol. A55, LaFontaine to Baldwin, Dec. 29, 1846.

 ⁶⁴Doughty, ed., Elgin-Grey Papers, I, 14–17.
 65Macdonald Papers, vol. 336, Morris to Macdonald, May 6, 1847.

Baldwin has proved himself superior to this . . . Ministry!"er Henry Sherwood was gathering his supporters, too, determined not to miss

his own opportunity for power.

As the Tory resurgence was threatening to overwhelm him, Draper was also feeling keenly a complete isolation. His relations with the Governor General were characterized by a certain awkwardness. Draper had assumed that the new Governor, like his predecessors, would be primarily interested in avoiding a Baldwin administration. He slowly came to learn that such was not the case. Elgin did mean to accept Responsible Government, But Draper had risked everything to keep Baldwin from power, not so much out of personal antipathy, but because of the British connection which Lord Metcalfe had called on him to maintain. Now, however, it seemed that the new imperial government as represented by Russell, Grey, and Elgin did not share that view. Draper was beginning to feel more and more that he was simply in the way of everyone—Governor, French Canadian, Tory, and Reformer alike. When, therefore, Christopher Hagerman at last expired, Draper took the course that seemed most conducive to the happiness of everyone, including himself. On May 28 he resigned the Attorney-generalship and accepted the position of Puisne Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench. In the brief struggle for power within the Tory ranks that followed his resignation, Draper suffered the ignominy of seeing the victory of the Sherwood wing and himself succeeded by the man he had forced from office only a few months previously. It must have been with a deep sense of failure that the former Attorney General bade goodbye to the legislature. The Government remained in the hands of his most hated rival; the future would inevitably fall to the man he had striven so long to protect the country from.

So ended the political career of a man who had attempted to play the role of a Sir Robert Peel in the Canadas. At this pretension, the Tory journalists could laugh and claim: "the only similarities between you [Draper and Peel] is that you both betrayed your trust—both have deceived your friends—both have shown yourselves dishonest politicians, and the downfall of both is looked forward to as the only means of saving—the one, the nation, the other, the colony." Nevertheless there are many grounds for comparison between the two men. Despite their positions, both disliked and distrusted party government. The chief end, in each case, was simply to provide good and cheap administration. Although both thought that this could and should be done within their respective existing constitutions, each saw the

68Reprinted in the Globe, Nov. 11, 1845.

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⁶⁷Baldwin Papers, vol. A55, LaFontaine to Baldwin, May 13, 1847.

necessity of a certain accommodation to the principles others had forced on him. Both attempted to tread the via media between Toryism and Radicalism. In both cases Peel and Draper were allowed to remain in power by a recalcitrant party only because there seemed to be no one who could replace them. At the same time, the fact that each man lacked personal political ambition allowed him to treat his party in a more cavalier fashion than would have been possible for an ordinary leader. A statement made by Peel in the House of Commons in 1841 might easily have been said by Draper: "then I tell every man in this country that he has conferred no personal obligation upon me by having placed me in this office; but, free as the wind, I reserve to myself the power of retiring." 69

But what if anything was the result of Draper's Peelite policies? In his last speech to the House of Assembly, made on June 14, 1847,

Draper stated:

. . . my purpose was, Sir, to found a party on a larger basis than ever had been formed before; I tried to do so for the advantage of our common country; and because I believed the principles of the honourable gentlemen opposite were not calculated to promote her good, I thought so—I think so still; and on that account I desired to extend broad and solid foundations on which I trusted to raise as a superstructure an administration, which enjoying the confidence of the majority would be efficient in working the machinery of government.⁷⁰

But the fact that Draper claimed he had "tried" to achieve these ends was in itself an admission of failure. Nevertheless such a party was eventually formed—and as Draper had so long striven for—in alliance with the French Canadians. In 1854, with the resignation of Francis Hincks as co-premier, a coalition of French, Hincksite Reformers, and Conservatives took office. MacNab and Morin shared the administration. Co-operation between MacNab and the Hincksite Reformers proved impossible, however, and Sir Allan was forced to give up his position. In May of 1856 the Taché-Macdonald ministry was created. John A. Macdonald, now undisputed leader of the moderate Conservatives, was destined to control the party until his death thirty-five years later, and throughout most of this period his staunchest support came from the French-Canadian wing. It was in the career of the greater man who had once been his follower that the political aims of William Draper were fulfilled.

Draper's work in clearing the path for Macdonald has been largely ignored. This has been the result of most historians having oversimply identified Draper with Metcalfe, and Metcalfe even more simply with Toryism. So writes J. L. Morison: "he [Metcalfe] had reprobated party,

⁶⁹ House of Commons, Debates, 1841, col. 555.

⁷⁰ Mirror of Parliament, June 14, 1847.

and he found in a party—narrower in practice even than that which he had displaced—the only possible foundation for his authority."71 But the Tory party, although it supported Metcalfe with votes in the Assembly did not in any sense form his administration, and indeed was scarcely represented in it. From the time he took office in 1843 until his resignation in 1847 Draper, as LaFontaine recognized, was virtually the sole driving force sustaining the Government. The rest of the Council-with the exception of Morris-were mainly political nonentities. If William Lyon Mackenzie and Lords Durham and Sydenham had managed among them to break forever the rule of the Family Compact, William Draper, one of the last scions of the Compact, had created a "respectable" Conservative philosophy which Macdonald was able to build into a practical reality. That Draper himself failed to achieve the latter end was a result of his greatest political weakness. He was totally unable to organize a real party within Parliament or a substantial following among the electors outside of it. If he gained an adherent like Macdonald or Gowan, it was largely because they were attracted to him, not because he sought them. Whatever personal following he had in the province as a whole was created by the influence of Ryerson among the Wesleyan Methodists and of Morris with the Church of Scotland. Undaunted in the court room or the Legislature, the Attorney General was out of place in the rough give and take of the hustings. To play successfully the role that Draper aspired to, a man was needed that did not hate politics, and was not constantly longing for the tranquility of the Bench. Strangely enough he does not seem to have made even the slightest effort to overcome this failing. Perhaps this was the fault of a rather patrician nature. When Ryerson once wished to publish a statement of Draper's, thinking it would help to keep him in the public eye, the Attorney General asked him to refrain, commenting typically: "I do not like the public press as a mode of addressing the public."72

In an assessment of Draper's career attention must also be paid to his long and unrewarding efforts to gain a coalition with the French Canadians. In 1837 the French had attempted to overthrow the English-speaking minority which dominated them through the "Chateau Clique." Following so soon after this period, the eighteenforties are indeed remarkable for their relative lack of racial conflict. In his biography of Robert Baldwin, G. E. Wilson attributes this to the Baldwin-LaFontaine alliance. This is too simple an explanation, how-

⁷¹J. L. Morison, British Supremacy and Canadian Self-Government (Toronto, 1916), 174.

⁷² Hodgins Papers, Draper to Ryerson, Jan. 26, 1844 (private and confidential).

ever, especially after the majority of the English-speaking populace so decisively rejected Baldwin in 1844. Bagot's great gesture was at least equally important as is seen by the remarkable measure of esteem which that Governor acquired among the French. Draper's part in this episode is clear, and of equal significance were his own attempts to form a coalition. Although the history of Draper's administration seems largely the failure of these negotiations, he did in fact come remarkably close to success. Had he been able to remain in power longer it is likely that the Quebec section at least would have united with him. The reading of the Draper-Caron correspondence, although embarrassing to the Attorney General, must have proved to the French as a whole that at least he wanted them in the Government. Although they might prefer to wait and take office with LaFontaine, the continued solicitations of the Ministry convinced them that no party wished any longer to exclude them from their rightful power.

Any such accomplishments, however, were to the Attorney General himself merely facets of his most compelling and urgent feeling—the necessity of keeping the British connection. It was indeed to that effect that he made his most important contribution. From this point of view, Lord Metcalfe's administration was a critical period. Metcalfe himself saw clearly the anomalies of his situation, but was unable to solve them. In what was perhaps one of his weaker moments, the Governor General had even confided to Stanley something that was

very like the inevitability of Responsible Government.

I see no prospect of any cessation of this almost unavailing struggle until the principle for which the present Executive Council—and the House of Assembly are practically contending, namely Democratic and Party Government is fully admitted; and then the prospect of being a tool in the hands of a Party would be anything but enviable, and even now it is difficult to be otherwise . . . were the power of the majority in the hands of a Party thoroughly attached to British interest and connection there would be a ground for mutual cordiality and confidence which would render real cooperation more probable, concession more easy, and even submission more tolerable. To

But Metcalfe would not give in to such a possibility. When the crisis was at its darkest he wrote:

I have now to strive to obtain a majority in my present Parliament. If I fail in that, I must dissolve, and try a new one. I do not know that I shall have a better chance in that; and if I fail then still I cannot submit, for that would be to surrender the Queen's Government into the hands of rebels, and to become myself their ignominious tool. I know not what the end will be. The only thing certain is that I cannot yield.⁷⁴

74Kaye, Metcalfe, II, 528n.

⁷⁸C.O. 537, vol. 142, Metcalfe to Stanley, Oct. 9, 1843 (confidential).

What then would have happened had Metcalfe been forced to meet an opposition as resolute as himself. It is almost impossible to imagine Robert Baldwin ever advocating a course that might lead to open hostilities, but Baldwin was not the whole Reform party. Although the great Reformer might well have been worth twenty regiments to the British connection when he was in power, Baldwin in opposition was a different matter. He was not a true popular leader. Where a real politician might accept defeat with a certain amount of magnanimity, Baldwin took it as a personal insult, and tended to retire from the combat. Such an attitude had allowed the Reform movement to leave him behind and flare into open rebellion in 1837; 1843 after all was only six years later. If such a thing had happened, and the Canadians broke the British connection themselves-or as is much more likely, convinced the imperial government that the maintenance of the connection was no longer worth the effort—then the question would have been solved. Canada would have achieved selfgovernment; but it would have taken the form of a right to send representatives to a Congress in Washington. For if Canada had cut the ties with Britain in the eighteen-forties, there can be no doubt that she would have ere long succumbed to either the blandishments

or the force of her southern neighbour.

It was for all these reasons that it was so important that the irresistible force of the Reformers did not collide head on with the immovable object of Lord Metcalfe. Baldwin, of course, might claim sincerely that it was not the Reform principles at all, but the intransigent attitude of Metcalfe that endangered the connection. Indeed this attitude has been perpetuated by historians. Yet it ignores certain salient facts, particularly the stand of the imperial government. Metcalfe's only alternative to acting the way he did was the onean inconceivable one for a man of the Governor's character-of deliberately disobeying the very clear and specific instructions of the Colonial Office. Stanley had sent Metcalfe to Canada under orders to conduct himself according to the principles contained in the despatch which Sir Charles Bagot had received too late to act upon in other words the policy of extension, playing off all parties against each other. On the very day of the crisis with Baldwin and LaFontaine, Metcalfe had received from the Colonial Secretary a letter instructing him never, under any circumstances, to give up his power of bestowing patronage—the most powerful tool of a colonial governor. 75 Historians have also been misled into blaming Metcalfe because of the fact that after the Governor's departure, Responsible Government was speedily realized. Yet the significant occurrence was not really Lord Metcalfe's

⁷⁵P.A.C., Derby Papers, M-S letters, 1842-5.

resignation, but that the Conservative government in Britain had fallen and been replaced by an administration which was quite

prepared to accept the new theory of colonial government.

Herein lies the true importance of Draper's career; that he was able to form and maintain a ministry throughout the critical years of Metcalfe's tenure of office, Since Draper was undoubtedly an adherent of the British connection, the dying Governor General was able to find "submission more tolerable" in the sense of his letter that has been quoted. At the same time the Reformers could not cavil at an administration which stood, however shakily, on the votes of a majority of the House of Assembly. The great conflict was therefore avoided. It is also true that it was wholly through the exertions of Draper that the weak Ministry, beset from all sides, was somehow sustained throughout that crucial period. Metcalfe called the Attorney General his "mainstay," and LaFontaine declared in December of 1845 "they [the Tories] may hate Draper as much as they please; still without his talents, their party, during the last two sessions, would have been no party at all." Here William Draper was able to play his greatest role. He acted as an indispensable bridge between the era of Metcalfe and Stanley and that of Elgin and Grey. During his administration, the question of Responsible Government turned from one of life and death into one of party politics.

76Kaye, Metcalfe, II, 528.

⁷⁷Baldwin Papers, vol. A55, LaFontaine to Baldwin, Dec. 2, 1845.

The "American Conflict," 1830-1877

G. M. CRAIG

WHEN HORACE GREELEY WROTE ABOUT the "American Conflict" in the 1860's he expected that it would be ended by the destruction of slavery and the defeat of the Confederate armies. Yet the bitter years of Reconstruction lay just ahead and despite the conscious, often self-conscious, efforts at reconciliation in later decades, the American people reached the centennial year of the breakdown of the Union with much unfinished business left over from the conflict. The ceremonial re-enactment of old battles had to share space in the newspapers with the exploits of those new invaders of the South, the Freedom Riders, while other evidences of continuing tension abounded on every side. Since the controversies centring on the Civil War have a persistent relevance for the present, they have inspired an ever mounting flood of books; those received here represent only

a few that have appeared in the last year or so.

But the desire for light on current problems accounts only partially for this outpouring. The Civil War was the great American epic; enormous, terrible, dramatic, romantic. It showed both the toughness of American democracy and the tenacity of American nationalism. Unlike other wars in which the United States has participated, this one did not have to be shared with foreigners. It was a purely American war, with the good guys fighting the good guys, speaking the same language, exchanging tobacco and coffee through the lines, dashing off on daring cavalry raids, and all of it ending on the magnanimous note struck at Appomattox Court House. The Civil War thus becomes a cherished national possession, providing a refuge from the almost unendurable complexity of present-day problems. Civil War "buffs" flourish and grow in numbers, and a vast literature of "buffology" (as one exasperated English reviewer put it) arises to meet the insatiable demand. At the same time, this vigorous interest makes possible the publication of contemporary works in convenient new editions and of valuable works of careful scholarship, both specialized and general.

The "buffs" are seldom interested in the thorny question of slavery's relationship to the conflict, but the scholars agree with Lincoln, more than they did a generation ago, "that this interest was somehow the cause of the war." One way of getting at the "somehow" is to review what the pre-Civil War generation knew and thought about slavery, with the result that many early works on the subject have been reprinted. Two of these are among the titles issued in a new series, the John Harvard Library, and they could not be in more complete contrast. In 1845

there appeared the Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave; both the book and its author soon became valuable weapons in the abolitionist crusade against slavery. It was sometimes argued that abolitionists had no personal knowledge of slavery, but William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips, who introduced the book to the reading public, could reply that one of their closest associates, soon a leading abolitionist orator in his own right, had lived under slavery for twenty years, and had with his own hand written a careful, temperate, yet devastating account of the institution under the relatively mild conditions of Maryland's Eastern Shore and of Baltimore. The book helps us to recapture the sentiments of anti-slavery readers as they imagined to themselves

how much worse slavery must be in Alabama or Mississippi.

The other volume, George Fitzhugh's Cannibals All! Or, Slaves Without Masters² appeared twelve years later, a pro-slavery tract seeking to seize the initiative from the abolitionists. This new edition has a perceptive introduction by the leading Southern historian of our day, C. Vann Woodward. As Woodward points out, Fitzhugh fits into no categories; he was not very representative of pro-slavery apologists, and he probably lacked the influence of many less original writers. Yet, except for Calhoun, who was an actor as well as a writer, he is much the most interesting for us today. He has, in fact, been a favourite subject for intellectual historians for several years; in a time of conservative revival this most thorough-going of all American conservatives inevitably receives much attention. Fitzhugh's basic point was that free society—that is, laissez-faire capitalist society -had failed, and that some form of reconstruction was essential. Anticipating Karl Marx's use of the evidence of parliamentary committees, he drew a savage picture of the exploitation of industrial workers and argued that government must enlarge its role and become more socially responsible. He was at war with every tendency towards liberalism and individualism, and John Locke and Thomas Jefferson were his favourite bêtes noires. Instead, he grounded himself on Aristotle, with some contemporary infusions from Carlyle. American slavery, with its emphasis on the family and on the social responsibility of those wielding power, offered a way out of the chaos of atomistic capitalism. His argument, only briefly suggested here, was essentially a feudal one; it had little appeal in a South which shared many of the assumptions of nineteenth-century liberalism, and it confirmed the North in its view of slavery as an anachronism. Yet his eccentric and quixotic work dealt with some questions that have lasted down to our own time.

George Fitzhugh wanted to see the rest of the world become more like the South; a group of younger historians, all with Southern backgrounds and including two Negroes, have sought to argue in a collection of essays entitled The Southerner as American³ that the South has never been as different from the rest of the country as we have been taught to believe. Several of the authors punch holes in the usually accepted generalizations, but in the end they fail to convince us that Southerners have always wanted to be the same kind of Americans as the

¹Benjamin Quarles, ed. Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written By Himself. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xxvi, 163.

²C. Vann Woodward, ed. Cannibals All! Or, Slaves Without Masters. By George Fitzhugh. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xl, 264. \$5.50.

3Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., ed. The Southerner as American. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1960. Pp. xii, 216. \$5.00.

people in the North and West. Those who did simply got out, like a majority of the authors of this volume. Those who remain, continue, willingly or not, to be Americans with a difference.

The editor of this volume, Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., is concerned to show that the South had such a bad conscience about slavery that it reached the year 1860 in a state of near hysteria. But the bad conscience, however real, did nothing to modify the institution. This is the question that interests Stanley Elkins.4 Why was American slavery harsher and more rigid than in the Latin American communities? Elkins is a social scientist rather than a simple historian, and he looks to psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, economic theory, and allied disciplines for light on the subject; in consequence, he uses a language and a method that mise the hackles of the pure disciples of Clio, who have accepted his book with little enthusiasm. He has violated a cardinal tenet of the faith by basing his study on printed works, contemporary and secondary, with only occasional forays into manuscript materials. He has made rather far-fetched analogies between the reactions of the inmates of Nazi concentration camps and those of the Negroes under slavery. Yet the book deserves a better reception than it has had. To compensate for his lack of manuscript research, the author has read widely in areas usually neglected, such as the literature on Latin American slavery and on the British anti-slavery movement. In short, he has used the comparative method to try to show that American slavery and abolitionism had characteristics that were peculiar to the United States and that prevented anything like the melioristic approach found by the Latin Americans and the British. These characteristics arose out of an atmosphere of unrestrained democracy and capitalism, where the traditional institutions of the aristocracy, the monarchy, the church, the law, and the university were weak, diffuse, or absent, and thus incapable of restraining the slaveholders. Equally important, intellectuals had no access to centres of power, and so frustrated anti-slavery crusaders thought of slavery only as a sin to be attacked rather than as a practical problem to be worked on. It could be argued that the factors usually mentioned, such as the nature of the American federal system, the racial attitudes of Anglo-Saxons, and the geographic concentration of the Negro slaves, were enough to doom meliorism without resorting to more fanciful explanations. Nevertheless, the experienced reader should find Elkins's book stimulating and the beginning reader will find it a concise introduction to the historiography of the subject.

If Elkins's social science terminology sometimes repels us and if his barrage of generalizations often leaves us unconvinced, H. H. Simms,⁵ by contrast, reveals the limitations of the more traditional mode of historical writing. He has gone back to the sources and has used them with a thoroughness unexcelled by any writer on abolitionism. He gives us a clear, descriptive account of the anti-slavery movement, but his rather flat and banal prose leaves us little the wiser after plodding through his book. His Preface makes the obvious statement that all this agitation made for "an unhealthy emotional climate which boded ill for the future of the nation" but there assessment ends. For all his extensive re-working of the sources, the author avoids any attempt to put the abolitionists in a clearer focus.

^{*}Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press], 1960. Pp. viii, 248. \$4.50.

⁵Henry H. Simms, Emotion at High Tide: Abolition as a Controversial Factor, 1830–1845. Richmond, Va.: William Byrd Press. Distributed by Moore and Company, Inc., of Baltimore, Maryland, 1960. Pp. viii, 243.

Leon Litwack's treatment⁶ of the position of the Negro in the free states, from 1790 to 1860, is a much more successful book. We have always known that that position was depressed, but never before has the evidence been assembled so effectively to show that by 1860, "the Northern Negro remained largely disfranchised, segregated, and economically oppressed." Clearly, the great majority of Northern whites were as strongly committed to the doctrine of white supremacy as were their Southern fellow-citizens, and they had little sympathy for an abolitionist movement that was as concerned to improve the lot of the free Negro as to end slavery. It was not until the emergence of the free soil movement in the late forties and fifties that any considerable number of Northerners enlisted in the anti-slavery crusade, for free soil was also devoted to white supremacy, that is, to the exclusion of the Negro slave from the territories. Understandably, then, the rise of the Republican party promised little for the Negro, as the author effectively shows by quoting Lincoln's opposition to the idea of social equality. Nevertheless, he could have culled other quotations from Lincoln, pointing in a somewhat different direction, that gave the Negro some long-run grounds for hope. At any rate, despite his lowly state, the Northern Negro preferred it either to slavery in the South or to colonization outside the United States.

Although Northerners had no intention of accepting the Negroes as equals, they nevertheless became increasingly anti-slavery in temper as they contested with the South for the control of the western territories. For politicians of national outlook this deepening struggle was a growing embarrassment, and they sought in every way to head it off. Certainly none tried harder than Stephen A. Douglas, the subject of a sympathetic study by Gerald Capers in the excellent Library of American Biography series. Douglas's reputation among American historians had oscillated greatly during the last century. At one time, he was put down as little better than a traitor to the North, much worse than Calhoun, who at least stood by his section; later, when the conflict came to be regarded as "needless" and "repressible," he was set forth as a far-seeing statesman; and still later, as the moral aspect of slavery was again moved to the centre of the stage, he was considered to be an obtuse and reckless political gambler. Now Capers sees him as the defender of the Union, who fought for reason against odds that were eventually insuperable. If he was at times a shifty politician, at least he was no worse

in this respect than the sainted Lincoln.

For Douglas national growth, the development of the great western regions, was the prime task of the 1850's. This task could be forwarded peacefully only if the federal government avoided affronts to the pride of the South. Through his various policies, especially popular sovereignty, he offered an approach that would give the North everything it wanted without hurting Southern feelings unnecessarily. Privately, he regarded slavery as "a curse beyond computation to both white and black," but he went on to say that "the integrity of this political Union is worth more to humanity than the whole black race. Sometime, without a doubt, slavery will be destroyed." But both sections, with mounting insistence, demanded an open decision on the place of slavery in American life, and Douglas was tossed before the storm. Capers's fair-minded biography engages our sympathy for Douglas, but we may wonder whether the highest statesmanship did

⁷Gerald M. Capers, Stephen A. Douglas: Defender of the Union. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company. 1959. Pp. xii, 239. \$4.00.

⁶Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press], 1961. Pp. xiv, 318. \$6.00.

not require a more direct confrontation of the slavery issue than the "Little Giant" was able to make.

In essence, Douglas advocated that the two quarrelling sections should agree to disagree over slavery, in order that the country might get on with the great tasks of national growth and unlimited expansion. Harry Jaffa, in his long, polemical Crisis of the House Divided,8 has argued that by 1858 many men of free soil tendency were sorely tempted to accept Douglas's leadership, following the latter's break with the Buchanan administration; and he further argues that if Douglas had been able to rally a broad coalition of moderate free soilers and Northern Democrats behind him, he would have gained so impressive a victory in 1860 as to leave the South with no heart for secession. Thus, resounding political success for Douglas in 1858-60 held out the probable hope of avoiding civil war. But, and this is Jaffa's basic argument, if the country had followed Douglas, it would have lost its soul. It would have refused to face the moral urgency of the slavery issue, and would, once and for all, have turned its back on the principles of the Declaration of Independence. With slavery confirmed in the South, renewed attempts would have been made to extend it into the West, and Supreme Court decisions might even have gained new concessions for it in the free states. Worst of all, Douglas, the most ardent expansionist of his day, was almost certain to take the country on a career of empire in the Caribbean and

Central American regions and slavery would have gone along.

None of this happened, and for one reason. In 1858 Abraham Lincoln resolutely confronted Stephen A. Douglas, and so brought the country back to first principles, to the principles on which it had been founded. He made it clear to all that white men could never really be free as long as black men were slaves; slavery must be contained within its present limits, and the public mind must be put at rest that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. The price paid for following Lincoln was a long and terrible civil war, but better this than to lose faith in freedom, which would have suffered everywhere, not just in the United States. Hence, the Lincoln-Douglas debates were a turning point in modern world history, and not the rather inconsequential affair made out by the late J. G. Randall and other "revisionist" historians, against whom Jaffa carries on a running battle throughout his book. Jaffa writes as a political scientist, and tends to see historical development as a series of contests of logical propositions. We may doubt, given the exceedingly complex political scene of the late 1850's, that as much hung on the contest for an Illinois senatorship as he believes or that freedom was so gravely imperilled. What we do know is that a rigid acceptance of his line of argument can indeed involve the payment of a frightful price, with some doubt about the ultimate safeguarding of freedom. Perhaps Americans were entitled to require that price of themselves in the 1860's; similar attitudes in the 1960's will have more far-reaching consequences.

Jaffa has returned to the fray in a book entitled In the Name of the People, in which Robert W. Johannsen joins as editor.9 After introductions by the two editors, the book provides the texts of Douglas's well-known Harper's article of 1859 on popular sovereignty and of speeches made in that year by Douglas and Lincoln in the Ohio state elections, a continuation of the more famous Illinois

⁸Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Issues in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1959. Pp. 451. \$6.50.

*Harry V. Jaffa and Robert W. Johannsen, eds., In the Name of the People: Speeches and Writings of Lincoln and Douglas in the Ohio Campaign of 1859. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press for the Ohio Historical Society. 1959. Pp. xii, 307. \$5.00.

debates of the previous year. It is particularly valuable to have Douglas's article readily available.

While we are mentioning books that require little notice we may cite a collection of essays on Lincoln, edited by Henry B. Kranz. 10 This consists of twenty-two short pieces and then some excerpts from contemporary views of Lincoln and from Lincoln's writings and speeches. Many of the short essays are by competent authorities, but the book will have its greatest appeal to Lincoln "buffs."

Politicians of the Douglas stripe regarded the slavery issue as an embarrassment that should, if possible, be kept off the national agenda; Lincoln wanted a firm national decision, but without unnecessary provocation to the South; but Charles Sumner was one of those politicians, both Northern and Southern, who found political opportunity in the controversy. In one of the best American biographies to appear in recent years, ¹¹ David Donald has written the first of two volumes on the puritan in politics, "the most perfect impersonation of what the South wanted to secede from," as Carl Sandburg described him. Sumner poses a severe test for a biographer who wishes to be sympathetic to his subject and yet write seriously about the coming of the Civil War, for it would be impossible to regard Sumner's contribution to his times as constructive or statesmanlike. Donald admirably meets this test; his portrait of Sumner is compassionate and understanding, yet it reveals fully and frankly the fatal flaws in his public and private personality. As well, the author deftly sketches in the background of Massachusetts and national politics needed to follow the course of Sumner's career. We become acquainted with a man who turned to reform and anti-slavery crusades following "a whole series of personal disasters and professional failures" that turned him against Boston society and led him to couple "the lords of the loom" with "the lords of the lash," who possessed immense powers of self-deception, and who exhibited, in Robert Winthrop's words, an "habitual indulgence in strains of extravagant thought and exaggerated expression." Elected to the Senate "through the devious workings of a political coalition," he stood little chance of re-election until he delivered what he correctly termed "the most thorough phillipic ever uttered in a legislative body." This, in turn, led to his brutal beating by Preston Brooks and to his enjoying "quite contrary to usage—the crown of martyrdom during his own life-time," in the historian Prescott's sardonic words. By 1861 he was "one of the most powerful men in the United States." Never, perhaps, have vast learning and great powers of eloquence been put to more harmful use in the world of politics. Yet his hatred of slavery was unquestionably genuine, and his vision of an "emancipated America" was a noble one. Although he exploited the slavery controversy, he was also driven on by it.

As we move into the war years, we find that Allan Nevins has already reached them in his vast project to replace James Ford Rhodes with an even longer history of the Union's ordeal. In the fifth and sixth volumes of his series he covers the "Improvised War" of 1861 and then seeks to show how "War Becomes Revolution" in 1862–3. We may expect at least another large volume on the

¹⁰Henry B. Kranz, ed. Abraham Lincoln: a New Portrait. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons [Toronto: Longmans Canada Limited]. 1959, Pp. 252. \$4.00.

¹¹David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf [Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited]. 1960. Pp. xxii, 392, xxiv, illus. \$7.50. 12Allan Nevins, The War for the Union. I. The Improvised War, 1861–1862; II. War Becomes Revolution, 1862–1863. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1959, 1960. Pp. xii, 436, illus.; xvi, 557, illus. \$9.00 each.

war, and then Reconstruction will beckon this most indefatigable of historians. An awed reviewer thinks of the old remark made by a scholar who said when asked if he had read Nevins's latest book: "Allan Nevins writes faster than I can read." But any earlier reservations regarding his enormous productivity have long since given way to admiration and gratitude for the magnitude and high quality of his achievements. Whatever assistance he may be able to command in the preparation of his works, there can be no doubt that the final product is his own; as in his previous writings, the mark of a clear, luminous, and vigorous intellect is on every one of the thousand pages contained in these two volumes.

They are the work of a master craftsman.

One runs the risk of impertinence in trying to assess in a few words an opus, really part of an opus, of such size and competence. Yet, for all the encyclopaedic range of these volumes, covering political, economic, social, and diplomatic, as well as military, factors and events, there is a distinct line of argument everywhere visible on which one may at least reflect. The argument is that the United States entered the war as an inchoate, formless, invertebrate, gelatinous assortment of communities, and that during the war it became an organized, disciplined nation on the road to maturity and world power. It cannot be denied that Nevins provides impressive as well as varied evidence in support of his argument; moreover, one cannot finally evaluate it until he has dealt with the rest of the war and with the postwar years. Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the feeling that the argument is pressed too hard. Unquestionably, the war forced acceleration in many areas, notably in manufacturing, yet it is also obvious, as Nevins himself has previously shown, that the country had many of the lineaments of a complex, diversified society by 1860; these would have continued to deepen without the impact of war, which was not needed to turn the United States into an industrial power, organized continentally. And war also brought stupendous economic waste and retardation, a factor on which Nevins, so far at least, has made little comment. It also stimulated corruption and greed that cast a shadow on the following generation. Nevins is too scrupulous a historian to ignore the seamy side of the war, but in these volumes his heart is less in exposing the grafters, the slackers, and the opponents of the war, especially a war become revolution, than in exhibiting the heroism and the resolution of the "plain people" who carried their country through its greatest crisis. That war ennobles men is clearer from Nevins's account than that it also debases them. 13

In his various military histories Bruce Catton also extols the virtues of the plain people, or rather, the soldiers in the ranks. It sometimes seems that nearly all histories of the war are written by Bruce Catton, "the last survivor on either side," as Alfred Kazin calls him. Frequently, and his appearances are indeed frequent, he is simply the greatest buffologist of them all. Nevertheless, when he attempts a long, substantial description of the campaigns he is usually entertaining, informative, and highly effective; certainly he is at the height of his powers in his account of Grant's rise from obscurity in 1861 to fame at Vicksburg in July, 1863. The book is a continuation of a biography originally begun by the late Lloyd Lewis, and of course, more is to follow. Although the biography of a general, Catton's book is really about the common soldier, the volunteer who

¹⁴Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South. Maps by Samuel H. Bryant, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company. 1960. Pp. xii, 564. \$7.25.

¹³Yet from the tone of his superb article, "The Glorious and the Terrible," Saturday Review, September 2, 1961, page 9, it is clear that Nevins is amply aware of the debasing side of the war, and it is probable that he will give it more specific treatment in later volumes.

enlisted for a political purpose, to save his country. For Grant was the common man, of uncommon capacity, who learned how to lead this kind of soldier, with "no Napoleonic displays, no ostentation, no speech, no superfluous flummery," as a contemporary journalist put it. Unlike most West Pointers, Grant grasped the fact that the war could never be won until it was turned into a remorseless struggle that would inevitably force profound changes upon the country. And Catton indicates that the men in the ranks accepted this road to victory, even though it often involved frightful butchery. It comes as no surprise to the reader that Nevins and Catton each acknowledges the advice and help of the

other in writing their books on the war.

As the most extensive and terrible war between 1815 and 1914 and as "the first modern war," the Civil War has inevitably been of continuing interest to military writers and strategists. It is well known that a great many European observers, official and unofficial, journeyed with the Union and Confederate armies, and that they and later authors produced an extensive literature on the war. Now that the war can hardly have any further bearing on current military problems, Jay Luvaas has analysed what the British, German, and French armies learned from it. 15 He concludes that the American conflict did indeed contain many important lessons for European soldiers, but that they were seldom embodied in official doctrine in time to be of use for later wars. In particular, Europeans, with a few exceptions, failed to see that the Civil War, especially in its 1864–5 phase when vast citizen armies fought behind elaborate entrenchment works until one side collapsed, clearly foreshadowed the essential character of the First World War. Of course, it is always hard to learn the lessons of history; as Luvaas concludes, however, "in military history, unfortunately, more

than an academic reputation is often at stake."

Returning to studies of the war years, we note that the emphasis of nationalist writers like Nevins has been on those matters that have proved "permanent" in the country's history. In consequence, such subjects as the Copperhead movement and the internal history of the Confederacy often receive slight attention in general accounts of the war. With this bias in mind, Frank Klement argues that the Copperheads need re-examination. 16 Certainly their story deserves to be better known, although Klement somewhat exaggerates the extent to which it has been neglected; for instance, Wood Gray's The Hidden Civil War provided a careful survey of the Copperheads several years ago. Nevertheless, Klement is right in asserting that they continue to be misunderstood, and to be "viewed as men whose hearts were black, whose blood was yellow, and whose minds were blank." Men who attacked the martyred Lincoln were bound to receive short shrift from the dominant school of American historical writing. And it is easy to see their defects: intensely partisan, self-seeking, Negrophobic, lacking in broad-gauged leadership, they blindly opposed a rapidly changing political and economic order, holding to outmoded Jeffersonian concepts at a time when Hamiltonian views were beginning to prevail. Yet, as Klement shows, their fate was essentially that of any political opposition in time of war; by criticizing the methods and objectives of the dominant party, they left themselves open to charges of defeatism and even of treason, charges that were skilfully promoted

¹⁶Frank L. Klement, The Copperheads of the Middle West. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. xiv, 340, illus. \$7.50.

¹⁵Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. xii, 253, \$5.95.

and exploited by Republican politicians. What is especially interesting in Klement's study is his demonstration that the Midwestern Copperheads, in opposing the powerful role of eastern financial and industrial groups in the conduct of the war, anticipated the Grangerism and Populism of later years. Indeed, many of the Copperheads became leading figures in postwar agrarian protest movements. and despite their earlier criticism of the war continued to have a devoted political

following in their section.

Although the Confederacy often receives abbreviated treatment in general histories, there is no lack of books on the subject; Charles Roland's, in the highly useful Chicago History of American Civilization series, is one of several relatively recent accounts of the short-lived nation over which Jefferson Davis presided.17 It is a short and well-organized résumé of the main facts about the Confederacy, although many readers will still prefer Clement Eaton's more original book of a few years ago. Mr. Dooley once said that most histories tell us what a country died of instead of what it lived of. Inevitably, this is true of histories of the Confederacy, which have emphasized state rights, inept leadership, internal dissension, declining morale, and faulty strategy, as well as inferior resources. Roland offers no strikingly new interpretation; instead, he takes the commonsense view that the South did remarkably well with what it had, and even with superior organization could not have avoided defeat. The Northern urge to retain the Union was as strong as the Southern urge for independence, but not stronger; in this situation, superior power determined the outcome.

Finally, for those who do not wish to tackle long or specialized books on the Civil War, there is Alan Barker's short survey, from causes to aftermath. 18 The author, the headmaster of an English school, believes that the Civil War is not only a major event in world history but that it provides an almost perfect case study for examining the causes of war. Accordingly, he devotes two-thirds of his space to the years before 1861, concluding with three chapters on the War and Reconstruction. Occasionally his interpretations and facts are a trifle shaky, but in general he provides an accurate and attractively written résumé. It is one that will be pleasing to American readers, for he is eminently fair to both sides, as centennial committees would have us be, and he feels that the war, despite its terrible waste and bloodshed, was justified by its results in preserving the Union and destroying slavery. The war did show with what formidable capacity a democratic republic would maintain its existence, but surely it also revealed enormous blundering in its origins and a fearful ruthlessness in its prosecution. Many Americans, in this anniversary year, find little for self-congratulation in the performance of their ancestors.

Although books of broad synthesis, like Barker's, are invaluable even if never entirely successful, much may also be learned from the biography of a secondary figure who lived through the whole period. Willard L. King has written such a book on David Davis, 19 Lincoln's close friend on the Illinois circuits, his manager in the campaign of 1860, a Supreme Court Justice, and after his resignation a prominent Senator. Davis's career was not significant in American

The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1961. Pp. x, 182. \$3.75.

¹⁷Charles P. Roland, The Confederacy. The Chicago History of American Civilization edited by Daniel J. Boorstin, Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. xviii, 218, maps. \$3.95.

18Alan Barker, The Civil War in America, London: Adam & Charles Black [Toronto:

¹⁹Willard L. King, Lincoln's Manager, David Davis. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xiv, 383, illus, \$8.00.

history, as the author states, yet it helps to illuminate many events of the time. A man of moderate outlook and of politically independent views, he consistently opposed extremism in all forms, and in the light of history most of his judgments have been confirmed. The author believes that "Few men of his generation were right so much of the time." Such men can have little influence in revolutionary times, when leaders with stronger doctrine inevitably secure large followings, usually to the detriment of the common weal.

The Reconstruction years were certainly revolutionary times, at least in the eyes of contemporaries, and we conclude with two excellent books on this period. They are centred on the two leading antagonists of "the Tragic Era" or "The

Age of Hate"-Andrew Johnson and Thaddeus Stevens.

In a long and intricately-argued book, 20 Eric McKitrick has written the most important work on Reconstruction to appear in a generation, and in doing so he has boldly taken issue with the prevailing interpretation. That interpretation, briefly, is that President Johnson, basing himself solidly on the Constitution and following Lincoln's example and policy, attempted a peaceful and magnanimous restoration that was thwarted and destroyed by a band of Radicals, led by Stevens and Sumner, who talked about justice for the Negro but who were really concerned to extend their own political predominance and to advance the interests of northern business groups. Howard K. Beale's The Critical Year, written when economic interpretations were more fashionable than they are at present, was the most effective presentation of this view, and it is now combatted at almost every point by McKitrick. Just as Beale reflected the Beardian climate of 1930, so McKitrick reflects the contemporary preoccupation with the art of political leadership. In his view Reconstruction took on the aspects of tragedy

because Andrew Johnson proved to be a totally unfit president.

In McKitrick's view, Radical Reconstruction need never have occurred if Johnson had made even a minimal effort to satisfy the legitimate feelings of the victorious North at the end of the war. These feelings did not require a harsh or vindictive policy toward the South; they required only some tangible evidence that the South accepted and would abide by the basic results of the war. Instead, Johnson encouraged the South to believe that it could take its place in a restored union as if almost nothing had happened since 1861. In so doing, Johnson proved to be the worst enemy of the South, and of a constructive settlement, for he progressively antagonized moderate Congressional leaders, notably Fessenden, Grimes, and Trumbull who, rather than Stevens and Sumner, were the real leaders of the Republican party. As these moderates became increasingly irritated and alarmed by Johnson's obstinacy and stubbornness, they were driven to adopt radical measures which they had not wanted in the beginning. At any point between December, 1865, and the spring and summer of 1867, they would have settled for milder policies if any sort of sensible leadership had come from the White House. Like many revisionist views, McKitrick's interpretation bears a close similarity to that put forward by earlier writers closer to the scene, in this instance James Ford Rhodes.

Obviously, the American political system, especially in a great crisis, will not work effectively if the president is out of sympathy with the basic objectives of the majority party. McKitrick is so concerned to level his fire on the person of Andrew Johnson that he is left with no ammunition to expend on a constitutional structure which allows such basic disagreements to happen and to persist. When

²⁰Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. x, 534, \$8.50.

the country faced this immense challenge to constructive statesmanship, it was the system of government that was found wanting more than the narrow states

rights Tennessee Democrat who found himself in the White House.

McKitrick denies that Thaddeus Stevens dominated the course of Reconstruction in the way suggested by most textbooks, and in his concern to emphasize the role of the conservatives he may underestimate somewhat the part played by this gaunt old puritan. Mrs. Brodie strikes a fair balance, in this as in other matters;21 writing shortly in advance of McKitrick she came to some of the same conclusions, and the two books complement each other very well. She agrees that Stevens never exercised a dictatorial influence over Congress, or even the House of Representatives. He failed completely to accomplish some of his most cherished designs, such as land for the Negroes, and in other matters he got only what conservatives in their own good time would accept. Yet, despite McKitrick's persuasive emphasis on the controlling role of these men, it is hard to imagine the course of Radical Reconstruction without the resourceful and driving parliamentary leadership of Stevens. Mrs. Brodie shows how he took relentless advantage of every possible opportunity to advance his programme of "Americanizing" the South. He died in the belief that he had probably failed, and the events of the next two generations seemed to prove that he had. Yet he left the Fourteenth Amendment behind him, and one might imagine his shade grinning sardonically at the knowledge that the amendment was finally proving to be a weapon to advance "Equality of Man Before His Creator"—the motto on his tombstone in an unsegregated graveyard.

²¹Fawn M. Brodie, *Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co. [Toronto: George J. McLeod Ltd.]. 1959. Pp. 448, illus. \$9.75.

North American

Economie et société en Nouvelle-France. By Jean Hamelin. Cahiers de l'Institut d'Histoire, Université Laval, 3. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval. 1960. Pp. 137, maps, graphs. \$2.00.

UNTIL RECENT YEARS the generally accepted view of New France was that, with the exception of the fur trade, its economic development had been very feeble and that a native commercial middle class, or bourgeoisie, such as had dominated the northern English colonies, had been conspicuous by its absence. This view was challenged by Professors M. Seguin, Guy Frégault, and Michel Brunet of the University of Montreal who maintained, quite persuasively, that New France had been a commercial colony, dominated by a sizable group of Canadian bourgeois and that the Conquest had destroyed the whole fabric of Canadian society by obliging this dominant group to remove to France, or to be submerged, in the face of competition from English merchants who settled at Montreal and Quebec with their connections and credit with British firms, while the Canadian merchants were cut off from their normal trade outlets and credit facilities in France. Thus, the Conquest appeared to have been far more than a military defeat and an exchange of masters; it was now depicted as representing the disintegration of a society by the destruction of its dynamic group, the commercial bourgeoisie.

This thesis was challenged by Fernand Ouellet in an article appearing in the Bulletin des Recherches Historiques (avril-mai-juin 1956) wherein he stated that New France had never had what could properly be called a bourgeoisie; that there had been a sizable group of wealthy men in the colony, yes, but that unlike good bourgeois they had spent the profits made in trade as fast as they had made them, instead of plowing them back into the expansion of their industrial or commercial enterprises. In short, they had amassed wealth merely to ape

the nobility and had thought more of consuming than of producing.

Now M. Hamelin has entered the lists with a monograph on the economy and society of New France wherein, he states, his aim has been to present hypotheses and raise questions, rather than to present a detailed analysis of a problem. This disclaimer, however, is belied by the fact that M. Hamelin does more than merely present hypotheses. Employing the research methods of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes at the University of Paris, he presents a considerable amount of detailed information in the form of charts, graphs, and maps to show the state of society and the economy. M. Hamelin makes no sweeping claims for the results of his research. He explains his methods, and its limitations, then stresses the need for more research before definite conclusions can be reached. That said, he proceeds to analyse the economic evolution of the colony, the monetary system, the roles of beaver and wheat in the economy, the immigration and attendant labour problems, and, in the final chapter, he criticizes the thesis of the disintegration of the old French-Canadian society occasioned by the Conquest. Although he is very careful to qualify his conclusions by declaring, "Ces réflexions sur les commerçants canadiens ne sont pas sans appel. Elles devront être controlées et vérifiées par les archives privées et les archives notariales," the evidence that he selects denies the existence of a Canadian bourgeoisie and, it seems, is intended so to do. He concludes: "L'absence d'une vigoureuse bourgeoisie canadienne-française en 1800 apparaît ainsi comme l'aboutissement du régime française, non pas comme une conséquence de la Conquête. Car le drame de la colonisation française au Canada, c'est de n'avoir pu former une bourgeoisie canadienne-française assise sur l'exploitation rationelle des ressources naturelles du pays. Le commerce avec la métropole, les grands pêcheries et le monopole de la vente du castor étaient aux mains des métropolitains, le chantier de construction navale et les Forges St-Maurice dans celles du roi.'

Regardless of whether or not further research were to prove, disprove, or merely qualify, the contentions of M. Hamelin, too much could be made, and perhaps already has been made, of this economic problem. That said, the fact remains that M. Hamelin's monograph is indeed a very important work. The methods he employs are those that must be employed before a clear picture of Canadian society, in any period, can be obtained. Statistics alone, however, will not give it, any more than an individual's income tax return gives the true

measure of his worth.

W. J. ECCLES

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University of Alberta

The Papers of Henry Clay. II. The Rising Young Statesman, 1815-1820. Edited by James F. Hopkins and Mary W. Hargreaves. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 939. \$15.00.

THIS SECOND FAT VOLUME of the planned ten-volume edition of *The Papers of Henry Clay* possesses the same general virtues as did its predecessor (see C.H.R.,

XLI (3), September, 1960, 245-6). Thus, it contains both a much greater variety of documents pertaining to Clay than had heretofore been available, or conveniently available, in print, and many more documents than had been collected and printed previously-contains, for example, approximately five times as many pages of documents as are found in the relevant portions of the 1904 edition of The Works of Henry Clay. Moreover, a comparison of this 1961 volume with its 1904 counterparts reveals the decidedly superior editing of the new edition, particularly in such matters as the identification of individuals, events, and places mentioned in the documents.

The Henry Clay revealed in this segment of his Papers is the "rising statesman" of the years from 1815 through 1820. During most of this six-year period, Clay was Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, and the Papers are rich in references to Clay's attitudes toward most of the major political issues of those years. Through this volume we can see Clay's support for the Second National Bank of the United States, for increases in the tariff, for such public works by the national government as the building of roads and canals, for the famous "compromise" by which Missouri was admitted as a state into the Union, and for the independence of the Latin American colonies in revolt from Spain.

Even more interesting than the documents pertaining to these well-known public questions, however, are the previously unpublished private letters by Clay in which we get glimpses of the Kentuckian as informal commentator on the human scene. Here, for example, is Clay's friendly but frank advice to a Connecticut Unitarian minister who had become president of a university in Kentucky and had incurred the criticism of the religiously orthodox: "it should never be lost sight of by you . . . that your object is not to propagate religious truth, but to capacitate the mind for the acquisition of truth of all kinds." Here, too, is Clay's recommendation that a young lawyer should settle in a wealthy community, because "without wealth there cannot be litigation. The passions may furnish it for a while, but they burn out at last."

Canada, judging from the documents in this volume, did not figure prominently in Clay's actions during the years from 1815 through 1820, and the few references to her are all related to the War of 1812. It was while criticizing the lukewarm efforts of New Englanders in that war that Clay made his most outspoken comment concerning the United States's neighbor to the north: "Had New England been as patriotic as Kentucky," he told a group of his fellow Kentuckians

in 1816, "Canada would have been ours."

Not Canada, however, but the presidency of the United States was to be the lasting object of Clay's desire. His unsuccessful attempt, lasting more than two decades, to gain that office form the announced theme for the next six volumes of this edition of his Papers.

THOMAS J. PRESSLY

University of Washington

British Emigration to British North America: The First Hundred Years. By HELEN I. Cowan. Revised and enlarged edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1961. Pp. xiv, 321. \$6.95.

Miss Cowan's British Emigration has long been a "standard" reference for Canadian scholars, but with this new, enlarged edition it achieves new status. It is no longer just a sound, if prosaic, account of a pioneering venture into manuscript material left in the Emigration Room of the old Colonial Office. In its text and in its valuable introduction and bibliographical review, it makes a firm claim to be a standard work in a field now filled with detailed studies. In addition to much further work of her own, Miss Cowan has embraced the conclusions of others, and has arrived at a satisfying synthesis of these investigations.

The most obvious improvement, besides fuller explanation and useful textual rearrangements, lies in the extension beyond the too arbitrary and too strictly Canadian date of 1837. The new terminal date coincides roughly with Confederation, but this limit was fixed by predominantly British developments. The mid-century triumph of laissez-faire closed an era of dispute over the value of assisting emigration, but ironically it had also permitted the continued voluntary flow of immigrants. New conditions in Great Britain and recurrent crises in the more complex colonial economy reduced the volume of emigrants after the "Great Emigrations, 1830–1860." In tracing this later development, Miss Cowan has greatly enriched her original account and has given a clearer picture of the changes and improvements effected in the emigrant ships and the emigrant trade by the mid-century.

Although the emphasis remains on the emigrants' reasons for leaving Great Britain, rather than on the attractions of the American colonies, the book is more valuable than ever to historians of Canada. Fuller treatment, or wholly new accounts, have been introduced of the operations of the Canada, the British-American, and the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Land Companies; of John Rolph, the Laird of McNab, William Berczy, and Colonel Talbot. The later history of pauper, child, and Irish famine emigration offers greater continuity with the original edition's detailed accounts of Wilmot Horton's and Peter Robin-

son's activities in these fields.

Indeed, in its better organization, accuracy, and now, literary style and greater comprehensiveness, *British Emigration* should hold an assured place for many years as a primary chapter in the story of emigration to Canada and in our domestic social history.

ALAN WILSON

University of Western Ontario

The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790–1860. By DOUGLASS C. NORTH. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961. Pp. xvi, 304. \$6.75.

"THIS STUDY IS BASED on the proposition that U.S. growth was the evolution of a market economy where the behaviour of prices of goods, services and productive factors was the major element in any explanation of economic change." Back of the extension of the market and basic to the timing and pace of the nation's economic development was the expanding export sector of the economy. This view leads to an examination of the evolving international economy of the nineteenth century, of the characteristics of the export industry, and, in particular, of the disposition of income derived from exports. Explanation of regional differences is sought in the rise of the staples trade and its impact on the major regions of the country. In this statistically-oriented version of the staples theme, political and institutional factors along with entrepreneurship exert at most a modifying influence on the operation of market forces. Seeking to build a skeletal framework useful in the study of the process of economic growth, the author applies a limited number of tools of analysis with discrimination and skill.

In the first part of the study emphasis is placed on the external events which gave rise to trade expansion in the period 1790-1814. An account of the international setting in which the initiating influences are found is followed by a

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statistical review of changes in prices, freight earnings, terms of trade, and population movements in the economy of this period. Long swings in economic activity are attributed to developments in the export sector and these in turn are related to the emergence of distinctive growth patterns in the Northeast and the South. In Part II (1815-60) the emphasis shifts to the internal operations of an economy stimulated to remarkable expansion by the increasingly free movement of commodities and services. Cotton takes its place as the major expansive force in the economy and over much of the period serves as the most important influence on the pattern of interregional trade. Changes in the nation's balance of payments, in the flow of immigrants, and in land tenure and policy are linked with changes in the export sector. Similarly data on the interregional movement of goods, capital, and population underline the strategic role of cotton and later wheat and gold as prime movers in growth. Chapters on the economic structures of the Northeast, West, and South, and on the quantitative aspects of economic growth in the periods 1815–23, 1823–43, and 1843–60, support the conclusion that the explanation of the widening of the market and the appearance of sharp regional contrasts must be sought in the key area of the staples trade. The evidence also supports the view that the Civil War brought an interruption of the accelerated growth of preceding decades, marking "a pause in the economic expansion which was already deeply rooted in American society.

In this presentation of what is essentially a statistical narrative of U.S. development, Professor North succeeds admirably in his attempt to uncover the major economic determinants of growth in the period under review. He has provided a wealth of quantitative evidence to throw light on rates of change in the United States and its regional divisions, and he has had the wisdom to select a period uniquely suited to his mode of analysis. In so doing he has produced a monograph valuable for its insights into process and for the questions it raises for the less statistically minded. It may be argued that growth analysis has severe limitations, and that non-economic factors can seldom be relegated to merely modifying roles; and Canadian readers are likely to hold the view that a more comprehensive version of the staples approach, embracing political and cultural as well as economic elements, is a more useful general purpose tool in historical investigation. Nevertheless the impact of this volume on the writing of conventional economic history should be most salutary. There is here a unity of theme and a consistency of treatment notably lacking in many of the treatises on U.S. economic history now being turned out in numbers to meet the needs of an expanding market. Textbook writers, in particular, will ignore Professor North's rediscovery of staples economics at their peril. The volume contains three appendices, supported

by extensive statistical data, and an adequate Index.

W. T. EASTERBROOK

University of Toronto

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The Explorations of Pierre Esprit Radisson: From the original manuscript in the Bodleian Library and the British Museum. Edited by ARTHUR T. ADAMS. Modernized by LOREN KALLSEN. Minneapolis: Ross & Haines, Inc. [Toronto: Burns & MacEachern Limited]. 1961. Pp. xxx, 258, xxxi-lxxxiv, chart, facsimiles, map. \$10.75.

THE VALUE TO SCHOLARS OF Radisson's account of his voyages has been, to some degree, discredited by apparent discrepancies which cast serious doubt on the veracity of the chronicler. In the original manuscripts the chronology of the voyages is not in accord with known historic facts; that is, Radisson could not

have been where he was when he said he was. In this new edition of the Voyages, the editor, a lawyer by training, advances a convincing explanation for the discrepancies and in so doing, removes them. He maintains that pages in the manuscript telling of events which conflict chronologically were somehow inserted in wrong sections of the manuscript. His arguments in support of his contention are certainly convincing. Radisson's account of his journey to the Mississippi is shown to be a composite narrative of two voyages, the one made in 1654-6, the other in 1658-60. Examples are cited of allusions to other voyages which Radisson did not include in his narrative. It may well be that he thought the account of one voyage to the Mississippi was enough and that, owing to the passing of ten years between the second voyage and the writing of the account, events which occurred on the first voyage were erroneously, but innocently, ascribed to the second. Mr. Adams devotes a chapter to a plausible discussion of this theory.

Mr. Adams disagrees with Grace Lee Nute's contention that the narratives were written in French by Radisson, then translated. He maintained that Radisson dictated from rough notes to an amanuensis, which accounts for many of the

errors. Again, his arguments are convincing.

That the narrative has been "modernized" might give rise to doubts in the minds of scholars, but a comparison with the facsimiles of the original manuscript—and with the Prince Society edition—makes it plain that these doubts are not warranted. This can best be demonstrated by a brief quotation: "Coming nigh preparing myself for to shoot, I found another work: the two young men that I left some ten hours before here were killed. Whether they came after me or were brought thither by the barbarians, I know not; however, [they] were murdered." The flavour of Radisson's quaint speech and the textual accuracy have not been lost, and clarity has been gained.

W. J. Eccles

University of Alberta

The "Foreign Protestants" and the Settlement of Nova Scotia: The History of a Piece of Arrested British Colonial Policy in the Eighteenth Century. By Winthrop P. Bell. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1961. Pp. xiv, 673. \$9.50.

THIS IS NOT ANOTHER FAMILIAR FORAY over the old battlegrounds of Nova Scotian history. It is a remarkably detailed and precise account, heavily documented, of the origins of one of the more distinctive ingredients in the Canadian population, the Germans of Lunenburg County. They were not all Germans and not confined to Lunenburg alone. (The learned author is impatient with general statements.) There were some Swiss and a few French among them. But it is at the Germans of Lunenburg County that they have become known, the continental Europeans who arrived as artisans and agriculturists in the eighteenth century and who have so powerfully contributed to the maritime activities of the province ever since.

Some years ago Dr. Bell, who has devoted much of his life to private scholarly pursuits and who once taught at the University of Toronto, became impressed by suggestions of contradiction in the writings of earlier scholars upon this important migration which took place in the years following the founding of Halifax in 1749. What he has to say about the work of DesBrisay, who produced a history of Lunenburg County in 1870, may very well be said of nearly all the early county histories of Canada. Many of them relied on tradition and hearsay,

and gave most of their attention to the achievements of a few notable families. The authors, as Dr. Bell points out in his interesting notes on sources, had few official records to work from so that their authority was often dubious.

The general comment to be made is that the subject is now exhausted. This is a book which explains all facets of the origins of the "Foreign Protestants," of their recruitment for emigration to Nova Scotia, of their travails upon their arrival and in the years following. Dr. Bell goes into the peripheral phases of the topic with the same earnestness and intensity. There is an interesting account of conditions in the lands of the Holy Roman Empire from which the Germans came. He is unsatisfied with traditional versions of the unravelling of the Acadian seigniorial system. Haliburton is taken to task for his creation of the unwarranted assumption that the immigrants came from Hanover because of the Hanoverian name given to the community. Other authors, even Brebner, are subjected to similar strictures.

This is not a work in which literary flowers are sought, but for its accuracy, close attention to detail, and zealous pursuit of all the information that can throw light upon the ordeals of the Nova Scotian Palatines, it can well come to be regarded as a classic among Canadian local histories. More than this, it shows in a manner much more effective than can general works the play of imperial policy upon the fortunes of the colonies and the hazards faced by entrepreneurs like John Dick who contracted to bring Europeans to America at this time. It is to be noted in this regard that the sub-title is "The History of a Piece of Arrested British Colonial Policy in the Eighteenth Century."

W. S. MACNUTT

The University of New Brunswick

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Canadian National Railways. I. Sixty Years of Trial and Error (1836-1896). By G. R. Stevens. With a Foreword by Donald Gordon and an Introduction by S. W. Fairweather. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company Limited. 1960. Pp. xviii, 514, illus. \$8.00.

BY AND LARGE THIS IS a very readable, good, and useful book. Although it is a commissioned "official" history it is clear that Colonel Stevens has been given his head in the course that he has pursued, and many spades have been called spades. But this is only the first volume of the work, and it may be more difficult to deal adequately with the modern period when controversial themes are more nearly contemporary. A second volume to 1922 is projected for the near future.

In form, the volume presents a lively account from their earliest beginnings of the several railway empires of eastern Canada, which were to be parts of the Canadian National Railways. These brief histories of the Grand Trunk, Great Western, Northern, Intercolonial, Midland group, and others are presented "from the inside," with sympathy, partiality, and due reference to the financial and administrative policy of each. There are good brief sketches of the engineering problems of the Victoria Bridge and the Detroit River Tunnel. The Canadian Pacific is inevitably the enemy.

I suppose that an official volume must be called Canadian National Railways, yet the title does not give the "come on" that the book deserves. The professional historian and the man on the street may both turn away, for their entirely opposite reasons. The treatment given to the subject is popular, though the research in railway records seems to have been exhaustive. The theme does take shape in a broad perspective. But the theme of railways does not arise here, imperceptibly from a broad conception of the general social and political history

of the era. There are a few jolts as the excellent railway theme is tacked rather abruptly upon the supporting scantling of general public history. Perhaps railways were politics, in this era, but politics were not the whole of history. Somehow the whole truth is not implied when Hincks or Howland or Sicotte or Tupper are dismissed fairly abruptly for their mishandling of railway policy in one episode or another. But at the same time this history does bring into view and into credit a number of railwaymen who, before now, have hardly seen the light of day; for example Schreiber and Pottinger of the Intercolonial, Cumberland of the Northern, and Tyler of the Great Western.

Rather than the almost inevitable collection of stiff family portraits of locomotives, this volume is most pleasingly illustrated with nineteen etchings. I

cannot see any credit printed to the deserving artist "McLaren."

This is a book about railways and tells the railway story, very well and with gusto. It is not intended to be, and is not, a primer of Canadian history.

PAUL G. CORNELL

University of Waterloo

The Industrial Struggle and Protestant Ethics in Canada: A Survey of Changing Power Structures and Christian Social Ethics. By Stewart Crysdale. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1961. Pp. xvi, 193. \$4.00.

THIS IS AN INTERESTING AND USEFUL BOOK, but I think it tries to do too much too fast, and in too small a space. I am no theologian, but the chapters on "Premises for Christian Social Ethics," "Ethical Challenges in an Industrial Community," and "The Ethical Witness of the Church in Industrial Society" seem to me very good. The chapter on "Social Thought and Action of the Churches, 1919 to the Present" seems excellent, and the earlier one on "The Churches' Social Awakening" very good. The chapters on "Industrial Crises Before 1918" and "The Impact of Industrialization Since 1918" are less satisfactory. They skim the surface much too lightly, and rely too much on Professor Logan's often very inaccurate Trade Unions in Canada. This part of his subject is one on which Mr. Crysdale has not taken enough trouble to inform himself. His long list of people who helped him does not include any economists, economic historians, or people who know something about unions and their history. The result is a series of errors which considerably reduce the book's value.

The Canadian Labor Union lasted not three years but five. The Trades and Labor Congress launched provincial labour parties as early as 1906. "Federal jurisdiction" has become not "more" but less "prominent" since the early years after Confederation. Price controls are not a permanent feature of our economy. Economic "expansion" was not continuous from 1918 to 1929. The C.C.F. was founded in 1932, not 1933. The Canadian Labour Congress has never contemplated "affiliation" to any party. The recession of 1957–8 was more than a "flattening out" of the boom. "Export markets" have not "shrunk": the volume of exports has increased every year in the last five. It is misleading to compare union membership with the total labour force, which includes employers, own accounts, unpaid family workers, and salaried management. Why pick 1922 as the year when international unions attained "dominance" in the Canadian labour movement? Their percentage of total membership in that year was only 74.5, against 80.0 to 89.7 in the years 1911–18. The C.C.L. in 1944 did not "surpass" the T.L.C. in numbers: it was 12,000 behind. The C.C.L. was never "in affiliation"

with the C.C.F." Before 1939, only three provinces, not seven, had laws ensuring the right of labour to bargain collectively. The Communists formed their own unions in the early thirties, not twenties; and, far from having "lost" in comparison with "the depression years," the present Communist-dominated unions have well over twice as many members as the old Workers' Unity League.

This is by no means a complete list of Mr. Crysdale's errors, but it is enough to show that he ought to have been a great deal more careful to get his facts

straight.

EUGENE FORSEY

Canadian Labour Congress Ottawa

The American Supreme Court. By ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY. Chicago History of American Civilization edited by Daniel J. Boorstin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. Pp. xii, 260. \$5.00.

cood brief accounts of the Supreme Court of the United States are not numerous. Professor McCloskey's book is one of the best of a rare breed. Achieving a nice balance between popular appeal and scholarly knowledge, the author moves easily and engagingly through nearly two centuries of legal history and decisions. Indeed, he glides so smoothly through such a mass of detail that he will be charged inevitably with over-simplification. Whether that criticism is valid depends on what one expects from a book which attempts to cover such a complex subject in less than two hundred and fifty pages. In this reviewer's opinion the author's effort is justified and successful. There are too few works of this kind which try to chart a path for laymen through the juridical maze. We have no similar study, for instance, of the Supreme Court in Canada.

Having said that, it is fair to include in the obvious comment that to divide the history of the American Supreme Court into three neat periods, as Professor McCloskey does, is to push simplicity to the limit. The writer himself recognizes this for in identifying 1789 to 1865 as the period dominated by the nation-state relationship, 1865 to 1937 as the business-government epoch, and 1937 to the present as the individual-government era, he is forced to note many exceptions. Even more questionable is his tendency to attribute conscious motives to the justices. Like many historians he falls into the habit of explaining events as reasoned acts. Thus the inconclusiveness of Court verdicts prior to Marshall are said to arise from the fact "that the judges understood, whether consciously or instinctively, their limitations as well as their opportunities. They realized that the Constitution did not explicitly accord them the power they coveted. . . . "

Such an approach may arise from Mr. McCloskey's personal sympathy for the social relativists on the bench. He makes no bones that he sides with those judges who have conceived of the Court as a malleable organ in the evolving process of American government; "the interests and values, and hence the role, of the Court have shifted fundamentally and often in the presence of shifting national conditions." However much this may shock the absolutists who hold legal truths to be immutable and timeless, Mr. McCloskey finds in the adaptability of the Court its secret of eminence. It has reconciled the two conflicting principles on which the American republic has been erected, the notions of popular sovereignty and fundamental law. In doing so it has also become what it was never admitted earlier to be, a policy-maker, but "with robes on."

The text is unencumbered with footnotes, which may be a blessing since legal

references are the most wearisome form of scholarly devotion. In any case the deficiency is more than compensated for by an excellent eighteen-page appendix which not only gives background material but also provides a superlative bibliography.

PAUL W. Fox

University of Toronto

Carl Becker: A Biographical Study in American Intellectual History. By BURLEIGH TAYLOR WILKINS. Published jointly by Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press and Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1961. Pp. x, 246. \$6.50.

AMONG THE NOTED AMERICAN HISTORIANS, Carl Becker will be remembered both for his felicitous style and for his contribution to our understanding of historiography and intellectual history. His interpretative essays, which constitute the bulk of his work, illustrate the dilemmas of the pragmatic and relativist historian. As Becker's first biographer, Professor Wilkins has not concerned himself merely with Becker's contribution to historiography, which others have done more fully and at greater length, but with the climate of opinion that produced Becker's

detached skepticism.

The psychological, sociological, and other imponderable factors that determine an historian's approach to his craft remain one of the intriguing problems in historiography. The author notes that in the case of Becker, who began as the son of a Methodist dirt farmer in Iowa, the university training was of paramount importance, especially the influence of his teachers. In Wisconsin, where he was an undergraduate and graduate student, Becker met "the most important teacher in his life," Frederick Jackson Turner whose "absence of dogma" he admired. During his one year at Columbia, Becker came under the influence of James Harvey Robinson then preaching the gospel of the New History. The author traces Becker's career from its beginning, when shyness and classroom ineffectiveness beset him, to its great days when as a famous teacher his graduate seminar was the glory of Cornell.

The author discusses Becker's major works and gives an excellent summary of their reception by different reviewers. He does not answer the question whether the *Heavenly City* is merely a clever little essay or a profound analysis of the *philosophes*, but he presents it as a partly biographical study. He also shows that Becker did not always see the implications of his relativism. In many cases be merely poses the dilemma inherent in much of Becker's writing and is content to record rather than explain. He also gives a complete bibliography of works

by and about Becker.

A most revealing part of the book deals with the impact of World War I on Becker whose disillusionment with its aftermath was typical of many liberal democrats. He saw the 1920's through the isolationist eyes of a "tired liberal," but unlike many fellow liberals he never saw the New Deal as the new faith in democracy. Only in World War II did he recover his faith in liberal democracy as he saw it triumph over Fascism. There is no indication whether Becker, who died in 1945, foresaw the threat that Communism would pose in postwar Europe.

To write this biography of a remarkable man, "one of the most attractive if minor figures of our age," the author has availed himself of the Becker material at Cornell and has corresponded with Becker's greatest achievement, his students, many of whom have been more prolific if not more brilliant than he. While the

problem of relativism is not at this time a major issue among historians, all the makers of myth," as Becker called them, should read this well-written biographical study in American intellectual history. They may even learn not to take themselves too seriously. EZIO CAPPADOCIA

Royal Military College of Canada

Laurier: Artisan de l'unité canadienne, 1841-1919. By RAYMOND TANGHE. Figures canadiennes, 4. Paris: Mame [Montreal: Librairie Hurtubise-Mame-Hatier Limitée]. 1960. Pp. 192. \$1.50.

THIS PAPERBACK IS THE FOURTH VOLUME of a series published in France on Canadian personalities and events. In it Mr. Tanghe, known more as a geographer and bibliographer than as a historian, introduces Sir Wilfrid Laurier to a Frenchspeaking audience. Written with zest and sympathy, the book serves its purpose of introduction well, but offers no new knowledge or original interpretation of Laurier and his times.

The central theme of Laurier's career, as seen by Mr. Tanghe, is indicated in the sub-title. Laurier is the "artisan de l'unité canadienne." The author traces this theme through his discussion of the events, personalities, and political principles of Laurier's life. The maintenance of national unity, as we are so well aware—yet constantly told, was achieved through compromise, tolerance, conciliation, and within the context "des libertés britanniques." The traditional discussions of the Manitoba schools question, imperialism, the Autonomy Bill, and the conscription issue are used to demonstrate that no other policy was possible within Canada. We are not made fully aware, however, whether or not Mr. Tanghe believes that Laurier achieved his goal; but we suspect that "le tout était toujours à recommencer."

Owing to the emphasis on this theme other aspects of Laurier's career are overlooked. For instance there is no discussion of Laurier's political skill and his ability to manage men. His lack of mastery of economic and transportation questions and his apparent misunderstanding of the so-called "imperialist" position are not fully developed. These lacks are particularly unfortunate since it is in these aspects of Laurier's career that our knowledge is so limited. Much of the historical perspective of such problems as the relations between church and state and the racial-religious conflicts of the period is lost in the author's attempt to simplify these questions. It would appear, however, that these deficiencies arise more from the nature of the book than from Mr. Tanghe's already established

The work did not apparently warrant any documentation in the opinion either of the editors or of the author. The brief bibliography (eight published titles, four of which are earlier biographies) indicates that the inspiration and the bulk of the information for the book came from secondary sources. These weaknesses make it impossible for the biography to be considered a work of original research and considerably limit its usefulness.

On the other hand, the author's polished style and obvious admiration for his subject make for pleasant reading. It is to be hoped that the conscientious student, introduced to Laurier by this work, will continue his reading and develop his interest in Canadian history. Should this be accomplished, Mr. Tanghe will have performed a singular service.

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LAURIER L. LAPIERRE

Prairie Editor: The Life and Times of Buchanan of Lethbridge. By C. Frank Steele. Foreword by Arthur R. Ford. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 196. \$4.50.

THE NEWSPAPER EDITOR has played a distinguished part in the history of the prairie west. Nicholas Flood Davin of the Regina Leader, Frank Oliver of the Edmonton Bulletin, Dafoe of the Winnipeg Free Press were all men of more than ordinary consequence, not only on the streets of their prairie cities but in the wider fields of provincial or Canadian politics. They were first-rate journalists who gave a vigorous individuality to their papers, an individuality too often lost in the chain publications of our generation. Buchanan of the Lethbridge Herald

was a worthy member of their company.

Buchanan was a typical successful Canadian of the early twentieth century—of Scottish antecedents, son of a Methodist manse, a convert to liberalism, and, when he came west, already an alumnus of newspapers like the Peterborough Examiner and the Toronto Telegram. He purchased a share in the Lethbridge Herald, a struggling weekly, in 1905. When he died in 1954 it was a vigorous daily, with a circulation approaching 18,000 and still independent of the press chains. In fifty years Buchanan had managed not only to make a success of his newspaper but he had served as Alberta's first Provincial Librarian, he had been a member of the Alberta legislature and, very briefly, a member of the Rutherford cabinet, though he withdrew in time to avoid serious involvement in the Alberta and Great Waterways crisis. A period in the House of Commons followed but he did not stand for re-election in 1921. In 1925, at the comparatively early age of 49, he was appointed to the Senate.

One cannot help wishing that Buchanan had found time to write his memoirs. He was a man of stature, a leading citizen of southern Alberta, high in the councils of the Liberal party, a consistent fighter in good causes, often good causes that, smacking as they do of the intellectual, find few defenders among our politicians. Had Buchanan, an effective journalist, followed the example of Sir Robert Borden, a political opponent he deeply respected and with whom he had much in common, his recollections might have been less disastrous to his

reputation.

Prairie Editor scarcely takes the place of the book Buchanan himself might have written. It is obviously a deeply felt tribute to a respected senior but it tries to tell far too much of the history of Canada, particularly of Lethbridge and southern Alberta, and fails to tell all we should like to know about Buchanan. There are too many times when the reader would like to know what Buchanan said, what he thought, but the vista is all too quickly closed. Obviously this is not the author's fault; he writes from a long and intimate experience of his chief but the documents that he needed for a satisfying biography did not exist.

L. G. THOMAS

University of Alberta

American Opinion about Russia, 1917–1920. By Leonid I. Strakhovsky. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1961. Pp. xiv, 135. \$4.75.

PROFESSOR STRAKHOVSKY'S SLENDER BOOK treats a most significant period in Russo-American relations, from the outbreak of the March revolution to the withdrawal of allied troops from Soviet soil after the ill-fated intervention.

Originally presented as a series of eight lectures at the Lowell Institute in Boston in 1946, it covers ground already blanketed by a number of scholars including Bailey, Williams, Kennan, White, and Unterberger. Its emphasis is not upon the narration of events but rather upon American opinion of those events. The conclusions are sound if not new—that the American people were confused by the rush of events in Russia and understood them not at all. The chief reasons for their state of mind were threefold: they were intellectually and emotionally unprepared for the revolution; the sources of information were unreliable (the reporters and interpreters of the events were new to the Soviet scene, they were moved by sentiment, and they were ignorant of Russia's culture and language); the personality of President Wilson was idealistic and removed from reality.

The basis of the author's survey of American opinion is, unhappily, very narrow. Apparently, he examined only two newspapers at first hand: the New York Times and the Washington Evening Star. For the views of other newspapers, he relied on the Literary Digest and Meno Lovenstein's American Opinion of Soviet Russia. There is no evidence of research in the periodical press for contemporary views nor is there anything on the attitudes of the churches, labour business, the professions, peace groups, or patriotic societies. Another serious defect of the book is the lack of analysis. Lengthy quotations of editorial opinion without interpretation or explanation are characteristic of the approach. We are told that the United States was optimistic before the November revolution but not why. We are informed that the various twists and turns of the press were "bewildering to the uninitiated American reader" but no reason is given for the twists and turns. An appraisal of the state of affairs by the New York Times on March 18, 1917, cited by the author was obviously way off the mark but even a hypothesis as to the reason is absent. On the same page (7), Mr. Strakhovsky states that the Times completely misrepresented the situation but again there is nothing in explanation. The Evening Star is referred to as "influential"—how it was manifested, on whom, and why is never explored.

Regrettably, there are some serious lapses in the mechanics of scholarship. A letter from Secretary Lansing to the Secretary of the Navy is cited in the footnotes as "Navy Department Archives." Even though the date of the letter is given, the absence of a file number would make it almost impossible for an inquiring student to find it. Similarly, the location of the E. Francis Riggs Papers (noted as a manuscript source in the Bibliography) is never revealed. The first citation (p. 34, fn. 24) mentions only "from the papers of the late Colonel E. Francis Riggs."

ARMIN RAPPAPORT

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The Mackenzie King Record. I. 1939-44. By J. W. Pickersgill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1960. Pp. xvi, 723. \$11.50.

IT WAS SURELY FITTING that when Mackenzie King died in 1950, he left behind him one final ambiguity—the status of his voluminous diaries. His will stated, "I direct my Literary Executors to destroy all of my diaries except those parts which I have indicated are and shall be available for publication or use." Since he never got around to marking the passages which he wished to have preserved, the executors have apparently decided to preserve the entire record. In this volume J. W. Pickersgill has given us the first of two volumes based on the

diary. Though the text runs to nearly 700 pages it is merely a selection and only those who have been allowed into the inner sanctum, where the original is em-

balmed, can judge whether it is an entirely fair one.

The editor has followed three principles of selection. First, he is concerned with public, not private matters. Second, he has included, by and large, only King's own comments, though there are important exceptions. Finally, he has excluded many references to persons still living (though not to some of the editor's present opponents), and also references where "Mackenzie King himself would not have wished them to be published." This latter category is perhaps the only questionable one. How does the editor know what Mr. King's view would have been? But whatever questions may arise about the selection, the importance of this book makes it very clear that the diaries must be preserved and some day made public, preferably in published form.

The book that emerges is a peculiar one, neither biography nor autobiography. The passages from the diary are connected by the editor's comments. But this does not pretend to be analytical history. Rarely is there any indication that the facts may be doubtful, opinions controversial, or other sources and accounts available. Thus the book is not history, but rather part of the stuff from which that history will one day be written. Perhaps King himself best described the book in a diary entry of November, 1943, shortly after agreeing to allow Emil Ludwig to write a brief biography of him. "I pray his thought and hand may be guided in what he writes. I have always felt I would rather write my own life

before having anyone else attempt it." Now he seems to have done it!

Although the volume provides insights into most of the activities of King's government in the 1939–44 period, two problems inevitably dominate the work: Canada's relations with her Allies, especially Great Britain and the United States, and the manpower question. On the former the picture that develops is not an unexpected one. King was deeply concerned about the role that Canada could play in obtaining American support for the war before 1941, and just as concerned after Pearl Harbour to keep Anglo-American relations on an even keel. His whole approach was based on the assumption, shared by Churchill, that "Hitler cannot be defeated, nor the British Empire saved without the aid of the United States."

Nevertheless, King was not unaware of the potential threat to Canada's existence that the United States represented, especially in the defence arrangements in which the Americans played an increasingly prominent role. At least privately, he was disturbed at the enthusiasm with which Canadians seemed to accept the growing U.S. influence on Canada. "I, personally, would be strongly opposed to anything like political union," he wrote in April, 1941, "I would keep the British Commonwealth of Nations as intact as possible." But he was even more concerned about suspected efforts by the British to centralize the empire under the guise of war necessity as his opposition to a revived Imperial War Cabinet, and even his reluctance to attend a Commonwealth conference, illustrates. He always found that Roosevelt was far more accommodating than Churchill and there can be no doubt that F.D.R., with his informal bonhomie, knew the way to King's heart much better than the British leader did.

King's mistrust of Churchill and the British led him to expect the worst from them, and to judge their intentions harshly and sometimes unjustly. What must often have seemed to the British nothing more than an effective means of prosecuting the war, appeared to King as an imperialist plot. The passages in this volume which describe King's anxiety that some mention should be made of Canadian participation in the Sicily landings in July, 1943, are suggestive of

King's attitude, as well as being indicative of the limitations of the book. King was utterly convinced that it was British opposition that prevented the inclusion of the Canadians in official announcements of the landings. He was confirmed in this suspicion because the U.S. War Department announcements did mention the Canadians. "I could not help remarking," King wrote, "how different the attitude of the Americans was from the British." Though he knew that General Eisenhower had been a stumbling block, he nevertheless held the British responsible. But Lieutenant Colonel Nicholson's The Canadians in Italy suggests a rather different conclusion. After an examination of a wide range of evidence, Nicholson argues effectively that the real difficulty lay with Eisenhower, and that the British were not prepared to go over his head, despite a desire to meet Canadian wishes. The U.S. War Department evidently suffered from no similar compunction. Thus Roosevelt once more scored with King. One would have more confidence in the Pickersgill book if it contained at least a footnote referring to the other version of the story. Actually, in retrospect, there is something rather pathetic about King's constant striving for recognition, both national and personal. What could Roosevelt and Churchill have thought of King's little lecture on Canada's "perfect equality of status" in May, 1943? And what could he have thought when he complained to them about a war bond brochure issued by a Canadian church describing Roosevelt and Churchill as "our leaders"?

On the second main theme of the volume, conscription, King's performance is much more attractive. He did get the country through the war without a serious rupture and he eventually put through a measure of conscription; it is doubtful if anyone else could have done this. Why was this so? The answer is essentially simple: he did his apprenticeship under Laurier, and while the technique he learned for keeping Canada united made him unduly cautious in peacetime, when a little division would not necessarily have harmed the country, it served him well in wartime. King was like those post-1660 politicians who had experienced the Puritan Revolution (in King's case the revolution of 1917) and wanted to avoid repetition at all costs. He knew that, above all, he had to move with caution to keep Quebec with him. It was true, as he remarked after the 1940 election, that by staying with Laurier in 1917 he had put Quebec in his pocket. But there were many times when he might have lost it. He did not because he knew the importance of good Quebec lieutenants, and to King a good lieutenant was one who could fight his case at cabinet and caucus. But King not only chose excellent lieutenants; he was also prepared to fight for Quebec's interests himself when others did it ineffectively. Finally, King realized, as perhaps few English Canadians did, what conscription really meant to Quebec -domination of a conquered people and minority by an Orange Protestant majority." It should also be noted, of course, that in this matter of conscription, as in so many others, King was fortunate in his opponents. He needed Quebec, but Quebec also needed him, for the alternatives appeared worse. All of these factors helped King through the difficult stages of the first conscription crisis. Borden lacked nearly all of these strengths during the 1917 crisis.

Though these problems and many others are illustrated in the book, its main importance is in the insight it gives into King's personality and tactics. The traditional picture is substantiated, and is best summed up in F. R. Scott's well-

known lines:

Truly he will be remembered Wherever men honour ingenuity, Ambiguity, inactivity, and political longevity. These characteristics are all there: ingenuity—"conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription"; ambiguity—"to leave sufficient leeway to proceed by steps and degrees and to leave sufficient doorways open for necessary revisions as to save the situation"; inactivity—"I was a great believer in events determining situations"; political longevity—"I would like to round out a quarter of a century and to lead my party . . . as long as Sir John led his from the days of Confederation." And finally, said Scott, he "always led us back to where we were before," and King replies, "I felt happy that in my Industry and Humanity, written after the last war, there will be found pretty much the whole programme that is now being suggested for post-war purposes." Indeed it is all there. But there is more.

What must impress the reader of this volume was King's keen sense of what the country would take without being shattered. This sense was derived from a deep feeling for his country's history. He had a close personal connection with two serious disruptions in the Canadian past—1837 and 1917. For him the results of both were tragic-exile for the Rebel and his family in 1837, political exile for the Rebel's grandson in 1917. Like Charles II, King did not want to go on his travels again. So he avoided divisive issues, and was thus seemingly devoid of principles-except for the principle of national unity and the preservation of the Liberal dynasty. Looking over the returns from the plebescite he wrote, "I thought of Durham's Report on the state of Quebec when he arrived there after the Rebellion of 1837-38, and said he found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state. That would be the case in Canada as a whole, unless the whole question of conscription from now on is approached with the utmost care." It is hard to find a flaw in this view. His caution was exasperating, his willingness to identify his interests, indeed his ego, with the interests of the nation was infuriating. And yet, during the critical days of the war, where did the alternative lie?

Of course King did not stop at identifying his interests with the nation's; he went further and saw the divine hand at work. Like most successful political leaders, he felt the heavy hand of destiny upon him—a fact that is not surprising in a man so lacking in self-confidence. Obviously, that evangelical priest in politics, William Ewart Gladstone, was the image in which King tried to mould himself—as he noted rather unctuously in February, 1942. Laying down this fascinating book, one sympathizes with that colleague of Gladstone's who remarked that he did not object to the fact that the G.O.M. always had the ace of trumps up his sleeve, but he did disapprove of Gladstone's claim that the Almighty had put it there.

RAMSAY COOK

University of Toronto

Canadian Annual Review for 1960: A Reference Guide and Record. Edited by John T. Saywell. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1961. Pp. xviii, 401. \$15.00.

THE REVIVAL OF THE Canadian Annual Review is a welcome event. Many Canadians in search of information about their country during the first three decades of this century have been grateful for the earlier volumes of the same title. For some developments during those years the review is still the only readily available account, and for many more it provides a place to begin

investigation by furnishing a key date, an outline of the positions of the major contenders in a controversy, quotations from leading newspapers, or some useful statistic. The new version is shorter than most of the earlier issues and is organized on a different pattern. It contains fewer facts and more analysis, but it will

continue to serve the same purposes and some it will serve better.

There are four main divisions in the book. The first, the editor's account of "Parliament and Politics," is a closely packed yet highly readable essay on Canadian politics, federal and provincial, during 1960. Robert Spencer's well-organized discussion of "External Affairs and Defence" is equally valuable and interesting. Under the heading "The National Economy" Douglas G. Hartle discusses general features of the economy, including government monetary and fiscal policy, and John D. Harbron deals with conditions in business and industry. The old Review rarely made critical assessments of persons or events, although its strong conservative and imperialist bias was never far below the surface, especially during the first twenty-one years of publication when J. Castell Hopkins was the editor and wrote the whole of each volume himself. The present editor, John T. Saywell, and his colleagues are less hesitant in making explicit judgments; naturally enough in this generation they are usually more liberal and nationalist in tone.

The last section, "Life and Leisure," contains seventeen chapters, each by a different author, and ranging from scientific research in Canada to sports, and from art to television; as a gesture toward our dual culture four chapters on aspects of life in French Canada are published in French. The picture of life in Canada drawn in these pages suggests that the arts are increasingly important to Canadians but that religion is of negligible social significance, since no church or religious organization receives more than passing reference. A few of the writers present purely factual material, an approach no doubt determined partly by the nature of their subjects, as in the discussion of science. Others, for reasons not so obvious, decline to probe very deeply. No reader of Charles Bilodeau's comments on education in Quebec will learn much about the conflict over clerical v. lay control which lies behind a good deal of the ferment in education in that province, while the chapters on radio and television ignore the year's lively debate on the relative merits of public and private broadcasting. Among the contributions to this section which go beyond mere narrative the most noteworthy are those by Milton Wilson and Guy Sylvestre on literature in English and in French, by Ramsay Cook on the social sciences, and by Edward McWhinney on the Bill of Rights.

Anyone who reads this work with the earlier series in mind must reflect on the increased complexity and maturity of Canadian society revealed by the comparison. The Canada Council, which has supported the publication of this

volume, should take heart.

MARGARET PRANG

University of British Columbia

The American Historical Association's Guide to Historical Literature. Edited by George F. Howe et al. New York: The Macmillan Company [Galt: Brett-Macmillan Ltd.]. 1961. Pp. xxxvi, 962. \$16.50.

IN 1931, THE American Historical Association published a Guide to Historical Literature which immediately became and has remained an invaluable tool for

the student of history. Now, thirty years later, the Association has put out another Guide which, while larger in size and different in emphasis and in arrangement, is designed to serve the same purpose: provide the student with a listing of the

most important printed materials in the long history of mankind.

The Guide is divided into nine parts: three cover topics (Introduction and General History, Historical Beginnings, The World in Recent Times); the remainder are geographic (Middle Period in Eurasia and Northern Africa, Asia since Early Times, Modern Europe, the Americas, Africa, Australasia and Oceania). Taken together, the whole world in its chronological entirety is represented. Each part, in turn, is further divided into sections dealing with topics or geographical areas. For example, "The World in Recent Times" breaks down into four topical sections (Recent History, The World Wars, International Relations: Political, and International Relations: Non-Political) while the part on the Americas consists of geographical sections (the Americas: General, Latin America, British and Dutch America, the United States of America). Each section is designated consecutively by letters running from A through the alphabet and to AI. The organization of each section is approximately the same, as follows: Bibliographies, libraries, and museum collections; encyclopaedias and works of reference; geographies, gazetteers, and atlases; anthropological, demographic, and linguistic works; printed collections of sources; shorter and longer general histories; histories of periods, areas, and topics; biographies; government publications; publications of academies, universities, and learned societies; periodicals. Within the sections, each entry is numbered in sequence with the number preceded by the section letter. This method of identification is used in the index and in cross-references.

The usefulness of the Guide is, of course, immeasurable. It will become the basic tool for the historical scholar and the starting point for the researcher. In any given field and area he can find the most significant material in any language in this one convenient compendium. What constitutes the most significant material may be debatable and, I dere say, a specialist in any of the topics covered could probably suggest some titles which should have been omitted and others which should have been included. But when one considers the herculean task of sifting all the articles, books, bibliographies, and other publications in all fields of history and selecting 20,000 items, some errors of commission and omission may be

forgiven.

ARMIN RAPPAPORT

University of California

European

The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary. Edited by G. R. Elton. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1960. Pp. xvi, 496. \$4.95.

THIS BOOK HAS BEEN DESIGNED as a replacement for J. R. Tanner's well-known collection of Tudor constitutional documents, which has long been an indispensable aid, but which is now somewhat out of date. In general it follows the form of Tanner's work, but there are significant differences in the arrangement of topics, in the number and variety of documents, and on some points of interpretation. One notable feature is the greater emphasis on administration. That is

a subject which Mr. Elton has made almost his own; and his interest in this important aspect of Tudor government is reflected in the commentaries on each of the institutions with which he deals, and in his choice of documents. The commentaries form a clear and concise history of the constitutional changes of the period. The footnotes and Bibliography provide an excellent guide to all recent work on the subject. Most of the basic documents published in earlier works of the kind are reproduced, sometimes in extended form; and substantial additions have been made, especially on subjects that have hitherto attracted little attention.

The Crown and the Council with its subsidiary branches are naturally given a great deal of space. The treason laws of the period are discussed at length, and illustrated by an unusual number of extracts. From the familiar statements of contemporaries on the nature of the royal prerogative Mr. Elton concludes that there was no doubt or ambiguity, that the prerogative was derived from, and was limited by the law, and that the ideas of Tudor monarchs and their advisers differed fundamentally from those of their successors. His views on the Council and the controversies concerning its history in these years are clear and emphatic. There was, in his judgment, one Council, and only one Council. Discussion about the supposed difference between the Privy Council and the Star Chamber, at least in the matter of membership, is dismissed as irrelevant and misleading.

The sections on the Church and on Parliament are especially interesting. The Reformation is described as "definitely a revolution," and the concept of royal supremacy which resulted from it is examined fully. Mr. Elton's conclusion is that under Henry VIII the supremacy was personal and was not shared by the two Houses. Under Elizabeth, as a result of the part taken by Parliament in the settlement of 1559, it is described as a compromise. It seems pretty clear that Elizabeth herself did not share this view, and it is to be regretted that no document is given here to illustrate her opinion. The chapters on financial administration and on the law courts, lay and ecclesiastical, are among the most important additions which Mr. Elton has introduced. The first of these is limited almost entirely to the non-parliamentary revenues of the Crown, and most of the evidence is taken from the reign of Henry VIII and the period immediately following. The developing financial crisis in the closing years of the century, and the efforts of Burghley and others to find a solution, are hardly noticed. The closing chapter on local government follows traditional lines and adds little to a subject that is still somewhat obscure. In conclusion, this is an unusually interesting, well organized, and carefully edited collection. But the older books should be kept on hand. They contain some material not reproduced here, which is still useful and important.

D. J. McDougall

University of Toronto

The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation, 1570–1640. By Charles H. and Katherine George. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1961. Pp. x, 452. \$9.75.

THE AUTHORS, spurred by an interest in the relation of religion to "social aspects of the historical process" have "plunged into" and relentlessly ransacked the works of over one hundred English divines in the seventy years before the Civil War. Their own presentation is verbose and awkward, reading like a committee report; but the quotations they have collected provide a sort of anthology which will be

useful for graduate students and above. The assumption behind the survey is that, in spite of variety and differences of emphasis, there was among these divines a "common Protestant understanding." Historians, we are told, have overstressed the dissensions. There was little "consistent division" (for instance) between "Anglicans" and "Puritans," except at the beginning (Cartwright) and the end (Laud)—the rest was "halcyon," "the large area of the via media," "the wide and relatively level plateau of valid Protestantism." This, of course, is debatable: Hooker would have been surprised. It involves some omissions and much cutting of corners; and it does separate ideas from action-how fit into the thesis, for example, the growth of the presbyterian movement and the response of authority? History with the ideas left out is bad: but ideas (especially in sermons) presented without history are equally misleading. However, it is an interpretation which deserves to be made. The thesis assumed, the authors expound the English Protestant mind as it dealt with theology, society, economic theory, the "spirit of capitalism" (an interesting chapter: Protestantism, the Georges conclude, was "agin" it), political thought, the family, and the church. The clerics get low grades for their "flabby," evasive political thought, for their conformist and conservative social teaching (a smothering by "facile sophistry" of a "Christian radicalism" of which the authors seem to approve), and for their failure to provide a "positive Christian economics" to cope with the new "bourgeois ethos of economic liberalism"—this was the last, fatal evasion, leaving Protestantism with "a receding heaven and mere apologies for a world outrunning its tutelage." But Protestantism-especially with its emphasis on "the greatest intensity of religious life to be achieved in all the ordinary routines of society"-did (so the argument runs) provide the "psychological stamina" for revolution.

There is, then, much interesting material here. But the book must be used with some caution and it cannot be read without perhaps immoderate effort. One small point: any student who accepts the summing up (page 72) of a quotation from the Restoration bishop, Robert Sanderson, as "no more and no less than the creed of Calvinism" will find much of Tudor and Stuart theological controversy

incomprehensible.

H. C. PORTER

Selwyn College Cambridge

The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu: The Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections. Translated by Henry Bertram Hill. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1961. Pp. xx, 128. \$3.75.

PROFESSOR HILL'S SELECTIONS from the best edition of Richelieu's Testament Politique (by André in 1947) are a welcome addition to the slim library of documents in English on the old régime. Having said this, it is necessary to caution the reader about the merits of both the original and the present excerpts. While the authenticity of the Testament is now well established, it should be read with certain mental reservations—reservations which unfortunately have not been made by many reputable historians. Written under the guiding hand of Richelieu for the edification of Louis XIII, the work provides a biased but penetrating analysis of the king's character, and a one-sided view of the Cardinal's personality. The treatment of the period should not be considered a blueprint of Richelieu's original intentions and an account of their implementation; rather, as a series of repetitive and occasionally incisive comments on the problems of the French Crown, written from time to time by the chief minister.

It is understandable, but somewhat regrettable, that Professor Hill has chosen his excerpts with general reader interest and the fame of certain striking passages uppermost in his mind. The inclusion of sections on Louis' character and the problem of dealing with royal officials is both natural and commendable. The harsh treatment of duller, but highly instructive, passages on such matters as administration and the aristocracy—matters which plagued the monarchy throughout the history of the old régime—is more difficult to understand. This is particularly true in view of the amount of space devoted to rather insignificant, if interesting, sections from the *Testament*.

Footnotes and Introduction are brief, perhaps too brief. Two errors should be noted. The term parquet (royal attorneys) is confused with paulette (permitting officers to bequeath their positions). The ten-volume Société de l'Histoire de France version of Richelieu's Mémoires is incomplete; after 1629 one must refer

to the older Michaud and Poujoulat collection.

A. LLOYD MOOTE

University of Cincinnati

Parliamentary Government in France: Revolutionary Origins, 1789-1791. By R. K. Gooch. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press [Toronto: Thomas Allen Limited]. 1960. Pp. x, 253. \$5.25.

ALMOST ANYONE MIGHT HAVE TOLD Professor Gooch, before the manuscript went to press, that this book has serious flaws, but to judge from the acknowledgments in the Preface the only people who ever had the opportunity to do so were two typists. To begin with, it is incoherent owing to a confusion of logical and chronological order. The chapter headings suggest that the author set out to deal with a series of topics, such as the prerogative of appointment and removal, ministerial responsibility, etc., but at the same time felt somehow compelled to tell the story, day by day, of the constitutional debates in the Constituent Assembly. Whatever his intention, he plods from session to session through the bric-à-brac of speeches, documents, events, and ideas with the antiquarian enthusiasm of a guide in a museum, interrupting himself to pass comments and throw off asides, muttering about "scenes of great enthusiasm" or "somewhat disordered discussions," mysteriously pointing out this or that as "striking," "significant," or "of more than passing interest," and confusing the reader beyond endurance. His style is at once coy ("it need scarcely be pointed out") and pompous ("Retrospective reflection concerning the constitutional activity of the National Assembly of 1789-1791 would seem to find its most natural initial point in the simple consideration that the final product of the Assembly's work was strikingly short-lived").

The reader who works hard enough on the book to coax out its substance will find little more than variations on the familiar theme that the growth of English parliamentary government in France was prevented by the principle of national sovereignty and the doctrine of the separation of powers. Far more interesting to consider is the profoundly unhistorical and unpolitical nature of the author's thinking. He writes of eighteenth-century Frenchmen as though they were unaffected by their time and circumstances, free intellects in search of the ideal form of government. He leads us into a cuckoo-land where a political system—parliamentary, republican, monarchical, or even English—can be selected, adapted, and installed like central heating; where political differences are based on mere opinion rather than on interests; and where a law passed represents the solution of a problem rather than the victory of a group. Can he seriously write

of a country where the Crown slowly codified hundreds of local coûtumes—"Historically, of course, the source of law in a monarchy is the monarch"? Does he really believe that the rejection of monarchy in France and the weakness of the French executive have stemmed from the way in which the Constitution of 1791 was worded? Or may we conclude that with all his experience as a writer and teacher he intended this book for use in the graduate seminar as an example of everything a monograph should not be?

JOHN BOSHER

University of British Columbia

The Correspondence of Edmund Burke. III. July 1774-June 1778. Edited by George H. Guttridge. Cambridge: At the University Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1961. Pp. xxvi, 479, illus. \$12.00.

"I CONFESS [wrote Burke to Lord Rockingham in January 1775] I do not entirely enter into the Idea of waiting until the publick discontents grow ripe. They never did, do, or will, ripen to any purpose unless they are matured by proper means." This continuing problem of Burke, to fire the magnificoes of the Rockingham party up to a systematic opposition to the Ministry on the basis of large political principles, dominates this third volume of the definitive edition of his correspondence, covering the period from the summer of 1774 to the summer of 1778. In these years—between the passing of the Intolerable Acts and the decisive intervention of France in the American War—Burke is at the height of his powers as a party politician. The Irish adventurer days are over; Verney, William Burke, and the other slightly soiled figures of his rise sink into the background. Now he is the respected manager of the party, cutting the party line on the great issues which the American crisis thrust upon them so as to unite opinion within and without doors, to overturn the Ministry, to cut out exiguous rivals like the Chathamites, and to bring the Rockinghams triumphantly back to power.

But the author of the speeches on American taxation and conciliation of America looked further than party advantage, to resist what appeared from the perspectives of opposition and geographic distance to be the exercise of tyranny over freeborn Britons, and to prepare for the day of reckoning when ". . . there will then appear—a remnant still left in Great Britain—with whom America may conciliate. . . ." Here is Burke at his whiggish best, alienating his Bristol constituents in order to help free Irish, and in principle all British trade from restrictions; co-operating with William Eden to mitigate the ferocities of the criminal law; declaring his faith in toleration for all religious sects to preach and teach as

they would.

These are, too, the years of Burke's representation of Bristol and the editor's interest in this subject has ensured that a generous proportion of the volume is taken up with his correspondence with Richard Champion, John Noble, and other Bristol notabilities on the commercial business of that city. The criterion for the selection of letters—that they should add substantially to our knowledge of Burke—has been adhered to with remarkable fidelity and judgment, but occasionally the reader must feel that fragmentary or duplicating notes on the trivia of Bristol politics might have been dispensed with in favour of letters, such as that of the Duke of Portland of October 5, 1775, setting forth the party's defence of the Declaratory Act, or John Cartwright's letter of February 18, 1777, enclosing his famous plan for the reform of Parliament—both of which are referred to only

in notes. The footnote references, as in the preceding volumes, are lavish, though it may be questioned whether the editor ought to usurp the simpler functions of the O.E.D. by explaining such terms as "Pyrrhic" and "chokepear."

But these are relatively small matters. This third volume is a worthy successor

to the first two in this most magnificent edition.

JOHN NORRIS

University of British Columbia

Wellington at War, 1794-1815. A selection of his wartime letters edited and introduced by ANTONY BRETT-JAMES. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1961. Pp. xl, 338, maps. \$9.00.

SINCE HIS EXCELLENT BIOGRAPHY of General Graham, students of the Napoleonic era have waited hopefully for another book of the same type from Antony Brett-James. Wellington at War is not quite what was hoped for, since it is a selection of Wellington's own letters, but for those who have not the time to read through the whole of the Despatches and Supplementary Despatches themselves, this book may prove even more fascinating. The author has chosen carefully, and has covered all Wellington's military life on active service. Divided into six parts, the letters deal briefly with Wellington's early years between 1769 and 1797; with the settlement of Mysore and with the Mahratta War; with the years 1805–1807; and then, as we would expect, more fully with the Peninsular War and

the period of campaigning in France and Flanders.

The picture of Wellington which emerges from these letters is, on the whole, a just one. He is shown as a man of great practical wisdom, attentive to detail, honest to an almost embarrassing degree, phenomenally industrious, and calmly confident of his own abilities and of the fighting qualities of the troops under his command. There was, of course, more to Wellington than this, and more than can conceivably be revealed by any selection of his correspondence. Wellington wrote as he fought, competently but without genius, but it is to his battles rather than to his letters that we must turn for an assessment of the whole man. And although it may not be true in literature, it is certainly true in war, that there are situations in which competence is better than genius. Therefore if one is to do justice to Wellington, it is well to remember that he was never once defeated on the field of battle.

A certain chilling quality in the great soldier comes out in these letters—and here again, although this is true enough, it is not quite the whole story. Wellington never attempted to gain affection, but he was respected, feared, and trusted by his army. Napoleon was idolized. Yet in all the practical aspects of war—including the not unimportant one of ultimate victory—it was better to serve

the British general than the French emperor.

Thus, although some facets of Wellington's character can not possibly be revealed by any selection of his correspondence, Wellington at War nevertheless gives a remarkably accurate impression of a very remarkable man. Mr. Brett-James has performed a valuable service in his selection and editing of these letters, and it is to be hoped that he has not yet finished with the period.

D. J. GOODSPEED

Army Historical Section Ottawa

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The Destruction of Lord Raglan: A Tragedy of the Crimean War, 1854-5. By CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd. [Toronto: Longmans Canada Limited]. 1961. Pp. xxii, 338, illus. \$6.00.

DEEP IN THE MIND OF EVERY CIVILIAN there lurks a dark and lingering suspicion that every military man is both unprogressive and incompetent. Certainly a superficial study of the Crimean War would seem definitely to confirm all the worst fears, but a closer examination of the facts would show that at least half of the responsibility for the disasters of the war came directly from the neglect, stupidity, and indifference of the civilians in Whitehall. The Crimean War was a limited war; the Allies had only the aim to prevent the Russians from destroying Turkey. There was no intention of carrying the war to areas outside the Black Sea. (Actually it might have made much more sense had the Allies sailed up the Baltic and bombarded St. Petersburg rather than confining themselves to an attack on the Crimean peninsula.) Because of the limitations laid down by the Allies in their tactics and strategy, the Russians should have been able to hold their own without difficulty and to force the Allies to withdraw as the Turks

were able to do in the Gallipoli campaign in the War of 1914-18.

With the vast number of biographies written about eminent persons of the nineteenth century it is really quite astounding that Fitzroy Somerset, Lord Raglan, should have had to wait until this book was written for someone to take him up as a subject for study. Yet in a very real way his own nature, career, and personality have all contributed to his neglect. For over forty years—from 1808 to 1852—Raglan was in the shadow of the Duke of Wellington. Not that Raglan minded being overshadowed by the Iron Duke at all, indeed he almost courted the shade, for Wellington was his hero and his leader, Raglan the moon to Wellington's earth. Indeed, to sum Raglan up one might say that he was an admirable second, and this can be a place of importance, but he was not a leader. Raglan was a popular general; he was popular with his fellow officers and the men. But for a commander something more than popularity, namely inspiration, is needed and this he did not

have. He was just too gentlemanly.

Raglan never really had a chance to do much in the war in any case. His fellow officers, many of whom had purchased their commissions, were extraordinary; "only two of those officers chosen had experience of commanding in action against trained troops, against anything larger than a battalion; and only one of them was under sixty, and he had never been in action before." Many of the generals were hated by the men and hated each other; the quarrels of Lords Lucan and Cardigan being perhaps the most famous and most disastrous. Further the soldiers who looked fine on parade were totally unprepared for real warfare. Perhaps Raglan thought of Wellington's remark on his soldiers that while he did not know if they frightened the enemy they certainly frightened him. The navy remained almost totally independent both in attitude and action. As for the Turks and the French with whom Raglan was associated in this affair he found them difficultthe French commander whose early motto had been "I will be memorable or die" had all the dash and bravado that Raglan lacked but certainly fewer brains than the Englishman. With such a motley crew it is no wonder that the campaign was hardly brilliant. Raglan never exerted himself to command and he liked to be in the forefront of the engagements rather than in a staff tent planning strategy for he had excessive "readiness to give his officers credit for more intelligence and foresight than they possessed . . ." which was not at all wise.

The accounts of the various battles from the initial engagements at Alma to Balaclava and Inkerman are presented with much clarity. This dual work of

biography and military history is excellent. The author does not tire one with excessive detail but at the same time presents enough material to give the reader a clear account of the events. He has made good use of manuscript materials, newspapers, and printed works. While the notes are at the end of the work this is not too irritating as most are for reference only and are not necessary for comprehension of the text. There is a good brief glossary of military terms and the illustrations are well chosen.

S. W. JACKMAN

Bates College Lewiston, Maine

Feargus O'Connor: Irishman and Chartist. By Donald Read and Eric Glascow. London: Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd. [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1961. Pp. 160. \$4.50.

PROFESSOR G. D. H. COLE used to lament that Feargus O'Connor continued to be overlooked by writers and researchers and that he remained the most influential figure in nineteenth-century British history without a biography. Donald Read and Eric Glasgow have tried to make good this deficiency and to supply the growing bibliography of Chartist studies with an adequate account of the great champion of the People's Charter. The result is far from impressive. The authors have searched Chartist records and O'Connor's personal traces as diligently as one could wish, but their findings really add very little of significance to what has already established in the various well-known Chartist histories about O'Connor.

To some extent the unsatisfactory nature of this book is the result of the authors' shortcomings as writers. They appear to be incapable either of careful and discerning analysis or of sustained and interesting narrative. Their materials are put together with little insight as to character or the psychology of personality, and with no apparent feeling for their subject. It must be added, however, that their task would undoubtedly have taxed the ablest of biographers. Even the most skilled would, without question, find it difficult to quicken these particular historical bones. The Northern Star aside, the materials for O'Connor's life are meagre indeed, and those that have survived are polemical and highly unsatisfactory. Here we have one of the major problems of labour history. Adequate accounts of the lives of such figures as Potter, Harney, Ernest Jones, Applegarth, O'Connor and a host of other worthies will probably never be possible simply because of the dearth of those materials which the well-wrought historical biography requires. The limitations of the book at hand are a commentary on this point. O'Connor, who cannot be said to have managed his public career with business-like discipline or efficiency, did not make any of those provisions for his posthumous fame which the élite groups of the British upper and middle classes commonly arrange. There are no files of O'Connor papers in the British Museum-or anywhere else. While a more experienced and inspired team of biographers could certainly have made a better book out of what has survived we must, nevertheless, applaud the diligence with which these authors have endeavoured, with scant encouragement from the archives, to fill one of the conspicuous gaps in mid-nineteenth-century British history. Their book will be helpful to students and it is probably as good as we shall get on this subject.

H. W. McCready

Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885–1959.

By Franklyn Arthur Johnson. With a Foreword by Lord Ismay. London and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. x, 416. \$7.50.

THERE IS PROBABLY NO INSTITUTION of equal importance in the modern history of Great Britain about which so little has previously been known as the Committee of Imperial Defence. It was established early in the present century largely as a result of British experience in the South African war. It sank into obscurity with the formation of the coalition government in 1940, and the assumption by the prime minister of the title and duties of minister of defence; and it was formally abolished in 1946, when its duties and responsibilities were transferred to the newly created ministry of defence. This study, by an American scholar whose primary interest is in the field of government, is the first serious attempt that has been made to write its history, and to form some estimate of its practical achievement and of its influence on other institutions, civil and military, in Great Britain, in the Dominions, and more recently in the United States. The general purpose is indicated by the text with which it begins, and the moral with which it ends. The text is a passage from Lindsay's work on the modern state, emphasizing the difficulty of combining efficient, centralized military organization with truly democratic government. The moral is found in the author's urgent appeal for Anglo-American co-operation, or even union in some form of "federal entity," for the defence of the free world.

Lord Ismay describes the book as "authoritative," and no one is better qualified to judge. But there are limits to what can be done in such a history under present conditions. The proceedings of the Committee were necessarily shrouded in secrecy and most of its essential records are still withheld from scholars. Mr. Johnson has therefore been obliged to rely largely upon such printed sources as official reports and parliamentary debates, supplemented by such scraps of information as could be gleaned from newspapers and periodicals, and from the memoirs of some of the men who took part in its work. He has received some information and a great deal of valuable advice and assistance from Lord Hankey and Lord Ismay; and he has made good use of the brief and guarded accounts of the early history of the Committee published by these two secretaries. From such sources, and from a large collection of secondary works dealing with the problem of defence and subjects related to it, he has compiled a book that is on many points extremely useful and informative, and one that will be most welcome to students of the period. It is, indeed, more than a history of the C.I.D. It is a survey, at times clear and concise, at others somewhat diffuse, repetitive, and uncertain, of the whole discussion of defence policy from the 1880's to the end of the Second World War.

The value of the book lies mainly in the detailed information which it provides about the personnel, organization, and procedure of the Committee itself and of the many subordinate agencies which developed under its aegis. The system was highly flexible, and the Committee was apparently free to adopt whatever method seemed most suitable for conducting its inquiries and securing required information. Membership was never confined to the ruling party; and continuity was preserved through all changes of administration by the secretary, Colonel Hankey, and by the permanent secretariat which he quickly developed to a high degree of efficiency. This served as the model, if not the progenitor of the cabinet secretariat established by Lloyd George in 1917. The two institutions were closely linked through Colonel Hankey's position as secretary of both. But they were never identical, and Mr. Johnson's statement that "the C.I.D.'s secretariat was becoming the Prime Minister's secretariat" is misleading. Lloyd George

had his own personal secretariat, about which a good deal was said then and later; but this was not the same as the permanent secretariat which henceforth served the cabinet. On the military side the most notable creation was the Chiefs of Staff Committee, established in 1924 to deal with the difficult problem of co-ordination of the three services. Mr. Johnson describes it as the "core of the C.I.D. system," and he gives some emphasis to it as the precursor of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in the United States.

Some parts of the narrative dealing with the role of the C.I.D. in relation to the Dominions raise more serious questions. The difficulty may be due in part to a lack of precision in the use of terms, but it is evident at many points that Mr. Johnson is a little uncertain about the exact position of the Dominions and the extent of the autonomy which they had acquired in the opening decades of the century. He describes the C.I.D. on the eve of the First World War as an "Imperial Council for consultation," and the discussion that follows appears to rest on the assumption that it had for all practical purposes superseded the Imperial Conference as the organ of consultation and co-operation among the self-governing communities of the empire. The response to Ward's motion in 1911, and the proceedings of the Imperial War Conference in 1918, should be enough to dispel any such illusion. Similarly, the Imperial General Staff is described in 1912 as an "effective empire-wide organ." That is no doubt what the advocates of military union desired, but the definition is not in accord with the facts, either in 1912 or at any later period. There are some inaccuracies as well, perhaps of minor importance, but serving to cloud the whole concept of the Commonwealth. The Dominions as a group did not oppose the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty in 1921. Australia and New Zealand were more anxious for its renewal than was the British government itself. Canada was not the only Dominion which declined to send military aid during the Chanak crisis, and the Canadian reply to the inquiry was not, as is here suggested, a simple negative. Later in the narrative there is a brief reference to the "Imperial Conference of 1935" and its failure to make any recommendations on the subject of defence. There was of course no such conference in 1935, and it is not clear just what is meant.

The book is written from a point of view strongly sympathetic with that of the imperialists and military planners. Their critics or opponents, pacifists, socialists, economy-minded ministers, nationalists in Canada and elsewhere, are too often regarded as simple obstructionists. There are no doubt grounds for difference of opinion; but nothing of value is added to the book by the author's disposition to sit in judgment—in his own words, to "prefer serious charges"—against so many of those who had to deal with the problem in all its complexity, and who

did not see it in quite the same light as he does.

D. J. McDougall

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Great Britain and the United States, 1895–1903. By A. E. CAMPBELL. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd. [Toronto: Longmans Canada Limited]. 1960. Pp. viii, 216, \$5.40.

THE CHIEF OBJECT of this well-written, revised, doctoral dissertation is to demonstrate the reasons for Britain's "virtual treaties of surrender" in the Venezuela Boundary Dispute, the Hay-Pauncefote Canal Treaty of 1901, and the Alaska Boundary Treaty of 1903. Yet Britain reacted angrily to the Kaiser's telegram of 1896 and fought the Boers for two and a half years. Why did the attitude to the United States differ from that to the rest of the world?

Dr. Campbell argues that while Britain might be horrified with the implications

of President Cleveland's message, for example, she lacked the strength to withstand United States' resources in the western hemisphere directed towards the attainment of a particular diplomatic aim. Canada, of course, complained at the sacrifice of her interests, but Britain's surrenders to the United States would do the least harm to her position in the rest of the world because aggressive American imperialism was then confined by the Monroe Doctrine and the tradition of isolationism to the western hemisphere. Moreover how could Britain take seriously a Yankee steer rampaging through a diplomatic china shop obviously without malevolent intent? The chief rationalization for surrender, however, was pride in the successes of "Anglo-Saxon" cousins, conveniently ignoring the many Americans who did not fit that category. Thus the myth of racial solidarity with the United States had a purpose not aggressive but defensive—to assuage diplomatic defeats. On the other hand, the American attitude towards Britain was far more realistic, being based on the ideological similarity of the institutions of the two countries.

The chapters on the Spanish-American War and the Far East form a kind of commentary on the foregoing. During the war British public opinion alone sympathized with an "Anglo-Saxon" power conquering an effete Latin power and acquiring its colonies; and incidentally justifying its own imperialism. American gratitude in that war did not lead to the hoped-for American intervention in the Far East, but only to a moralistic gesture, the Open-Door policy

for China.

Although Dr. Campbell has used manuscripts on both sides of the Atlantic his work here only goes a little beyond that of Professor Charles S. Campbell, Jr.'s Anglo-American Understanding 1898–1903 (1957). Dr. A. E. Campbell's contribution lies chiefly in the analysis of the ideas, assumptions, and irrational arguments that Britain used. He finds the sources of these ideas in the leading newspapers and periodicals; and these were representative of British opinion because the editors formed part of an unusually coherent governing class.

This well-indexed study is an excellent analysis, not least because it accepts the fact and the importance of the irrational in international politics. Might not, however, the irrational interpretation be now taken a step further: To what extent was an unconscious motivation for the British surrender of 1895–1903 a kind

of shriving for the guilt that remained from 1783?

NORMAN PENLINGTON

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The Russian Intelligentsia. Edited by RICHARD PIPES. New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 234. \$4.50.

"A LITTLE LEARNING is a dangerous thing," said Alexander Pope in the seventeenth century and it is applicable to the Russia of the nineteenth and to the world at large in this second half of the twentieth century. The Russian intelligentsia, contrary to most statements in this collection of essays, which first appeared in the summer 1960 issue of *Daedalus*, a publication of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, was originally a heterogeneous group of misfits who had acquired some learning, but no sense. The word intelligent (no matter what its origin) was first used in opprobrium both by the masses and by the educated people in Russia in referring to these misfits, who in defiance accepted the term as a compliment and claimed boldly, though rather foolishly, to be "the conscience of the people."

Although in the two decades before the revolution of 1917 a much larger group, including professionals and truly educated people, was identified with the

intelligentsia, at the beginning, that is, in the 1860's and 1870's, the term denoted essentially persons with some education but none of the social graces. After all, manners marked a gentleman in nineteenth-century Russia, as they did in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France; otherwise, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme would make no sense. And it was precisely the lack of manners of the early "intelligenty" which prevented their being accepted socially. The full story of the Russian intelligentsia, if it is worth such a treatment, still has to be written in its proper historical perspective and not in the pseudo-liberal, sugary approach

presented by this work.

The volume is composed of a Foreword by Richard Pipes and twelve essays: "What is the Intelligentsia?" by Martin Malia; "The Pre-Revolutionary Intelligentsia and the Legal Order" by Leonard Schapiro; "The Russian Intelligentsia on the Eve of the Revolution" by Boris Elkin; "The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia" by Richard Pipes; "The Structure of the Soviet Intelligentsia" by Leopold Labedz; "Observations on Soviet University Students" by David Burg; "The Solitary Hero and the Philistines: A Note on the Heritage of the Stalin Era" by Leopold H. Haimson; "The Thaw and the Writers" by Max Hayward; "Soviet Scientists and the Great Break" by David Joravsky; "Ideology and Science in the Soviet Union: Recent Developments" by Gustav Wetter, S.J.; "The Intelligentsia in Communist China: A Tentative Comparison" by Benjamin Schwartz; and "The Situation of the Intelligentsia in Spain Today" by Julian Marias. The latter two seem to be quite out of place. Two documents are appended: (1) Philosophy and the Natural Sciences in the U.S.S.R., a report of a conference on the philosophical problems of science, Moscow, 1958; and (2) "Dr. Zhivago": Letter to Boris Pasternak from the Editors of Novy Mir. A selective glossary of Russian terms and an Index complete the volume.

As can be seen, the major part of the volume is devoted to the Soviet scene in an attempt to show the continuity of history and to prove that there is an intelligentsia of a sort in the Soviet Union, notwithstanding the fact that the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, which had led Russia to the revolution and

perished in it, is still condemned in the U.S.S.R.

One is surprised that a volume of this kind has no Russians among its contributors, although three of the contributors claim to have been born in Russia. There are many outstanding Russian scholars in the western world from among whom a happier choice could have been made. Perhaps this omission accounts for a number of errors, both of historical fact and of translation of Russian terms, which could have been avoided.

LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

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Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin. By DAVID J. DALLIN. Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company [Toronto: Longmans Canada Limited]. 1961. Pp. xii, 543. \$9.25.

LIKE ITS PREDECESSORS, Mr. Dallin's tenth book on Soviet Russia should serve for at least a few years as a useful survey of an important aspect of Soviet affairs. It is valuable as an industrious digestion of the kinds of sources that are likely to be available on the very recent history of a highly secretive country, and it would be unfair to judge it in terms of the kind of historical scholarship that is not yet possible on such matters. The concentration is on the critical period of transition in the U.S.S.R., 1953-6, with a substantial section by way of prologue and a fairly short concluding survey of the years 1957-60. Within the period

of concentration Mr. Dallin has wrung from the periodical press of the Soviet Union and the main western countries as much as one could expect concerning Soviet policy on the NATO powers, the East European Communist states, the Near East, China, and the other Asian states. He has also attempted to relate this shifting and sometimes inconsistent policy to the pressures and personalities within Russia, but with caution, generally refraining from striking speculation in the realm of Kremlinology. He has chosen to treat the questions of military strategy, foreign aid, cultural exchange, and disarmament in a rather allusive, secondary fashion, which leaves quite a bit to be desired, but probably simplifies the problem of conveying an adequate sense of continuity in an inevitably complex narrative. Perhaps this problem would have been considerably reduced had Mr. Dallin refrained from quoting so extensively from official Soviet statements and relating so much of the narrative detail that his researches produced.

The main lines of this survey rest on official statements of undoubted authenticity and newspaper reports that need not be challenged, but in his desire to fill in the details Mr. Dallin sometimes has to fall back on less reliable reports, such as the Israeli figures on Soviet bloc arms shipped to Egypt. He has attempted to supplement open sources by an elaborate programme of confidential interviews, but on the whole these do not seem to have added greatly to our knowledge of Soviet foreign policy. Concerning the more original bits of intelligence gleaned from Mr. Dallin's anonymous informants, one would wish for more assurance that they were graded according to reliability. Since Mr. Dallin seems inclined to take at face value almost all dispatches in non-Soviet newspapers, one wonders whether he has given much attention to this conventional step in the analysis of

the raw sources of intelligence.

In sum, Mr. Dallin has provided a useful, if rather lumbering, survey of Soviet foreign policy in the mid-nineteen-fifties, but he has not overcome the obstacles inherent in the history that lies at the edge of current affairs.

ROBERT H. MCNEAL

University of Alberta

Recent Publications Relating to Canada

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TOBONTO PRESS By MARION MAGEE

NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later and more extended review,

The following abbreviations are used: C.H.R.-Canadian Historical Review: C.J.E.P.S. -Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science; R.H.A.F.-Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française.

See also Canadiana, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; External Affairs, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the University of Toronto Quarterly, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

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Notes and Comments

SURVEY OF MANUSCRIPT MATERIALS

CANADIAN HISTORIANS WILL SOON HAVE AVAILABLE a most welcome research aid: an inventory of the manuscript collections held in Canadian libraries and archives. The project is the result of a decision made by the Archives Section of the Canadian Historical Association in 1959 to conduct a survey of political papers available in the most important Canadian depositories. The product of this initial survey is a fifty-page mimeographed report, now available at most archives and libraries. The report first provides a description of the major archives with a brief list of their publications and general holdings. Then follows a forty-two page list of political papers held in the following institutions: Glenbow Foundation; University of Alberta; the provincial archives in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British Columbia, Ontario, and Nova Scotia; Hamilton Public Library; Toronto Public Library; Queen's University; University of Toronto; Bibliothèque Saint-Sulpice; Archives du Seminaire de Trois-Rivières; Société historique du Saguenay. This listing in itself is valuable. More important, however, is the news that a more complete survey, covering all the depositories in the country is planned under the auspices of the Humanities Research Council with the assistance of the Canada Council and the co-operation of the Public Archives of Canada.

THE WAR OF 1812

To commemorate the 150th anniversary of the war of 1812 the Algonquin Club of Detroit and Windsor is sponsoring a series of six lectures on the war, designated the Quaife-Bayliss Lectures. The lectures began in November, 1961, and are given monthly. Held alternately in Detroit and Windsor, the lectures will emphasize events in the old northwest and Upper Canada. The lecturers and dates of their appearance are: November 3, 1961—Dr. William T. Utter, Denison University; December 1—Dr. W. Kaye Lamb, Public Archives of Canada; January 12, 1962—Professor G. F. G. Stanley, Royal Military College; February 9—Professor C. P. Stacey, University of Toronto; March 9—Dr. Reginald Horsman, University of Wisconsin; May 4—Dr. Thomas D. Clark, University of Kentucky. Information may be secured from Philip P. Mason, Wayne State University, Detroit.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE EDITOR, CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

DEAR SIR:

I have read with great interest the short piece in the March issue by Professors Manning and Galbraith on the appointment of Sir Francis Bond Head. It is fascinating to discover that Howick was one of those who advocated Head's appointment and naturally one would wonder how Howick knew of Head.

Head had some friends at court. His nephew, Lord Erroll had married a daughter of William IV, but there is no indication that Howick's path and that of Erroll had crossed, nor is there any indication that Erroll ever applied either directly or indirectly for a place for Head. It is known that Lord Brougham had written to support Head's application for the post of Poor Law Commissioner, a post which Head did not get. It would be interesting to know if Howick remained on friendly terms with Brougham even after the latter had been dropped

from the Whig inner circle.

The excerpts from the diary as printed do give another clue which might be of some value. It is said by Howick that Glenelg is a supporter of Head's candidacy. Why and how did Glenelg know Head? There is a possibility that Glenelg was a friend of Charles Manners-Sutton, Lord Canterbury. Both men had been raised to the peerage in 1835, Canterbury the 10th of March 1835, and Glenelg 8th of March, 1835. Further Canterbury had been appointed as High Commissioner for settling the claims of Canada in 1835. Canterbury was acquainted with Head because the latter had been active in the rescue of Canterbury's furniture when the latter was Speaker of the Commons during the fire of October 1834 when the old House of Commons was destroyed. Perhaps the connection might be through this event. The answer might be found in the missing Glenelg papers but the mystery still remains. Professors Manning and Galbraith have, however, helped to uncover a bit more evidence in this amazing historical event.

Yours truly, S. W. JACKMAN Bates College

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORY

THE HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION announces the availability of funds to aid archivists, librarians, and researchers interested in investigating topics in economic and business history or in studying the acquisition and handling of archival material, manuscripts, and books in this field. The School's unique resources in these areas will be available to such persons during the summer of 1962. Members of the Business History Group and the staff of Baker Library will be available for consultation and guidance, but applicants who receive assistance will be free to pursue their projects as they think best. The criterion for awarding financial aid will be primarily the extent to which the use of the School's resources can be expected to advance proposed projects. This decision will be made by a committee of faculty members at the Harvard Business School. The amount of aid will be adjusted to the requirements of the individuals who are selected. Inquiries may be addressed to Professor Ralph W. Hidy, Morgan 304, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Soldiers Field, Boston 63, Massachusetts.

PERSONAL NOTES

MCMASTER UNIVERSITY announced recently that Dr. E. T. Salmon, head of the history department since 1954, had been appointed Principal of University College. Succeeding Dr. Salmon is Professor H. W. McCready, a member of the McMaster staff since 1943.

Dr. William Kaye Lamb, Dominion Archivist, received a rare honour in October, 1961, when he was elected a Fellow of the Society of American Archivists. The Fellow award is bestowed in recognition of "significant achievement in the archival profession."

CONTRIBUTORS

ALAN WILSON is an assistant professor in the Department of History, University of Western Ontario.

GEORGE METCALF is a graduate student at the University of London.

G. M. Craic is Associate Professor of History at the University of Toronto.

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- 10. G. O. Rothney, Newfoundland (1959)
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
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
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
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